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DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY 
Introduction 
In the past, most classroom teachers and administrators appeared to 
be indifferent to the legal principles that were applicable to schools. 
The sparcity of cases that appeared before the courts confirms that 
teachers usually conformed to the local custom and rule. Seldom did 
they question the source or the principle underlying these standards. 
Today, teachers are more likely to question these rules and ask for rea-
sons behind these rules and school law. 
The law never is static: it is in a state of constant 
flux. In fact, if one word were all that was allowed to char-
acterize the law since 1941, that word might well be 'change.• 
No quarter century in our nation's history, except perhaps the 
revolutionary period, can match the far-reaching transforma-
tion in the law which occurred between 1941 and 1966 ••• ,; If 
there was a central theme throughout the period, it was the 
role of government in relation to each individual citizen. 
The role of law is to adjudicate between society--all of us--
on the one hand, and each of us--as individuals--on the other. 
In 1941, the rule was simple: the greatest good to the great-
est number. Whether thai is still the rule in 1966 may be a 
subject for speculation. 
School administrators, teachers, and board of education members are 
becoming increasingly aware of the importance of a basic knowledge of 
the legal aspects of public school education. In this regard, Edward c. 
1 Chester M. Nolte, "The Law: An Anchor or a Sail," American School 
Board Journal, CLIII (November, 1966), p. 48. 
2 
Bolmeier, a recognized authority in education and school law, makes the 
following statement: 
The growing importance of school law is reflected by the 
growing interest in school law.--Deep and broad interest in 
school abounds. School officials, school employees, and others 
connected with the public schools want at least to understand 
the basic elements of school law. There is considerable evi-
dence of the growing interest in school law, particularly that 
which is based upon judicial decisions.2 
Part of this awakening is caused by the college preparation for a 
career in education. The preparation of teachers today does not resem-
ble the past preparation over most of the educational history~ 
Today, teachers attend college longer, study more subjects, and are 
better informed than those of any other era. 
Most states are requiring, or have plans for requiring, four years 
of college preparation for certification to teach. Some require five 
years of study for entrance into the field. 
Another factor is the activities of the organized teaching profes-
sion. Teacher organizations have sponsored legislation for the benefit 
of the schools; some have lobbies in state legislatures; some have 
engaged in litigations to redress situations thought to be inequitable. 
Through the teacher-education institutions and teacher organizations, 
knowledge of the importance of school law and its many ramifications has 
spread to the rank and file of teachers in every school. 
According to Remmlein, school-law courses of the past often were 
confined to a reading of publications issued by the state department of 
2 Warren E. Gauerke, School Law (New York, 1965), Foreword by 
Edward c. Bolmeier. 
,, 
3 
educationo3 These courses did not explore judicial interpretations or 
study legal principles underlying either statutes or court decisions. 
Even today, the graduate teacher is little prepared in the field of 
school law, which is of growing importance to him and his profession. 
The study of law, the set of principles which governs every social and 
individual action needs exploring today. As teachers demand more 
rights, work more closely together, and change roles, the knowledge of 
the law should be of increasing importance to each teacher in public 
elementary and secondary schoolss 
Knowledge of the law will advance the professional growth of teach-
ers. Drury and Ray simply state that, "A knowledge of school law is 
basic to the education of any teacher; for the well prepared school 
administrator, it is indispensable .. 11 '* Educators may differ regarding 
many aspects of teaching, but they share one common goal to obtain for 
teaching the recognition which it deserves as a significant profession, 
an objective which depends to a large extent upon the establishment of 
legal sanctions and controls surrounding the profession's members. 
According to Nolte, in recent months, a growing awareness by the 
teaching profession of its new role of power has resulted in a prolif-
eration of new legislation aimed at improving the professional autonomy 
of teacherso5 
3Madaline Ko Remmlein 9 School Law (Danville 9 Illinois, 1950), 
p. vii. 
4: Robert Lo Drury and Kenneth D. Ray9 Principles of School Law 
(New York, 1965) 9 p .. Vo 
5chester Nolte 9 "Teachers Seek Greater Independence Through Legis-
lative Channels," American School Board Journal, CLII (March, 1966) 9 
p .. 7. 
This study is concerned with bringing together some selected legal 
aspects that are of particular significance to teachers today. The pro-
tection of the teacher as he performs his duty is of utmost importance 
to both the public and the profession. 
Statement of the Problem 
This study will attempt to identify some of the more significant 
problems related to teacher rights and responsibilities in the public 
schools that have come before the courts since 1941. More specifically, 
it shall be the purpose of this study to determine the extent to which 
the body of law is changing to determine what implications these chang-
ing patterns have for public school teachers. 
Need for the Study 
There are many reasons why teachers need a knowledge of school law, 
but the most compelling of these are the ones which follow: First, 
knowledge of school law will advance the professional growth of teachers. 
Teachers as a class are provided for in the constitution and 
statutes of the various states, but the rights and responsi-
bilities of teachers as individuals are constantly being 
hammered out in legislative chambers and courtrooms. As 
teaching changes, the rights and responsibilities of the 
individual ~eacher change, both legislatively and 
judicially. 
Secondly, teachers will be better able to avoid involvement in needless 
litigations when they possess a thorough knowledge of school law. Many 
cases involving teachers could have been avoided had the teachers known 
their rights and responsibilities before the law. 
6 
Chester Nolte and John P~ Lynn, School Law~ Teachers (Danville, 
Illinois, 1963), p. 8. 
"A teacher should be able to recognize the circumstances surround-
ing potential litigation in order to avoid unnecessary action. 117 
The body of school law that affects teachers' rights and responsi-
bilities has grown until the analysis on any one question is a formida-
ble task for any teacher. Gauerke states that, "An impressive mass of 
evidence has accumulated from court decisions regarding what can and 
cannot be done legally in the dozens of· predicaments that daily con-
front school personnel and parents." 8 
Nolte states that, 
Teachers are more interested in their legal status than ever 
before because the era of collective bargaining, in the indus-
trial sense, has arrived. The rules of collective bargaining 
are well understood in private industry, and a healthy 
respect for those rules usually produces a realistic agree-
ment. Teachers want higher wages and better working condi-
tions, and they intend to bargain in a manner familiar to 
the industrial union.9 
5 
Teachers today are asking for reasons behind laws and school board 
regulations. This is due partly to the organized teaching profession 
activities the past few years. Therefore 9 there is a need to acquaint 
classroom teachers with some of the legal rights and responsibilities of 
their positions. Although the teacher's position has become increas-
ingly legalistic, amazingly little has been done to inform him of the 
legal rudiments of his position. 
Now, there is a growing awareness that teachers must be 
? Ibid., p .. 8. 
8 Warren E. Gauerke 9 Legal~ Ethical Responsibilities of School 
Personnel (Englewood, No Jo 9 1959), P• 1. 
9chester M. Nolte, "Teachers Face Boards of Education Across the 
Bargaining Table--Legally 9 11 American School Board Journal (June, 191±5), 
p. 11. 
6 
knowledgeable of the law if they are to effectively perform their pro-
fessional duties. Because the teacher's role has been substantially 
extended into broader teaching responsibilities and administrative 
duties, new legal relationships are arising which impose a greater 
obligation on the teacher to possess at least a fundamental knowledge 
of school law. Furthermore, as an active member of a united profession, 
the teacher is increasingly involved in activities related to the evalu-
ation and promulgation of laws governing the teaching profession. Con-
sequently, the teacher is more conscious than ever before of a need to 
know the law as it affects him in his vocation. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to analyze and determine the extent to 
which litigations by the courts that seem to be most controversial and 
urgent at this time are changing in the area of legal rights and respon-
sibilities of teachers. Implications pertaining to courts' decisions 
and current reasoning of the courts will be discussed. From these court 
decisions, recommendations will be made regarding legal rights of 
teachers. 
It is hoped that the information presented in this study will be of 
value to classroom teachers in making decisions regarding their legal 
rights. This study might be of help in avoiding some costly litigations 
that might arise regarding a teacher's legal rights. 
Procedure 
Innumerable situations exist in the public schools where certain 
types of regulations are considered to be reasonable and necessary and 
some unreasonable and unnecessary by others. 
Virtually, all of these situations are controversial and filled 
with potential litigations. American Jurisprudence states this princi-
ple in the following manner: 
••• They (the courts) will not consider whether regulations 
are wise or expedient, but merely whether they are a reason-
able exercise of power and discretion of the board. The rea-
sonableness of regulations is a question of law for the 
courts.10 
The distinction between whether an issue questions the reasonable-
7 
ness or whether it questions the wisdom is sometimes extremely difficult 
for the courts to determine. 
The decision of the courts to pass upon a matter or refuse to do 
so, based upon reasonableness, is not always a fundamental one. In 
commenting on this situation, Remmlein states: 
The lines of demarcation between reasonableness and wisdom 
is sometimes shadowy; the difference may be only a matter of 
terminology. The courts never violate the principle that they 
have jurisdiction to decide whether a rule is wise or unwise. 
Nevertheless, one court may refuse to review a rule which 
another court will pass upon, the one court basing its review 
of the issue on the question of the rule, while the other 
court refuses its consideration of the rule on the basis that 
the question is whether the rule is wise or unwise.11 
Reasonableness is a changing concept. What was considered reason-
able thirty years ago may be considered unreasonable today; an act con-
sidered reasonable in one part of the country may be considered 
unreasonable in another. It becomes necessary to analyze recent cases 
and decisions in an attempt to have clearer understanding of current 
thinking of the courts. 
1047 American Jurisprudence, 326. 
11Madeline K. Remmlein, The Law of Local Public School Administra-
tion (New York, 1953), p. 191-.-------
8 
Court decisions serve as precedents for consideration of subsequent 
cases. These judicial precedents constitute legal principles which can 
become an invaluable aid for teachers in dealing with problems of their 
rights. Remmlein states: 
When a court decision has established a principle, it is a 
precedent for subsequent decisions until overruled, but the 
precedent value of the decision applies only within the same 
jurisdiction. In other jurisdictions, the courts are free to 
make different or contrary decisions, although they are some-
times influenced by the weight of prevailing views in other 
courts.12 
These two criteria, reasonableness and precedent, will be used to 
help acquire a clearer understanding of the current thinking of the 
courts. 
In making this study, a method of approach similar to that used by 
members of the law profession in studying questions of law was adapted. 
In each area covered, pertinent positions of legal textbooks and ency-
clopedias were researched in order.to obtain an outline of the'problems 
presented. References made in these works that were applicable to 
teachers were noted for study and examination. 
After determining the general outline and problems involved in 
each area to be covered, the American Digest System was used to cite 
court cases pertinent to the problems. 
The National Reporter System was used to brief cases pertaining to 
the particular problem being studied. This includes all cases from all 
courts of records in all states and gives the actual opinion of the 
court in each. 
After completing the foregoing steps, Shepard's Citations to cases 
12Ibid., p. 14:. 
9 
was used to determine the present status of cited cases. 
Scope of Study 
The rights and responsibilities of teachers are so broad and general 
that one study could not begin to cover all the legal aspects pertaining 
to this area. This study is limited to the litigious aspects of certain 
specified areas that appear to be the most timely and significant in 
view of existing social conditions. 
Major emphasis of the study will be placed on case law with 
Statutory law being only referred to in general terms. The study refers 
to those cases brought before the higher courts and reported in the 
National Reporter System. 
More specifically, the study is concerned with (1) legal rights of 
teachers concerning contracts and salaries, certification, and leaves of 
absence; (2) academic freedom of teachers in classroom performance, 
libel and tort liability; and (3) the causes for dismissal of teachers. 
The intent will be to summarize the cases and to examine and ana-
lyze the general principles of law gathered from the judicial interpre-
tations. An attempt will be made to identify the implications of these 
principles for those employed as public school teachers. 
CHAPTER II 
LEGAL RIGHTS OF TEACHERS 
The legal and ethical problems of school personnel today may seem 
to have little, if any, connection with the status and organization of 
the past. Today in the United States, school personnel enjoy the legal 
status they have and the professional favor of the general public at 
least in part because of the pioneers in education who met and solved 
problems that confronted them. They worked under conditions and with 
personnel quite different from those existing today. 
In America, early interest in education and teaching included 
training for moral instruction as well as limited intellectual pursuits. 
Because education included more than mere knowledge, problems arose con-
cerning the place of the school in cultivating religious sentiments and 
developing the physical fitness of children. Schools in Ameri.ca played 
a subordinate role in society. Only in rare instances did schools 
achieve a distinct place of their owno Education and religion were so 
closely related in daily living that there was little distinction be-
tween education and religious instruction. 
Teaching in America is what it is today because of influences which 
have been molding it since the founding of the first school on the 
eastern coast. Practices, pertaining to education, were the basis for 
precedents for personnel practices which now are a part of firmly estab-
lished educational philosophy. 
11 
The first action in America to provide public education was brought 
about by the Puritan influence. In 1642, the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts passed an edict which made it mandatory that all children be 
taught to read. Five years later, the legislature of the colony passed 
a law requiring: 
(1) That every town having fifty householders should appoint 
a teacher of reading and writing, and provide for his wages in 
such manner as the town might determine; and 
(2) That every town having one-hundred householders must 
provide (Latin) grammar school to fit youth for the university, 
under a penalty of five pounds for failure to do so. 1 
Certification and Qualification 
A teacher's certificate is a document indicating that the holder 
has met the legal qualifications to follow the teaching profession. In 
some aspects, it might be compared to any other professional's license. 
A lawyer or a physician, upon obtaining a license, is free to open an 
office or practice his profession. The holding of a teaching certifi-
cate does not in itself give the holder the right to demand a position. 
Certification is a process of giving legal sanction to teach. It 
includes all types of licenses, whether permanent or temporary in char-
acter, whether short or long-term, and whether issued on the basis of 
several years of study or as a result of a few weeks or months of prep-
aration or even on the basis of having passed an examination. It 
includes those of an emergency nature as well as those which meet the 
1 . t 2 regu ar requiremen s. 
1 Elwood P. Cubberly, Public Education in~ United States (Boston, 
1919), P• 18 .. 
2Albert J. Huggett and TG M .. Stinnett, Professional Problems of 
Teachers (New York, 1956), p. 412. 
The certificate to teach should be considered within its legal 
framework. Its nature is determined by the statutory details which 
govern its issuance. It is necessary for each state to determine how 
closely the provisions of the governing statute must be followed in 
order to assure the validity of the teaching certificate. 
12 
The teaching certificate is by nature a 11 limi ted11' legal document 
issued by the state, which may be revoked under whatever conditions the 
state wishes to impose. The certificate is merely a license to teach in 
a given state, attesting to the fact that the ho.Ider possesses, at the 
time of issuance, the required qualifications. No absolute rights are 
conferred by the certificate upon the holder. Its continuing validity 
is often dependent upon successful, continuous employment. Teaching only 
intermittently, the certificate may be terminated according to rules 
laid down by the legislature or the state department of education. Upon 
its termination, the certificate is completely annulled and is subject to 
renewal only upon full compliance with certification standards in effect 
at the time of renewal. 
In addition to professional qualifications, there are frequent per-
sonal standards which must be met in order to qualify for a certificate. 
Citizenship is one such requirement, although an exception may be made 
in some states for those teaching foreign languages or an exchange from 
a foreign country. For other teachers, declaration of intent to become 
a citizen will suffice under a few laws, but if a person does not follow 
through and become an American citizen within the specified time, the 
conditionally granted certificate is revoked. 
Age is another requisite, eighteen being the most frequently men-
tioned minimum age for eligibility. An interesting case arose in 
13 
Kentucky concerning this aspect of certificationo 
This action was instituted by the appellee, Ivonell Slone, against 
the appellant, Floyd County Board of Education, and also Palmer Hall, 
Superintendent of Schools and Secretary of the Board of Education of 
Floyd County, to recover salary claimed to be due her for teaching 
school in Floyd County in the Fall of 19510 At the time she started 
teaching, she did not have a teaching certificate as required by 
KRS 161.020, nor was she eligible for such a certificate under 
KRS 161.040 because she was not eighteen years of age~ She taught dur-
ing the 1951-1952 school year both before and after she became eighteen 
years of age on November 18, 1951. 
On October 2, 1951, Miss Slone was paid $143.03 for the sixteen 
days she taught in September$ No further checks were issued until 
January 1 9 1952, because of her statutory ineligibility. On January 1, 
1952, she received checks for the fifth and sixth months of the school 
year, and from which had been deducted the $143003 payment on October 2. 
Miss Slone was paid for the teaching she did after becoming eighteen and 
was issued a certificate. The court ruled that she was entitled to the 
salary for the time taught before she reached eighteen years of ageo 
The trial court's judgment was based on the proposition that, where 
parties to an illegal contract for services are not in equal fault and 
the transaction is only Malum Prohibitum 9 the innocent party may recover 
for value of the service actually renderedo 
This ruling of the trial court, however, was reversed by the Court 
of Appeals, which held that the rule is valid only as to contracts be-
tween individuals; the case before the court was one involving payment 
by public agencies to employeeso The court based its refusal to grant 
the teacher's wages for the period between September 3 and November 18 
on the grounds that: 
In the case at hand Miss Slone was ineligible for the 
office or position of teacher because she held no certificate 
and she failed to qualify for such a certificate under the 
provisions of KRS 161.04:0 during the period for which her 
salary was withheld. It follows that she taught as a volun-3 
teer and was entitled to no compensation during that period. 
14: 
Even though· the board of education may wish to compensate a teacher 
who lacks a certificate, it cannot do so whenever a valid certificate is 
a prerequisite to an enforceable contract. In some instances, board 
members have been held personally liable for illegal payment of public 
monies to unauthorized persons. The board may accept the free services 
of the uncertified teacher,· but it is clearly prohibited from paying 
public money to any teacher other than one who holds a valid teaching 
certificate. 
The power of the state to control licensing of occupational groups 
is implied in the state's power to protect the health, morals, and gen-
eral welfare of its people. The right to control education is one of 
the police powers of the state. Since public schools contribute to the 
betterment of society, educational legislation often reflects the hopes 
and aspirations of the legislative branch of government in exercising 
control over the health, morals, and the general welfare of the social 
order. 
The need for the legislative intent to safeguard the welfare of 
children against unqualified, incompetent, and immoral teachers arises 
as society grows more complex, and the number of teachers grows. 
3Floyd County Board of Education v. Slone, 307 s. w. (2d) 912 
(Kentucky, 1957). 
15 
The chief purpose of teacher certification is to make certain that 
only duly qualified persons come in contact with children. Certifica-
tion also protects public monies, fulfilling the rule that public funds 
shall be paid only to persons licensed to teach. Certification also 
helps to maintain a school system designed to improve society, in that 
teachers must meet a minimum level of quality before the certificate 
will be issued. Furthermore, certification protects the profession of 
teaching by establishing criteria for membership in the profession. 
Thus, certification is seen as protecting (1) the child's right to an 
education under qualified persons, (2) the public fisc, (3) society, by 
establishing minimum standards for teachers, and(~) the profession of 
teaching.~ 
The courts have consistently ruled that states have plenary power 
over educational matters, including the formulation of certification 
standards, the examination of teachers, and the issuance of certifi-
cates. As long as these functions are performed in a reasonable manner, 
the court will not interfere. However, instances have often arisen in 
which persons seeking certificates, believed themselves qualified and 
have brought court action to force the issuance of a certificate. 
A case appeared in the Supreme Court of New York in 196~.5 Miss 
Cassandra Tripp had submitted papers of application for renewal of a 
substitute teacher's license to teach in the city schools. Among other 
things was the requirement of a "satisfactory" on the part of the exami-
nation titled "Physical and Medical test." 
~ M. Chester Nolte and John R. Linn, School~ for Teachers 
(Danville, Illinois, 1963), P• 67. 
5Tripp v. Board of Examiners, 255 N. Y. S. (2d) 526 (1965). 
16 
The petitioner had received a passing grade in the English and 
interview tests, and appeared on May 6, 1964, for her physical and 
medical examination. The test was conducted by two members of the 
medical staff of the Board of Education. The findings of the two 
doctors, in which a third member of the medical staff concurred, was 
that Miss Tripp was found "not fit" for service because of obesity .. 
Such conclusion was based upon the results of the examination which 
showed that the petitioner was 22 years of age, weighed 243 pounds, and 
her height was 69 inches; the standard weight for her height was 174 
pounds. The conclusion thus reached was that the petitioner was 69 
pounds overweight and, therefore, not fit for service. 
The court in ruling stated that since the petitioner with knowledge 
and understanding applied for and took the examination given by respond-
ent as authorized and pursuant to its duty, she was bound by all the 
requirements and conditions relevant thereto. Upon her failure to 
receive the "satisfactory" rating on one phase of the test, the Board of 
Examiners had no alternative other than to certify to the Superintendent 
of Schools that petitioner's extension of validity of her license beyond 
June JO, 1964 be refused. Harsh as it may seem, the court is without 
authority to change the results. Under the circumstances, it cannot be 
said that the board in this case fixed standards which were unreasonable 
with respect to the physical fitness of candidates. The rule of law is 
that unless the standards applied by the appointing body are so clearly 
irrelevant and unreasonable as to palpably be arbitrary and improper, 
they are to be sustained. 
In the certification of teachers and in establishing qualification 
for their employment, courts generally hold that they are without 
17 
authority to change the decisions of administrative bodies empowered by 
statute to make and enforce regulations and standards~ On the other 
hand, however, where the decisions of the board of education or board 
of examiners are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to statute, the 
courts will substitute their discretion for that of the board. This 
6 happened in a New York case. Here, the court directed the Board of 
Examiners of the Board of Education of New York City to certify a 
partially blind music teacher as eligible for appointment as a regular 
teacher. The board had denied him a license to teach because he was 
classified as being legally blind and because he received an unsatisfac-
tory rating in his physical and medical examination due to defective 
vision. The statutes prohibit disqualifying anyone "solely by reason of 
his or her blindness." The court held that the action of the board of 
examiners was aroitrary, capricious, and contrary to statues. This 
judgment was reversed by a three-to-two decision in the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court,, whi'ch was later affirmed in the Court 
of Appeals of New York. 7 The key reasoning of the Appellate Division 
was based on the fact that the state education law provided that the 
New York City Board of Education may prescribe additional or higher 
qualifications beyond state minima for persons employed as teachers. 
The court, in upholding the reasonableness of the New York City 
regulation on visual acuity, said: 
That the determination by the Board of Education with 
respect to vision requirement is reasonable and is clear when 
the multitude of duties of a New York City junior high school 
teacher is considered, e.g., maintaining classroom discipline 
6chavich v. Board of Examiners, 252 N. Y. S. (2d) 718 (196~)0 
7Ibid., 258 N. Y. S. (2d) 677 (1965). 
in a class of approximately JO children, age 12 to 15; prevent-
ing them from fighting or from throwing pencils or erasers at 
each other (of which there have been many instances resulting 
in tort actions against the board of education, involving 
serious injury to pupils); marking roll books, examinations or 
other written work; preventing cheating on examinations; 
writing on the blackboard; fire drills; going up and down 
stairs quickly in emergencies; use of textbooks; keeping the 
room clean; performing other administrative duties during 
non-teaching periods. 
Whether a blind teacher may satisfactorily perform class-
room duties in a particular school may not be for the deter-
mination of the school principal or other supervisory officials, 
as the minority opinion suggests. The statute required the 
board of examiners to determine whether an applicant has the 
ability to perform satisfactorily the duties of a teachero 
The board of education is concerned with the effective perform-
ance1 of duties by a teacher both inside and outside the class-
rooma Althoughmany sympathies are with this petitioner because 
of' his unfortunate affliction, it is my opinion that the 
refusal to certify petitioner as eligible for a teaching 
license was within the power of the board of examiners. 
Revoking Certificate 
State statutes may be silent as to the cause for which the state 
18 
will revoke the certificate, or they may list the causes .. In Oklahoma, 
the State Board of Education has the authority to revoke a teacher's 
certificate after notice and an opportunity for hearing before the state 
board of education for: 
2 .. 
Knowingly and willfully violating any of the provisions 
of the State Aid Law0 8 
Willful violation of any rule or regul~tion of the State 
Board of Education, or of any Federal or State laws, or 
other proper causes, but only after sufficient hearing 
had been given before the State Board ~f Education .. 9 
Can a teacher that has a lifetime teacher's certificate have his 
870 O. S. 1949 Suppa 18-7 (5) o 
970 O. Sm 1949 Supp. 2A-4C9) • 
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license revoked'? This question of law arose in Oklahoma. Mr. L. R. Stegall., 
prior to March 23, 1951, held a lifetime teacher's certificate and was en-
gaged in teaching at the Burbank School in Osage County. On December 19, 
1950, twenty complainants from the Burbank School District appeared before 
the State Board of Education and filed a written complaint with the board 
specifying twelve alleged violations of the Oklahoma laws by Mr. Stegall. 
The complaint requested a hearing thereon and at the conclusion of the 
hearing the State Board of Education recommended that the certificate of 
the teacher be revoked. The State Board of Education then proceeded with 
the hearing and at the conclusion thereof revoked the certificate. 
After such revocation, the action was instituted in the district 
court, asking for a mandatory injunction to reinstate the certificate on 
the ground the action of the board was ar~itrary, unwarranted, and con-
trary to and in excess of the jurisdiction and authority of the board. 
The court in ruling cited an Ohio case which says: 
A license, such as held by appellant, is not a property 
right; it is not a contract, and the Legislature may impose 
new or additional burdens on the licensee and reserves the 
right to alter the license or to revoke or annul it even 10 
though the licensee h~s expended money in reliance thereon. 
No certified person ought to assume he is fully and forever quali-
fied to teach and without need to periodically add to his existing body 
of knowledge and skills. Teaching methods and materials change making 
it imperative that in-service teachers seek personal and professional 
growth. The gradual disappearance of life certificates may be consid-
ered in support of the idea that states intend to require teachers to 
continue to grow in order to keep their certificates in force. 
10 
Hodge!:.!.!!!..· v. Stegall, 206 Oklahoma 161 (1951). 
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The courts have consistently ruled that states have plenary power 
over educational matters, including the formulation of certification 
standards 9 the examination of teachers, and the issuance of certificates~ 
As long as these are performed in a reasonable manner, the courts will 
not interfere. 
Another legal principle that courts of law have consistently 
accepted is that the certificate is prima facie evidence of the compe-
tency of the teacher until such time as it has been proved to be other-
wise. In cases where incompetency is given for non-renewal of 
certificate, it is not necessary for the teacher to prove his 
11 
competency. 
In Oregon, an action was brought to require the state board of 
education to issue a five-year teacher's certificate to one who had 
earlier been convicted of burglary while holding the position of night 
policeman5 The state board of education refused on the ground the 
applicant was lacking in good moral character~ The testimony indicated 
that in 1953 the plaintiff was convicted of the charge of burglary, 
served eighteen months of a two-year sentence, and was paroled~ In 
1956, he entered East Oregon College of Educationa In 1958 9 he was 
restored to full-citizenship rightso In 1960 9 he was granted a one-year 
license and he taught under this license while finishing his fourth year 
of collegeo The sole evidence regarding his character concerned the 
conviction mentionedo The court, ruling in favor of the board, stated: 
The power to decide such an issue was delegated by the legis-
lature to the Board of Education, therefore, as previously 
pointed out, the courts are not permitted to substitute their 
11 
Pope Vo Hackett, 156 Paco (2d) 299 (Wyoo, 19~5)o 
21 
judgment for that of the Board where there is substantial 
evidence to support the agency.12 
Since the state possesses the power to issue certificates, it fol-
lows that they also have the power to revoke them .. 13 A license is, in 
its very nature, revocable. A person that holds a teaching certificate 
does so at the pleasure of the issuing agency. 
Contracts and Salaries 
Contracting is seldom a simple matter, but the particular laws 
governing the teacher's contract create significantly special problems~ 
Many legal questions face the teacher. Must a contract be in writing? 
Can the rules and regulations of the board of education be changed and 
affect an existing contract? Is the school superintendent a proper 
party with whom to contract? These and other principles of law govern-
ing the teacher's rights and responsibilities in contracting is the 
concern here. 
It is obviously impossible to understand the nature of the rights 
and responsibilities of teachers without an understanding of the legal 
nature of the organization for which they work, namely, the school 
district. This employer has characteristics not possessed by other 
employers. It is subject to a wide variety of obligations and restric-
tions entirely foreign to employers in private enterprise. Technically, 
it leads a precarious and uncertain existence, depends for its support 
12Application ..2!, Bay, 378 P •. (24) 558 (Oreg., 1963) .. 
13Marrs v .. Matthews, 270 SQ W. 586 (Texas, 1925). 
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on the whim of legislative bodies, and has not even an inherent right to 
l "f 14 i e. 
The school distr;i.ct is a creation of the legislatures of the vari-
ous states. The constitutions provide generally that the legislature 
shall provide for the establishment of a uniform and efficient system of 
public schools. These general constitutional provisions impose upon the 
respective legislatures the obligation for setting up and administering 
the public schools of the states. School districts, therefore, are 
agents of the state that are created by the legislature to carry out the 
constitutional mandate. It is clear that school districts are state and 
not local organizations. 
Since local school districts are state agencies, it follows that 
members of the local boards of education are state officers rather than 
local officers. They have only such power as the legislature, by spe-· 
cific law, confers upon them, and those powers which are implied for the 
purpose of enabling the boards to carry out their legislative powers. 
Boards of education are accorded wide discretion of power in the dis-
charge of their duties. 15 So-called local boards may employ teachers, 
purchase supplies, establish reasonable rules and regulations for the 
management of the school system. Local boards, being officials of the 
state, are subject to all the constitutional and legislative restric-
tions which have been placed upon them. Under statutes prescribing 
methods for appointment of school teachers and requiring the execution 
of a contract in writing on behalf of board, both a valid appointment 
14Robert R., Hamilton, Legal Rights and Liabilities of Teachers 
(Laramie, Wyoming, 1956), p. 1. 
15 Johnson v. Wert, 279 S. W. (2d) 274 (Ark., 1955). 
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and a contract are essential to entitle teachers to a position. 16 
The relationship between a teacher and the school authorities is 
created by contract. A contract may be defined as an agreement between 
two parties to do or not to do certain things. The teacher's contract 
of employment or contract of hire is an agreement whereby the services 
or labor of a teacher are stipulated to be given over a specific period 
of time for a certain salary and other benefits. From a valid teaching 
contract, reciprocal obligations arise which are recognized and enforce-
able under the law. One whose contractual rights are threatened or 
ignored may seek the aid of the courts to enforce the fulfillment of the 
employment agreement. 
The rules of law governing the ordinary contracts of the business 
world also apply to contracts for the employment of teachers except to 
the extent that state constitutions or statutes regulate such contracts. 
As might be expected, most legal problems stem from the contract areas 
controlled by constitutional and statutory provisions. Teachers and 
boards of education have great difficulty keeping informed of statutory 
changes governing teaching contracts because statutes vary from state to 
state, are subject to frequent change, are often mandatory in nature, 
and usually cannot be waived. A violation of statutory provisions may 
void the contract of employment and abrogate the attempted contractual 
relationship entirely. Therefore, the teacher must learn the law 
governing contracts and act in accordance therewith. 
In 1958, the National Education Association reviewed 715 court 
cases in which teachers were litigants between 19~2 and 1957. 
~ ( . . Iches v. Costlow, 193 Atl. 287 Pa., 1937) •. 
24 
One-half of the cases were concerned with questions related to teachers' 
contracts and tenure rights. 17 The comparatively large number of cases 
involving the contractual relationship of teachers and boards of educa-
tion make this one of the most significant legal problem areas confront-
ing the public school teacher. Clearly, teachers do not comprehend the 
nature, value, and limitations of their contracts of employment. It is 
also apparent that the local boards that contract with teachers are 
sometimes unaware of their duties and legal limitations in contracting. 
Elements of Valid Contract 
Under the common law, all contracts possess certain essential ele-
ments upon which their validity depends. A valid contract, including 
the contract for teaching services, has five basic elements. The 
absence of any one element will render the contract null and of no 
effect. These five elements are as follows: (1) The contract must be 
between competent parties; (2) The contract must be based upon mutual 
assent; (3) The contract must contain a valid consideration; (4) The 
contract must contain rights and liabilities sufficiently defined to be 
enforceable; and (5) The contract must be of such a nature as not to be 
18 
prohibited by statute or common law. 
Board Action Necessary to Validate Contracts 
The board of education, although made up of individual members, 
17National Education Association, Plaintiffs and Defendants-School 
Teachers in Court (Washington, 1958), p. 58. 
18 . ( Newton Edwards, The Courts~~ Public Schools Chicago, 
1947), p. 171. 
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exists only as a legal unit and legally can act as a board. The several 
individual members of the board have no more authority to act on behalf 
of the district than does any other individual not a member of theboard. 
Authority to enter into contracts with teachers cannot legally be 
delegated to the superintendent or any other employee or official. The 
superintendent or individual member of the board may interview and 
recommend teachers to the full board, but the final action must be by 
the latter. It is sometimes said that there has been "no meeting of the 
minds". There is no valid contract until the board as such acts affirm-
atively on the recommendations. 19 
It may be laid down as a general rule that when several persons are 
authorized to perform a public service or to do an act of a public na-
ture as an organized body which required deliberation, they should be 
convened in a body in order that they may have the counsel and advice of 
every member, although they may not all be of the same opinion concern.,.. 
ing the matter at hand. 20 Individual and independent action, even by a 
majority of the members of the board, will not suffice. A public body, 
such as a school board, consisting of several persons authorized to per-
form acts of a public nature and to which public duties are intrusted, 
such as the employment of teachers for the public schools, should per-
form such duties as a board. To do so, it is imperative that all should 
meet or at least be notified of such meetings and have an opportunity to 
meet, and consult relative to the employment of such teachers before a 
valid contract can be entered into by them binding the district. 21 
19Taggart v. School District No • .!, 188 Pac. 908 (Oregon, 1925). 
20Ryan v. Humphries, 150 P. 1106 (Cklahoma, 1915). 
21School District No. l2, v. Shelton, 109 Pac. 67 (Ckla., 1910). 
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It is a firm rule that a board of education, in entering into con-
tracts with employees, must do so in light of the statute. A New York 
case illustrates this principle. A superintendent brought an action to 
recover damages for breach of a written contract. The Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, held that statutory power of city board of education 
to appoint superintendent of school for term not to exceed five years 
did not empower board to enter into written contract with the superin-
tendent for such services. 
In ruling, the court had this to say: 
In our opinion the power of the board of education 
pursuant to section 2507 of the Education Law, to appoint 
a superintendent of schools for a term not to exceed five 
years, does not empower the board to enter into a written 
contract with the superintendent for such services. Sec-
tion 2507 is derived from former section 2565 of the Edu-
cation Law. Prior to 1948, the board of education of a city 
had no power to contract with a superintendent of schools; 
it could only appoint a superintendent of schools to serve 
at.;i.ts pleasure, with the right in the superintendent to 
resign by giving written notice (L. 1917, Ch. 786, 8869). 
In 1948 the Legislature added to the predecessor section 
2515 the clause permitting an appointment for a term not 
to exceed five years (L. 1948, Ch. 111). The Legislature 
did not recind the right of the superintendent to resign 
on written notice; nor did the Legislature expressly con-
fer the power to contract with a school superintendent, 
found elsewhere in the Education Law (cf, Education Law, 
§1711). A board of education may enter into such contracts 
only when permitted to do so by statute •••• 22 
A number of contractual problems have arisen from statutes provid-
ing for automatic renewal of employment contracts of teachers which have 
been enacted by several states. Oklahoma, for example, has an automatic 
renewal statute which provides that: 
A board of education shall have authority to enter into 
22Smith v. Helbraun, 251 N. Y. S. (2d) 531 (1964). 
written contracts with teachers for the ensuing fiscal year 
prior to the beginning of such year. If prior to April 10th, 
a board of education has not entered into a wr.itten contract 
with a regularly employed teacher or notified him in writing 
by registered mail that he will not be employed for the 
ensuing fiscal year, and if, by April 25th 9 such teacher has 
not notified the board of education in writing by registered 
mail that he does not desire to be re-employed in such school 
district for the ensuing year, such teacher shall be consid-
ered as employed on a continuing contract basis and on the 
same salary schedule used for other teachers in the school 
district for the ensuing fiscal year, and such employment and 
continuing contract shall be binding on the teacher and on 
the school district.23 
A case came before the courts in Cklahoma concerning the continu-
2~ ing contracts. On the 27th day of June, 1955, defendant, Board of 
27 
Education of Lacy, met and decided to conduct two schools at D-5 school 
district in Kingfisher County, Cklahoma, and by a resolution dated that 
day elected Mrs. George to serve as a teacher in the school district. 
Mrs. George was further notified of the election by a copy of the reso-
lution signed by the board and delivered to her. 
As a result of this arrangement, Mrs. George felt that the board 
obligated itself to hire her for the school year 1955-1956. She further 
stated that she relied upon the election and notification by the board 
and was ready to teach but was refused service. Wherefore she sued for 
$3,600 and whatever other relief may seem to the court as equitable and 
just and the cost of the action. 
The plaintiff argued that the continuing contract of employment 
phase of the statutes controls the issue superseding the statutory pro-
visions requiring a written contract and the approval of such contract 
23 
70 o. s. 1961 (6-1). 
2~George v. Joint School District~· 2.~ Kingfisher County, Ck.la. 
317 P. (2d) 251 (1957). 
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by the county superintendent of schools after the beginning of the new 
fiscal year. 
The court did not agree. In the absence of a contract of employ-
ment, it is unnecessary to determine the applicability of the continuing 
contract. The petition does not show or allege any written teacher's 
contract as required by statutes. Therefore, under the circumstances, 
there is not a case for action. 
In Missouri, where the statutes provide that failure to notify a 
teacher of his non-employment by April 15th would automatically consti-
tute re-employment, an interesting case came before the court. A board 
of education, not certain of finding another teacher, hesitated to dis-
miss a teacher. In so doing, it neglected to notify the teacher by the 
appointed date. During the summer, another teacher was employed. On 
the first day of school in the fall, both teachers appeared at school, 
together with the board of education. 
The board members informed the students they were to obey the 
second teacher. The board then sought an injunction against the first 
teacher to vacate the school. The court in ruling stated that the first 
teacher was entitled to the position inasmuch as the board had failed to 
follow the letter of the law in serving notice before the date speci-
fied. The court further noted that the plight in which the board was in 
was of their own failure to proceed in accordance with statutes of the 
state; to follow the statutes in making the contract was mandatory, and 
not open to the discretion of the board .. 25 
25community School District 27 of Gasconade County Ve Brinkmann, 
233 S. W. (2d) 768.(Mo .. , 1950). 
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Statutes which control the legal relationship between the board of 
education and the teacher are not often mentioned in the contract it-
self. It is taken for granted that the board and teacher are aware of 
such statutory provisions and conduct themselves accordingly. 
State departments of education, by virtue of state statutes or 
state constitutional provisions, are charged with the responsibility of 
public education and enforcement of the school laws. These state 
agencies are limited in their power by the legislature that creates 
them, but they usually possess explicit or implied power to prescribe 
rules and regulations for the public schools. State departments of 
education have been given power to determine the general educational 
policies, particularly in respect to teachers' qualifications, the edu-
cational curriculum, and supervision. 
To determine the extent to which the rules and regulations of a 
state education department become binding on a teacher, it is necesary 
to examine the law of that particular state. A state department of edu-
catipn may be enjoined on the ground that it has gone beyond the power 
conferred on it by the law of the state. When the rules or regulations 
of the board of education do not conform to statutory provisions, it 
will be of no effect. However, courts will not always uphold the rules 
and regulations of state boards of education as the following case will 
indicate. 
This case came before the court in Delaware whereby it was provided 
in a teaching contract that the teacher "agreed to observe and enforce 
the school law of the State of Delaware, the rules and regulations of 
the State Department of Education, and the Mount Pleasant Special 
School District. 11 At the time the teacher signed the contract of 
JO 
employment, she was handed a pamphlet containing the rules and regula-
tions of the school district, but not a copy of the rules and regula-
tions of the state board of education. The rules and regulations of the 
state board of education provided for teacher's salary on a per diem 
basis but the teacher's contract clearly indicated that a monthly basis 
of payment was contemplated by the parties. In determining that the 
regulations of the state board were not a part of the teaching contract 
in this regard, the court had this to say: 
Would a reasonable person in the light of such language 
and all the surrounding circumstances here mentioned, believe 
that she was being charged with knowledge of regulations of 
the State Board dealing with compensation not made available 
to her and which she had never seen: To me the use of the 
words 'observe and enforce' connote an agreement bearing on 
the conduct of a school teacher in the execution of her duties 
such as--for instance, to agree to observe all regulations 
requiring teachers to behave themselves with decency both in 
and out of school, of these deal with discipline, standards of 
teaching and a hundred and one other subjects that might 
readily come to min4; but not with those governing com~~nsa-
tion already clearly set forth in the contract itself. 
Whether the rules and regulations of a state board or department 
are a part of the teacher's contract of employment may only be deter-
mined after careful consideration of a particular factual situation, and 
the power of the board to make such rule or regulation as evidenced by 
the language of the particular state statute. 
Ratification of Invalid Contracts 
There is a rule of law to the effect that in certain circumstances 
a contract which is invalid in its inception may subsequently become 
valid if the parties who are contracting ratify it. Ratification may be 
26state ex. rel. Hirst v. Black, 8JAo (2d) 678 (Delaware, 1950). 
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expressed or implied. Express ratification consists of a later specific 
agreement between the contracting parties that the contract shall be 
valid. Implied ratification occurs when both parties proceed to act on 
the contract as though it was valid at the time formulated. There can-
not be any legal ratification that does not conform to mandatory statu-
tory provisions. If a statutory law requires teachers' contracts to be 
in writing, oral contracts are invalid. 27 An invalid contract of 
employment cannot be validated in its entirety by part performance and 
t f 1 ' 'f' d th ' 28 paymen o sa aries as speci ie erein. 
If a contract is defectively executed and therefore voidable, it 
may be turned into a contract by ratification; if the contract is void, 
however, it cannot be ratified. Ratification of a defective and void-
able contract may be accomplished by subsequent action by the board when 
it follows the proper procedure. A voidable contract may be considered 
29 ratified when a board accepts partial performance. 
An important principle of law is that a contract which is void 
because of legal disability of one of the parties cannot be ratified; 
whereas, one which is voidable because of defective procedure can be 
ratified even by acceptance of partial performance. For example, a 
teacher employed without a certificate has a void contract and if dis-
missed before the end of the contract period has no recourse. However, 
if she had been properly certified but employed by a defective procedure, 
27Riegel v. Holmes, 171 N. E. (2d) 553 (Ohio, 1960). 
28 
Dungan v. Independent Schodl District No. 39, 77 P. (2d) 1117 
( Okla:. , 1938). 
29williams v. Board of Education of Woodward, 171 P. (2d) 120 
( Okla. , 1941). 
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the voidable contract is enforceable as a whole. 
Where the statutes prescribe a mode of contracting to the exclusion 
of all other modes, the mode prescribed becomes the measure of power, 
and there can be no ratification inferred from acts recognizing the 
legality of the contract. 30 
If the contract is one which the board could not enter into legally 
in the first instance and cannot, therefore ratify, the teacher cannot 
recover the value of services which may have been rendered under it.Ji 
The reasoning on .. ·tnis point is the same as that advanced for refusal to 
allow recovery for services rendered by a teacher who does not hold a 
teacher's certificate.32 
Sometimes the courts will allow recovery on invalid contracts on 
the theory that, even though the contract is invalid, the board should 
pay for the services rendered. However, such ratification will ordi-
narily be only for the time of performance, and not to the full extent 
of the contract. An Oklahoma court in ruling on the question of the 
ratification of an oral contract, when the statutes called for contract 
to be in writing had this to say: 
We hold, therefore, that the ratification herein extends 
only to the period of performance, and such oral contract can-
not be enforced in its entirety. The plaintiff having been 
paid for the services actually rendered by him, the defendant's 
liability has been settled in full and the plaintiff cannot 
recover in this action.33 
JOFlo}d County Board .2f Education v. Slone, 307 S. W. (2d) 912 
(Ky., 1957. 
31Goose River Bank v. Willow Lake School Township, 44 N. w. 1002 
(N. D .. , 1890). --
32Wayne County v. Hopper, 75 So. 766 (Miss., 1917). 
33Williams v. Board of Education .2f Woodward, 189 Okla. J42 (1941) 0 
Rights of Teachers Under Contract When 
School is Closed 
According to the weight of authority, a teacher is entitled to full 
payment of her salary while the school is closed because of the preva-
lence of an epidemic. While it is settled that if performance of a con-
tract is made impossible because of an act of God or a public enemy, the 
district is relieved from liability under its contracts, but the preva-
J4 lence of an epidemic does not fall within that category. It is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to determine as an abstract matter just what 
acts of God will relieve one of contractual liability. It would hardly 
admit of doubt that an epidemic is an act of God, and under the general 
rule should relieve the district of liability. The opposite conclusion 
can be justified, however, on the ground that the possibility of an 
epidemic is one which may be reasonably foreseen, and· unless the dis-
trict expects to assume the risk of an epidemic rendering it necessary 
to close the schools, it should provide against the risk in the teacher's 
contract. A court in Oklahoma in ruling on a case of this nature had 
this to say: 
In our judgment, the board of education might have stipu-
lated that the plaintiff should have no compensation during the 
time the schools. were closed on account of the prevalence of a 
contagious disease, but not having done so, and the suspension 
being temporary, it cannot deny him compensation for the time 
lost on account of the temporary suspension from duty.35 
Some courts draw a distinction between cases in which the schools 
are closed by health officials and those closed by the board of 
34carthage v. Gray, 37 N. E. 1059 (1910). 
35Board of Education of Hugo v. Couch, 162 P. 485 (Okla., 1917). 
education, denying recovery by teachers in the former and permitting it 
in the latter. The former is based on the theory that teachers know 
that health officials have authority under the law to protect the public 
health by closing the schools if that seems necessary. The contract of 
the teacher is entered into with that understanding and that she, there-
fore, assumes the risk of the schools being closed. A case in Illinois 
appeared before the courts concerning this. The teacher was regularly 
employed to teach in the school district. Due to the prevalence of an 
influenza epidemic, the school was ordered closed for two months by the 
board of health. The board refused to pay her salary for the time the 
school was closed on the grounds that the rule where schools are closed 
by state boards of health does not apply where schools are closed by 
school authorities. The court in ruling had this to say; 
Here the school was closed for the protection of lives 
and health of the people in the community against the spread 
of a contagious epidemic, and whether closing was by board of 
health or school authorities, it was lawful. That the school 
might be closed on that account was a contingency that might 
happen, and whether the school officials took the initiative, 
or whether it was done by the board of health does not alter 
the rights of the parties to the contract. It works no hard-
ship on anyone to req4ire the school authorities to insert in 
the contract of employment a provision exempting them from 
liability in the event that school is being closed on account 
of contagious epidemic.36 
Courts will not insert by construction, for the benefit of one of 
the parties, a condition which they have omitted from their own contract~., 
Board Rules and Regulations as Part of 
the Teacher's Contract 
Frequently, teachers will sign contracts without any specific 
36Phelps v. School District, 134 N. Em 312 (Ill., 1922). 
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knowledge of the existence or nature of the rules and regulations of the 
board. One should know that a board has the authority to adopt reason-
able rules and regulations with which the employee is obligated to 
comply. 
A teacher should understand that upon signing a contract, he is 
bound by the laws of the state and the rules of the state board of edu-
cation and the local board. The local board has inherent power to make 
reasonable rules. No statute is needed specifically to confer such 
power. The only restrictions placed on these rules are that (1) they 
must be reasonable and (2) they must be within the legal framework of 
the state. 
In Texas, where a school board had a policy which provided that 
employees of the school district shall not be commercially involved in 
the liquor traffic, discharged a teacher who, after signing the contract 
but before school opened, purchased a liquor store. The court, in 
affirming the right of the school board to discharge said teacher had 
this to say: 
The general rule is that regulations and operational 
policies adopted by a school board prior to making a contract 
with a teacher form a part of the contract, and the teacher's 
employment is subject thereto. 
Since the records reflect that it was the school district's 
policy that a teacher be not involved in the liquor traffic, 
prior to the date of the plaintiff's contract. 
It also seems to be the law that a regulation adopted 
after a teaching contract is made becomes a part of it and the 
employment is subject thereto.J7 
In Oklahoma, one elected as a member of the legislature was 
37Romeike v. Houston Independent School District, J68 s. W. (2d) 
895 (1963). 
)6 
discharged by the board, on the ground that he could not, thereafter, 
legally be employed as a teacher, and an action was brought to compel 
the board to pay his salary as a teacher. The statutes provided that no 
member of the legislature shall be interested in any contract with the 
state or any of its subdivisions. 
On October~, 196), the Attorney General of Oklahoma issued his 
official opinion in which he held in effect, among other things_, that no 
member of the legislature may receive compensation out of the general 
fund of any school district to which there had been appropriated funds 
by the State Board of Education derived from state aid. 
The court in ruling had this to say: 
Under the facts here presented we have concluded that 
justice, and the avoidance of confusion and disorder, requires 
us to grant a writ of mandamus for and during the accomplish-
ment of the duties of the parties under their written contract 
entered into on July 1 1 196). 
It is our further conclusion that the plaintiff should not 
be disqualified, under the situation here presented, from seek-
ing employment in any school in the public school system of the 
state for the school year 196~-1965 and subsequent years because 
of membership in the Twenty-Ninth Legislature (196)) but if he 
e ects to continue serving in his profession as a public 
school teacher it should be understood that subsequent appro-
priations for state aid by the Legislature, of which he is a 
member, will for reasons set forth in this opinion invalidate 
any subsaquent school teaching contract of his which depends 
upon state aid for its validity.3tl 
In a New York case decided in 1951, a group of teachers questioned 
the authority of the board of education to assign them certain 11 inciden-
tar' duties not expressly covered in their contracts. This question was 
raised after a request by the teachers for a salary increase was denied. 
Upon the recommendation of the superintendent of schools, the board 
)8 
State v. Board of Education of Dependent School District No. D-38 
389 P. (2d) 356 (Oklah-;;;a, 1963). ~ 
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passed a resolution to the effect that every teacher be required to give 
service outside of regular classroom instruction as one of the inciden-
tal obligations under his contract. The teachers sued the board of 
education seeking annulment of the resolution. The teachers' ,suit was 
unsuccessful. After calling attention to the statutory provisions con-
ferring upon the board power to establish rules and regulations, the 
court made it clear that the hours of service of teachers may not neces-
sarily coincide with the hours of instruction in the classroom. It is 
not legally required that the hours fixed be the same for all teachers. 
The New York court used the following significant language which will 
probably be quoted widely by the courts in other states should the ques-
tion arise: 
The hours established in any case must be reasonable. 
The broad grant of authority to fix "duties" of teacher is 
not restricted to classroom instruction. Any teaching duty 
within the scope of the license held by a teacher may prop-
erly be imposed. The day in which the concept was held that 
teaching duty was limited to classroom instruction ha_s long 
since passed. Children are being trained for citizenship, 
and the inspiration and leadership in such training is the 
teacher. Of course, it is recognized that any bylaw of the 
board outlining teachers' duties must stand the test of 
reasonableness. Any teacher may be expected to take over a 
study hall; a teacher engaged in instruction in a given area 
may.be expected to devote part of his day to student meetings 
where supervision of such teacher is, in the opinion of the 
board, educationally desirable. Teachers in the fields of 
English and Social Studies and undoubtedly in other areas 
may be expected to coach plays; physical training teachers 
may be required to coach both intramural and inter-school 
athletic teams; teachers may be assigned to supervise educa-
tional trips which are properly part of the school curriculum. 
The band instructor may be required to accompany the band if 
it leaves the building. These are illustrations of some of 
the duties which boards of education have clear legal justifi-
cation to require of their employees. A board is not required 
to pay additional compensation for such services. The duty 
assigned must be within the scope of teachers' duties. 
Teachers may not be required, for instance, to perform janitor 
services, police services (traffic duty), school bus driving 
service, &c. These are not •teaching duties.' The board may 
not impose upon a teacher a duty foreign to the field of 
instruction for which he is licensed or employed. A board may 
not, for example, require a mathematics teacher to c9ach 
intramural teams. Where the service is not part of the duties 
of the teacher, there is nothing to prevent th.e board from 
arranging for such extra service and paying for the same in 
its discretion. It is pointed out that section 1709, subdi-
vision 16, of the Education Law specifically notes that the 
board may utilize teachers for playground activities and may 
pay them extra for so doing. These are some of·the activities 
that are part of instruction but, by their very ~ature, may be 
performed after the close of the regular school session. The 
athletic program, for instance, in many instances take place 
under such circumstances. It has, nevertheless, over the 
years been always regarded as part of the school curriculum 
(see Commissioner's Regulations section 155). As has hereto-
fore been stated9 in department publications, •athletic activi-
ties are a definite and integral part of the instruction 
program in physical education.• Coaching in athletic sports 
is teaching .. It, therefore, does not follow that because an 
activity is conducted after regular class hours, it is not 
part of the regular curriculum.,.'.39 
The implications of the educational philosophy expressed by the 
court in New York are tremendously significant to both teachers and 
38 
boards of education. The effect of the court's decision is to restrict 
the obligations of teachers under their contracts to duties related more 
or less closely to the teachers• subject matter areas. Under the theory 
of this case, teachers in certain subject matter areas would not, for 
example, be legally required to supervise school :pirc'ni'cs , take tickets 
at football or basketball .games, or perform other similar duties in no 
way related to their respective fields, of instruction. In the implica-
tions of the decision above quoted, boards of education would be obli-
gated to either pay additional compensation for the performance by 
teacher of duties unrelated to their subject matter fields, or hire 
additional employees to perform the innumerable detail tasks so essen-
tial to the successful ongoing of the school. 
39Parrish Vm ~' ·106 N. Y. s. (2d) 577 (New York, 1951). 
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A somewhat similar problem arose in the Sacramento City sc.hools. A 
male teacher, who had recently obtained tenure, along with other male 
teachers had been required to attend certain non-classroom activities 
and act in a supervisory capacity., The activities the teachers were 
asked to supervise were school football and basketball games carried on 
under the auspices and control of the school authorities. These games 
were held at places other than the school premises .. Six of these ath-
letic assignments were made to each male member of the faculty during 
the school year, three football games and three basketball games .. At 
the beginning of the school year, each teacher was permitted to select 
the three football games he would prefer to supervises At the end of 
the football season, he was then permitted to select the three basket-
ball games he would prefer to attend in a supervisory capacity. To the 
extent possible, the requests of the teachers were complied with in 
scheduling their assignments .. Their duties consisted of maintaining 
order in the student section of the stands, sitting in the student sec-
tion9 reporting disturbances to the police if necessary, preventing 
spectators from going on the playing field 9 and such other similar 
duties as the circumstances may demande The teacher in question 
objected to the assignment and went to court for a determination of his 
rights and duties under his contract of employment in the high school .. 
He complained that the duties at the athletic contests were (1) in the 
nature of police work 1 (2) unprofessional, (3) foreign to his field of 
instruction, and (4) imposed unreasonable hours upon him, and therefore 
were not within the scope of his teaching duties required by his con-
tract~ The California court was not impressed with the teacher's com-
plaint., The court ruled that the teacher was obligated to perform the 
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duties described as part of his duties under contract despite the fact 
that duties of this nature are not specifically enumerated in the agree-
ment between the teacher and the board~ The court in ruling had this to 
say: 
We are convinced that the school board had the right to 
assign plaintiff to assist in the supervision of any and all 
athletic or social activities, wherever held, when conducted 
under the auspices of the Sacram$'l'l"to Senior High School, or 
any class or organization thereof 9 provided such assignment 
is made impartially and without discrimination against plain-
tiff with relation to the other teachers employed at said 
schools It must be borne in mind that the respondent school 
authorities are entrusted with the responsibility of adminis-
tering the affairs of the school district and that as stated 
in Bates Vo Board of Education, 72 Po 907: 9The public 
schools are not created 9 nor are they supported 9 for the 
benefit of the teachers therein 9 as implied by the contention 
of the appellant 9 but for the benefit of the pupils and the 
resulting benefit to their parents and the community at 
largee 1 And as stated in Knickerbocker v. Redlands High 
School District 9 122 Po (2d) 289: 'The whole system of 
legislation regarding the educational machinery is based 
upon the consideration of the welfare and best inter.est of 
the childreno The proper regulation of tenure in office 
and other rights of teachers were also properly considered 
and regulated 9 but the fundamental purpose and primary 
objective of the legislature was the consideration of the 
welfare of the childrene This fundamental purpose must not 
be lost sight of by courts in the construction of legisla-
tion dealing with an educational systema 1 
We believe that respondent school authorities had the 
right under the law and the contract with appellant to assign 
appellant to attend and to assist in supervising these ath-
letic contests., We believe that the presence of teachers at 
such contests should be helpful not only to the student but 
that the school authorities had the right to determine that 
such duties should be performed by the teachers assigned 
theretoe Have the parents not the right to expect, and in-
deed9 to demand that all such school activities be under the 
supervision of the school authorities? If not 9 then who is 
to be in control? The answer to these questions seem obvious 
Gee~ Our courts have repeatedly enunciated the principle 
that they will not lightly interfere with the exercise of the 
functions entrusted by law to the school authoritiess~O 
40 
McGath Vs Burkhard 9 280 Po (2d) 864 (Califs 9 1955)e 
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The court recognized that so-called extracurricular duties are 
essential to a complete educational program, and that the supervision of 
such activities is part of a teacher's legal responsibility despite the 
fact that the duties were not spelled out in his contract~ The rule is 
educationally sound, and a teacher is protected by the legal require-
ment that any outside assignment must be reasonable and that assignments 
be impartially distributed among the teacherso 
Salary Schedule 
Salary schedules which provide rates of compensation for teachers 
in various classifications have been widely adopted either under stat-
utes expressly requiring them~ or under general authority of local 
school boards to fix the compensation of teacherso Since salary sched-
ules normally become part of a teacher's contract 9 obviously the admin-
istration of salary schedules vitally affects a teacher's financial 
rights under his contracto 
Courts have uniformly sustained the legality of sala:i'y schedules if 
the classifications meet the test of reasonableness0 Arbitrary and un-
reasonable classifications uniformly incur judicial displeasure@ How-
ever, a salary schedule which provides complete uniformity among 
teachers of like experience and performing similar services 9 rewards the 
inefficient teachers equally with the efficient 9 and thus provides no 
incentive for diligent effort and the development of professional abili-
ties& The courts have recognized this and have sustained various types 
of salary schedule provisions designed to give recognition to differ-
ences in individual apility and performanceo 
It is also generally held that minimum salary laws are just what 
their name implies. They are not considered as maximums. In New York, 
where the statute required boards of education to adopt schedules fixing 
minimum mandated salaries, a school board, having adopted such a sched-
ule and finding itself with additional funds 9 granted cost-of-living 
adjustments to all teachers in the first four years of teaching. An 
action was brought by certain teachers on the ground that the board had 
no authority to deviate from the salary schedule as respects to one par-
ticular group of teacherso In ruling 9 the court had this to say: 
Herein, the board adopted a schedule that fully c.omp'.lied 
with the statute and in no manner discriminated among those 
in any class or group set forth in the scheduleoQ The board 
then found itself with additional fundse It decided to use 
the money in an attempt to attract new teachers .. It adopted 
a revised schedule applicable to those in the first four 
years of teaching in all three educational groups .. The cost 
of living adjustments were graduated from $~00 to $100 
annually with the larger amount going to those in the first 
and second year of serviceo We conclude that this was the 
right of the Board and petitioners, who are concededly 
receiving the statutory minimum salaries for their respective 
gro~ps t¥d years of service 9 have no legal grounds for 
action., 
With respect to salaries, it is a rule of law that, in absence of 
statutes 9 a board may not increase a teacher's salary during the period 
for which he is under contractQ In California 9 in a case where a board 
adopted a new salary schedule 9 the court stated that a school board, 
"subject to designated minimum requirements," is vested with the statu-
tory authority to change the salary schedule of teachers, including 
those on tenure 9 as long as it does not act arbitrarily or unreasonably9 
and provided such a schedule: 
aeo is adopted prior to the beginning of the school year ..... 
except that a schedule increasing salaries may be adopted 
4:1 
La Penna Ve Union Free School District, 24:6 N. Ye So (2d) 817 
(N. Y., 1964:)" 
during the school year if the board has reserved the right 
to do so by an appropriate rule adopted prior to commencement 
thereof or by a provision in the contract of employment.~2 
While this decision appears to have been rendered in light of a statute, 
it is also the common-law rule. 
In considering contracts, salary and recovery rights are important 
topics and the basis of some litigation. In an unusual Missouri case, 
the Supreme Court of that state decided that several county superintend-
ents were entitled to receive additional compensation for the prepara-
tion of budgets and the supervision of transportation even though they 
had no such duties to perform. The court in ruling had this to say: 
Thus plainly the legislature has entrusted the counties, 
the local levels in school administration, with the function 
and business of distributing the funds appropriated for super-
vision of transportation and budget preparation. From the 
general tenor of the statutes it is the function of the 
appellants to distribute these funds to the counties. 
There is no claim that these superintendents have 
abandoned their office, and 'the fact that he does not perform 
all or any of its duties will not affect his right to the 
salary attached thereto unless a statute otherwise provides.' 
The General Assembly could have attached conditions to 
the superintendents rights to receive additional compensa-
tion but did not do so. One of the conditions could have been 
that there were or must have been common school districts with 
budget and transportation problems. 
Not only could the General Assembly have attached condi-
tions to the superintendent's receipt of compensation in con-
nection with school transportation and budget, it could have 
authorized the Commissioner of Education, the State Board of 
Education, the State Treasurer and the Comptroller or some 
other official to make the determination that there were no 
duties to perform and that, therefore, this part of the appro-
priated school funds should not be transferred to tte counties, 
but as the judgment implies that has not been done. 3 
~2San Dieg) Federation .2!_ Teachers v. Board .2!_ Education, 31 Cal., 
Rptr. 1~6 (1956. 
~3state v. Carpenter, 388 s. w. (2d) 823 (Mo., 1966). 
It is a well-settled rule in considering salary rights under con-
tract that where teachers have been unlawfully dismissed they are 
entitled to the balance due under contract. 44 Not only are illegally 
dismissed teachers entitled to their salaries under contract, but if the 
contract is a continuing one they are entitled to salary benefits during 
the period from dismissal to reinstatement. In an unusual case in 
California, the period of illegal suspension was for more than ten years 
and the salary benefit amounted to $82,476. 45 In this case, the teacher 
was also awarded the right to participate in retirement benefits and to 
pre-judgment interest as an element of damages on each salary payment as 
it accrued. On the other hand, the teacher was not entitled to recover 
for the loss of fringe benefits such as medical protection and insurance 
plans for the board's employees. The court denied recovery on these 
items primarily because no losses were demonstrated by the teacher which 
were attributed to the suspension of medical and insurance benefits. 
A board of education may require membership in a professional 
teachers' organization as a condition of a salary schedule according to 
a Missouri court. A board of education of the Riverview Gardens school 
district adopted a resolution that each teacher on the salary schedule 
must join the local, county, state, and national professional organiza-
tion. Failure to join these organizations would preclude the person 
from benefits derived through the salary schedule. A teacher brought 
suit to test the right of the board to enforce such a resolution. The 
court in holding the rule reasonable and a valid exercise of board 
44school District v. Propes, 392 P. (2d) 292 (Colo., 1966). 
45Mass v. Board~ Education, 394 P. (2d) 579 (Calif., 1966). 
power, used the following language: 
The legislature of this state has given Board of Educa-
tion the broad powers 'to make all needful rules and regula-
tions for the organization, grading and government in their 
school district.' In the teaching profession, as in all 
professions, membership in professional organizations tends 
to increase and improve the interest, knowledge, experience, 
and over-all professional competence •••• Such membership 
affords an opportunity for self-improvement and self-
development on the part of the individual member. It is the 
duty of every school board to obtain the services of the 
best qualified teachers, and it is not only within their 
power but it is their duty to adopt rules and regulations 
which seek to elevate the standards of teachers and the 
educational standards within their district.46 
Teachers' Right to Hold Other Employment 
The right of a public school teacher to hold employment outside the 
school system while under contract in the public schools has been the 
subject of some litigations. Boards of education are invested by law 
with large discretion in matters pertinent to the management of schools. 
Courts have no rightful authority to interfere unless there has been 
such abuse of their discretion as works palpable injustice or injury. 
A teacher in an Illinois school was under contract to teach agri-
culture on a twelve-month basis. He became involved in a business ven-
ture in which he sold seed oats, advertised and sold fertilizers, tested 
soils, and operated a fertilizer blending factorye The board of educa-
tion sought to determine whether he would teach during the ensuing year, 
but he refused to inform the board on this point. He did affirm that if 
he sold 500 tons of fertilizer that he would not teach the following 
year. The board discharged him on the ground that (1) his outside 
46 . . . . J. Magenhe1m v. Board of Education of R1verv1ew Gardens, 3~7 s. w. 
(2d) 409 (Mo., 1961). 
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activities interfered with his teaching duties, and (2) the best inter-
ests of the schools would be served therebyG 
The teacher brought suit for reinstatement to his former position. 
In dealing with the question of outside activities of the teacher, the 
court had this to say: 
It is peculiarly a province of the Board of Education in 
the exercise of its discretion whether the outside activities 
of the appellant had progressed to such an extent as to inter-
fere with the performance of his duties as a member of the 
teaching staff of the educational institution under its 
direction. 
The best interest of the schools of the district is the 
guiding star of the Board of Education and for the courts to 
interfere with the execution of the powers of the board in 
that respect is an unwarranted assumption of authority and can 
only be justified in cases where the board has acted mali-
ciously, capriciously, and arbitrarily.47 
In Pennsylvania, a teacher holding a contract under the teacher 
tenure law of that state acted as a waitress in a restaurant·managed by 
her husband. On certain occasions, she served as a bartender after 
school hours and during summer vacations. In the restaurant, and in the 
presence of her pupils, she took an occasional drink of beer, served 
beer to customers, shook dice with customers for drinks, and played and 
showed customers how to play a pinball machine. She was rated by her 
superintendent as "43 per cent" competent, a rating of fifty per cent 
being the passing average rating. She was dismissed by the board on the 
grounds of incompetency 9 and she sued for reinstatment. 
State law in Pennsylvania provides that a teacher holding a con-
tract under the teacher tenure law could be dismissed only on the 
grounds of ~mmorality 9 incompetency, intemperance, cruelty, willful and 
47 Meredith v •. Board of Education of Community Unit School District 
No. 1., 103 N. Eo (2d) 5 (Ill., 1939). 
persistent neglect of duty 9 and other specified causes" The teacher's 
argument was that she was illegally dismissed~ since her holding an out-
side job did not come under the specified provisions of the tenure act~ 
She further contended that her outside employment had no bearing on her 
competency as a teacher 9 since it did not pertain to her knowledge of 
subject matter used in teachingo On the question of the teacher's con-
duct 9 the court had this to say: 
Is such a course of conduct immoral or intemperate 9 and 
does it--in combination with her scholastic and efficiency 
rating--amount to incompetency? We hold it to be self evi-
dent that under the content and meaning of the act 9 incompe-
tence is not essentially confined to a deviation from sex 
morality; it may be such a course of conduct as offends the 
morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth 
whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate., 
Nor need incompetency be confined strictly to overindulgence 
in alcoholic liquors--temperate in conduct without being an 
alcoholic addict. And so as to incompetency; as we take it 9 
this means under the Act incompetence as a teacher--but does 
it mean that competency is merely the ability to teach the 
three R1s? 
We conclude that it would be 1 j~st 1 to affirm the action 
of board in dismissing the teachero48 
In New York where the statutes prohibit New York public school 
teachers from occupying more than one position under the board of educa-
tion 9 a case came before the court concerning the "Dual Job Law.," The 
court 9 in refusing to find the law unconstitutional 9 had this to say: 
The issue here is one of law, not of policy; one of 
power 9 not of the wisdom in the exercise of the power., The 
policy has been expressed by the Legislature through this 
law 9 and with its wisdom or economics the Court on these 
motions cannot concern itselfo Conceivably9 the law will 
operate harshly on many individualso There is force to the 
appeal of the Teachers Union that present occupants be 
exempted from the sweep of the lawo Unfortunately 9 however 9 
the Legislature has limited the Court 0s power to inquire into 
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Horosko Vo Mount Pleasant Township School Disto 36 A. (2d) 866 
(Pao 9 1939)0 
the plea. The law is presumed to be constitutional, unconsti-
tutionality cannot be declared unless the reasons therefore 
appear clear and compelling. 
Of the approximately 38,000 teachers employed under the 
Board of Education, about 1 1 200 hold more than one teaching 
position; some of them holding as many as four. The plain-
tiff teaches both in Day High School and Evening High School. 
Yet, some 5 1000 teachers on eligible lists are awaiting 
appointment. 
Inasmuch as the law applies to all persons of a class, it 
is not discriminatory. Nor does the law transgress or affect 
that provision of the Constitution which prescribed merit and'* 
fitness as the standard for appointment to the civil service. 9 
In Arkansas, a statute of that state provided that members of a 
48 
school board must "not hold any salaried or fee office of the state or 
50 any public subdivision thereof." The court said that the position of 
a teacher was not an office within the meaning of the statute, but in-
stead was an employment. However, the court would not allow the teacher 
to act as an employee and a board member in the same school district, 
but saw no reason why the teacher could not serve as a board member in 
one district while acting as teacher in another. 
It seems apparent from these leading cases that boards will be up-
held in their dismissal of teachers whose outside work is of such nature 
as to make him unfit for the position as teacher, or whose outside ac-
tivities occupy so much of his time that he "slights" his teaching 
duties under contract to the board. While it is obvious that teachers 
may sometimes accept outside employment to supplement their salaries, 
the board still'riJay release them should such employment substantially 
interfere with the performance of their teaching duties. 
'*9Lapolla v. Board of Education of City of New ~' 15 N. Y. s. 
(2d) 149 (N. Y., 1939). 
50Maddox v. State, 249 s. W. (2d) 972 (Ark., 1952). 
Leaves of Absence 
State laws requiring or permitting local school boards to grant 
leaves of absence for professional or sickness or for other reasons have 
been enacted in most of the states. Many local rules and regulations 
provide for teachers in the particular district. Even when there is a 
state law on the subject, a great deal is left to local discretion as 
only general guides for granting leaves of absence are contained in most 
of the states. 
Among the rules and regulations which boards are authorized to 
adopt are those providing for leaves of absence from teaching duties in 
such instances as maternity of the teacher, illness or death in the 
family, professional improvement, and health reasons. Several state 
legislatures have provided leaves of absence for teachers. Of course, 
when rules and regulations of school boards conflict with state stat-
utes in such matters, the state law is controlling. 
The courts of Massachusetts, in an early case, went so far as to 
hold that granting a leave of absence with pay constituted a gift and 
51 was beyond the power of the board. Since it is now commonly accepted 
that school systems profit by the added learning, vigor, and enthusiasm 
of persons returning from leaves of absence, probably no court would now 
hold that a leave with pay is a "gift". In fact, the exact opposite has 
been held. In Louisiana, it was specifically ruled that teachers could 
be granted sabbatical leaves with pay. 52 
51Whittaker v. City .£! Salem, 10LJ: N .. E .. 359 (Mass., 191LJ:). 
52 State ex. rel. Scroggens v. Vernon Parish School Board, 44 So. 
(2d) 385 (La., 1950). 
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In the absence of state legislation on the matter, it is fairly 
well established that boards have power to provide for employee leaves 
of absence. This authority is not only applied from the board.' s role· as 
an employer, but also from its role as trustee and s-tewar'~ of the wel-
fare of the children in the public schools.. The courts will construe as 
nearly as possible such board rules and regulations in the light of 
benefits to children, as long as the board acts judiciously in the 
handling of public monies in its care .. 
Maternity Leave 
At one time, t.he majority of women teachers were single. Today, 
however, most of the female teaching force is married. Courts have not 
always implied through their decisions that boards of education should 
expect pregnancy among married women teachers. Some state legislatures 
have dealt with the problem, and most school districts have formulated a 
policy in one way or another. Usually, it is in the courts that the 
reasonableness of maternity leave policies is finally decided .. A 
Pennsylvania case is in point. The court in this case was called upon 
to decide whether because of her pregnancy a teacher became incompetent 
to perform her dutiess The board had so ruled9 and had dismissed the 
teacher on grounds of incompetency. There was general agreement that 
her incompetency, if it were such, arose not from her educational quali-
fication, but entirely from her physical condition. The teacher sought 
reinstatement to her position .. 
The action of the board was upheld by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania .. Said the court in ruling on the case: 
We must bear in mind that Mrs .. Brown was not being dis-
criminated against because of her marriage ....... Her dismissal 
was due neither to that fact nor her legitimate pregnancy, but 
because she became incom5etent due to her physical incapacity 
to discharge her duties. 3 
Following World War II, a serious teacher shortage developed and 
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housewives, many of whom had previous teaching experience, were used in 
the teaching service to alleviate the shortage. It became apparent that 
married women should not be discriminated against in their employment 
because of motherhood, a natural consequence of their marital status. 
If and when pregnancy occurred, the married teacher should not be 
penalized. 
Faced with this problem, several states enacted statutes outlining . 
the rights of the married teacher to maternity leave. In the absence of 
statutes, boards of education began to include provisions for maternity 
leave in their policiese In Louisiana, where state statutes provide 
that regularly employed teachers "shall be granted maternity leave for a 
reasonable time before childbirth," a board of education adopted a rule 
requiring any married woman teacher in its employ who became pregnant to 
ask for a leave of absence immediately after having knowlege of her 
condition, and under no condition to remain at work after three months 
of pregnancy. Later, the board adopted a resolution which provided that 
a teacher who became pregnant again while already on maternity leave 
must remain off the job six months after the birth of the second child. 
A teacher in that state, with tenure, while on maternity· leave, 
notified the board that she was again pregnant, but that the second 
child would be born in time for her to resume her duties when school 
reopened in the fall. This request was denied by the board. 
53Appeal of School District of City 2£ Bethlehem, 32 A. (2d) 565 
(Pa., 1943) ~ 
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In bringing action for reinstatement, the teacher argued that the 
board's refusal to permit her to resume teaching was in effect a "removal 
from office." In Louisiana, a tenure teacher may be removed only on 
written and signed charges of willful neglect of duty, incompetency, or 
dishonesty. The teacher's suit for reinstatement was dismissed. The 
court in ruling that the board had not acted arbitrarily, had this to 
say: 
No one will quarrel with the fact that a maternity leave 
is mandatory on the school board, but although the law was 
intended to benefit the expectant mothers in the teaching pro-
fession, the needs of the school system cannot be overlooked. 
The school has the duty of securing enough teachers for each 
term and must arrange the teachers' maternity leave in such 
a way as not to disrupt the operation of the schools. It is 
not the duty of the school board under the statutes to take 
108 S (2d) 96 (La., 1959) under advisement the case of each 
pregnant teacher and determine what would be a reasonable 
time before and after childbirth to allow that particular 
teacher leave. The board is authorized to make such rules 
and regulations for its own gover~ent as it may deem neces-
sary, not inconsistent with law.~ 
A similar case arose in Pennsylvania in which the supreme court of 
that state held reasonable a board rule which required that female em-
ployees should apply for leaves of absence in cases of expected mater-
nity. A teacher who refused to apply for such leave was discharged 
because of such refusal. The court in upholding the board''s ruling had 
this to say: 
It was her plain duty to notify the board of her changed 
status and apply for maternity leave in accordance with the 
regulations. This, however, she obstinately refused to do. 
Such conduct amounted to ';persistent and willful violation 
of the school laws,' and in our opinion affords ample justi-
fication for termination of her employment.55 
54 
· Sepulvado v. Rapid Parish School Board (1959) La. 1085 (2d) 96 
(La., 1959). 
55Board of School Directors of Ambridge Borough School v. Snyder 
29 A. (2d) 34°"l"Pa., 1942). 
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It seems apparent from these cases that boards of education have 
wide discretionary power in dealing with maternity leave for teachers in 
their employ, in the absence of a statute directly bearing on the 
subject. 
Sick Leave 
The practice of making deductions from the teacher's salary for 
absences occurred by sickness or personal injury is rapidly disappear-
ing .. Boards are coming to realize that granting leaves for a period 
with full pay for illness or injury has beneficial effect for both the 
school system and the teachero Such payments are clearly within the 
authority of the local board to grant in absence of statutes to the 
contrary. 
It is universally held that a board may compel a teacher to take a 
leave of absence if the cause is illness or any type of physical or men-
tal disability. 
The Supreme Court of New York has a case that will illustrate this 
point. A teacher had been placed on "inactive status without pay," 
having been placed there after a medical examination by board of educa-
tion physicians .. The teacher in this case contended that by the board's 
action she was in fact suspended or temporarily removed from her posi-
tion without charges or a hearing in violation of the tenure statutes~ 
The court, indicating that no questions of fact were considered, said: 
In our opinion, the placement on inactive status was not 
a suspension or removal from office, with termination rights; 
· and, therefore, the service of charges and a hearing thereon 
were not requireda56 
56Brown v., Board of Education, 259 N. Y. S. (2d) 179 (N. Y., 1965) .. 
In a similar case, in the New York Courts, a teacher on tenure had 
been placed on an enforced leave of absence for alleged illness. The 
board's bylaws require that an employee who has exhausted his compensa-
ble sick leave to immediately apply for and accept leave of absence 
without pay, stating that failure to do so shall be deemed neglect of 
duty and an act of insubordination. The teacher in this case maintained 
that her unsolicited leave was in fact a suspension and that such could 
not be accomplished without the benefit of a hearing as required under 
the tenure law. During the pendency of this proceeding, she was re-
examined and found fit. The court in ruling for the teacher had this to 
say: 
The facts in Brown v. Board of Education are quite similar 
except that this respondent adopted the view in that case that 
the petitioner was on •inactive status.• The net results are 
the same. Respondent's position that petitioner in the instant 
preceding does not have the same complaint since she has been 
reinstated since this proceeding began, poses a distinction 
only in degree. Petitioner here has still lost over a year in 
pay and accumulated sick leave under circumstances that cannot 
be justified under the applicable statutory law or respondent's 
by-laws ..... 
Accordingly, petitioner's application is in all respects 
granted and respondent is directed to reinstate her as of date 
when she was originally relieved of her duties with full 
restoration of loss of pay and sick leaveG57 
The major difference reported was in the former case the teacher 
had been placed on "inactive status without pay1 " having been placed 
there after a medical examination by the board of education physicians. 
In the latter case, there was no mention of an examination by the board 
physicians. 
Reinstatement at the end of a leave depends upon the terms of the 
57Pantaleo v. Board of Education of City of~ York, 259 N. Y. S. 
(2d) 447 (N. Y., 1965) .. 
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agreement at the time the leave is granted, or upon the language of the 
law under which the leave is granted. Usually a teacher on leave re-
turns at the same salary which had been paid in the school year immedi-
ately preceding the leave, however, in at least one instance they were 
not required to do soo In 1962, in Wisconsin, a case of this nature 
reached the supreme court of that state. The plaintiff-teacher had been 
engaged as a physical education instructor in the Kenosha public school 
for 35 years and was on tenureo In October, 1958, he applied for a 
leave of absence and submitted a physician's certificate to the effect 
of refraining from his present work from six to nine months because of 
his medical status. At the time of the application, the teacher was 
district manager for an encyclopedia firm, and had been selling books 
for them during the summer months. He had been informed by the company 
that if he were to remain in that capacity he would have to work full 
time. 
The board of education granted the leave of absence, but attached a 
condition to the effect that plaintiff was not to engage in any kind of 
gainful or remunerative employment during the leave. 
The teacher took his leave and continued to sell books. When he 
returned to work he was requested to sign an affidavit to the effect 
that he engaged in no gainful employment during his leaveo This he 
refused to do so the board advised the teacher that the contract was 
void but offered him re-employment as a beginning teacher at a lower 
salary. 
The teacher brought suit to test the validity of the contract and 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the dismissal. The courts 
pointed out that the school system has a substantial interest in 
56 
protecting the continuity of its teaching staff. Substitutes are diffi-
cult to obtain, and changing teachers during the school year has a 
deleterious effect on the students. In ruling, they had this to say: 
Tenure is for the benefit both of the school system and 
the teachers. It insures the teachers of a permanent position 
and insures the school system of the continuous services of 
teachers and reduces the annual turnover of teachers and admin-
istrative problems. To protect this interest, the board of 
education may place upon the granting of leaves of absence 
restrictions which will reasonably protect that interest and 
prevent an abuse of such leaves of absence of their use for 
purposes determined by the school system to be detrimental to 
it, however, beneficial to the teacher. Such condition was 
reasonably necessary for the protection of this interest.58 
No doubt, boards of education will continue to allow teachers 
leaves of absence for reasonable manner, so long as the board acts in 
good faith and within its statutory powers. 
Remmlein states that a sick leave may be "demanded as a right" on a 
teacher's part and that a board may compel such leave if the disability 
might interfere with the efficiency of the teacher. 59 A teacher should 
not guess what provisions have been provided for such leave. 
In the state school code and the local regulations are the pro-
visions governing the granting of sick leaves for employees. 
Other Leaves of Absence 
The list of the types of leaves to which teachers may be entitled 
is varied. In some states, the legislature provides that all workers, 
including teachers, shall be excused from work for a certain limited 
period of time in order to visit the polls and vote. Leaves for jury 
58Liddicoat v. Kenosha City Board of Education, 117 N., W. (2d) 369 
(Wisc.,, 1962). 
59Madaline Kinter Remmlein, School~ (New York, 1950), p. 137. 
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duty, for active service in the armed forces, and for other community 
service may be provided. 
In the absence of state laws on the matter, it is generally conceded 
that boards may exact reasonable rules and regulations governing em-
ployee leaves of absences What constitutes reasonableness, however, may 
be open to question. Sometimes, the teacher may feel that his rights 
have been infringed upon and seek, through court action, to ascertain his 
status before the law., In Indiana, for example, a tenure teacher de-
clared his candidacy for state representative,. The board immediately 
passed a resolution that any school employee elected to public office 
would be required to take a leave of absence without pay. The teacher 
brought action to recover salary lost through enforcement of the resolu-
tion. The court in ruling in favor of the board had this to say: 
This rule, general in terms and applying to all teachers, 
does not to us seem such an unreasonable exercise of the 
board's powers as to warrant jydicial interference. The 
board, not the courts, is charged with the duty of managing 
the school system and so long as it acts with fairness its 
decisions on matters within its descretion are not subject 
to judicial view.,60 
The fact that the resolution was passed subsequent to the announce-
ment regarding his candidacy 9 the court said that it was not necessary 
for the board to wait until the anniversary of the contract to put new 
rulings into effect" The principles of law propounded in this case are 
majority holdings in most of the states., 
Perhaps the most common type of leave is for professional improve-
ment~ This may range from leave for teaching in a foreign country on an 
exchange basis to attending a professional meeting. Sabbatical leave 
60 
· School City 2.f. East Chicago v,. Sigler, J6 N. E. (2d) 760 (Ind .. , 
1941)., 
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for professional study in one instance was declared to be the right of a 
teacher. A case came before the courts in· Louisiana seeking to compel a 
school district to grant a Sabbatical leave for one semester for cultur-
al improvement. The board refused on the grounds that a qualified sub-
stitute to replace him, while on leave, could not be found. The court 
in ruling in favor of the teacher had this to say: 
In the first place, there is no testimony in the records 
to show that they could not get a qualified substitute teacher 
and there is no showing that any effort was made to get a sub-
stitute teacher and we cannot take judicial cognizance of the 
shortage of school teachers. It would appear to us the board 
could have found one teacher to employ if it made an effort 
and it was their duty to do so. 
And in view of the fact that his application was filed in 
accordance with law and in time prescribed thereby, we believe 
we should affirm the judgment and order the defendant school 
board to grant relator sabbatical leave as requested in brief 
filed in his behalf.61 
Professional leave is usually a privilege granted by the board of 
education. Unless provision is made by the statutes, leave for reasons 
other than illness is a matter within the discretion of the local board. 
Generally 9 boards have become more liberal in defining professional 
leaves of absence. Travel, with the special purpose of study, is being 
gradually included within the scope of such leave. 
Teacher Tenure 
One of the most constructive concepts for improving both the effec-
tiveness of the school system and the general welfare of public school 
personnel is that relating to tenure. It may be thought of as a 
61state ex rel. Scroggins v. Vernon Parish School Board, 44 S (2d) 
385 (La., 195o).-
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security measure which society establishes in behalf of personnel en-
trusted with the education of its children. In its finest intent, 
tenure is a necessary safeguard to provide continuity of employment for 
the competent, to prevent unjustified dismissals, and maintain staff 
stability and academic security in the interest of carrying out the 
function of the school system. 
Tenure practices that affect public school personnel are shaped by 
statutory provisions and court decisions. Within the legal framework, 
however, a heavy responsibility rests with local school officials for 
realizing the intent of tenure. 
Legislation designed to afford security for teachers in their posi-
tion is of fairly recent origin. Historically, boards of education had 
the power to employ and discharge teachers at the end of the term at 
will. Educators and other groups interested in education have long 
recognized the detriment to education which necessarily follows from the 
instability of teaching personnel. Insecurity renders the profession 
unattractive to many of the most able people to the detriment of educa-
tion. Furthermore, it deprives the schools of the advantage which would 
be gained by the retention of teachers in their positions long enough to 
enable them to acquaint themselves with the community and its problems. 
Characteristics of Tenure 
Tenure, in the broadest sense, embodies a system designed to pro-
vide educators with continuing employment during efficient service, and 
which establishes an orderly procedure to be followed before their serv-
ices are terminated. Some features of the tenure system include: 
1. Completion of a specified probationary period, the dura-
tion of which is generally three years. The probationary 
period is construed to mean a temporary appointment, 
during which time the individual is carefully supervised 
and appraised in terms of the extent of his ability to 
render efficient service to the school organization. 
2. Automatic tenure status at the end of the probationary 
period to personnel who meet established requirements. 
3. An orderly procedure for the dismissal of personnel. 
This includes provisions for notifying the individual 
that his services are unsatisfactory, as well as a 
reasonable opportunity to show improvement before 
notification of intent to dismiss is given. 
~. Notice of the intent to terminate the services of the 
individual in the event that the desired improvement in 
service has not been attainede Written notice of the 
intent to dismiss details the specific reasons for the 
action which is contemplateds 
6 .. 
A hearing before local authorities which provides an 
opportunity for the accused to defend himself against 
the charges. 
The right to appeal an adverse decision to higher educa-
tional authorities 9 and to the courts.62 
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The meaning and operation of tenure laws are not always understood 
by some persons within the teaching field, nor by many boards as well. 
Perhaps this misunderstanding has given rise to the relative high inci-
dence of tenure litigatione The number of litigation involving tenure 
laws are increasing rapidly$ There are a number of reasons for this 
increase., There is the normal increase that follows from the enactment 
of tenure legislation in a greater number of states. Upon the passage 
of special acts affecting a large number of persons or agencies, there 
inevitably arises a series of cases seeking to have the law construed by 
the courts., Until such construction is had, there are doubts as to the 
scope of its application., The conflict between the enthusiasm of 
62w· · A . . . S P 1 1ll1am Be Castetter 9 dm1n1strat1ng the chool ersonne 
Program (New York, 1962)0 
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teachers to enforce their newly acquired rights and the tendency of the 
board to cling to tradition will doubtless be responsible for a large 
number of litigations. 
Tenure legislation varies in the several states from that which 
provides merely that the teacher's contract shall continue from year to 
year unless the teacher is notified within a specified time that it will 
not be renewed, to more elaborate systems which provide that after a 
stated probationary period the employment shall become permanent. The 
probationary period varies from one year in some states to five years 
in others. During the probationary period, the teacher may be dis-
missed at the end of the year for any or no reason, but once tenure has 
become permanent, one may be dismissed only for causes stated in the 
law. If the law merely continues the contract unless or until notice of 
termination is given, the teacher has little protection she would not 
have in the absence of the law. Of course, the notice which must be 
given a stated number of days before the end of the term enables her to 
seek another position earlier than she otherwise would be able to do, 
but it makes her position no more secure. The board may dismiss her at 
the end of any year merely by giving notice to that effect. Such legis-
lation can hardly be called tenure legislation. The teacher is entitled 
to no hearing, no cause for her dismissal need be shown, and the proce-
dure required of the board is very simple and formal in its nature. 
Objectives of Tenure Legislation 
One of the major purposes of tenure legislation is to protect the 
teacher from unjust and hasty dismissalo A Louisiana court had this to 
say: 
The tenure teacher act was designed to accomplish a laud-
able purpose., If sanely and impartially administered, the 
beneficient results to inevitably follow vindicate the persis-
tent efforts of its champions in procuring its adoption. It 
was intended to protect the worthy instructors of youth of the 
parish from enforced yielding to the political preferences of 
those theretofore having the power to grant or without employ-
ment and to vouch-safe to such teachers employment, after a 
long term of satisfactory service to the public, regardless of 
the vicissitudes of politics or the likes or dislikes .Gij those 
charged with the administration of the school affairs. , 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in discussing the purposes of tenure 
legislation used the following language: 
In 1885, the National Education Association brought forth 
the question of tenure for school officials. A committee of 
the association studied the matter and later submitted a report. 
Generally speaking, the tenure so sought was interpreted to 
mean, in substance, the application of principles of civil 
service to the teaching profession. It was thought for the 
good of the schools and the general public the profession should 
be made independent of personal or political influence, and made 
free from the malignant power of spoils and patronage. The 
bases for recommendation were that better talent would be 
attracted to the teaching profession; that annual contracts 
therefore in vogue had not resulted in the elimination of poor, 
incompetent, and inefficient teachers; that the principle of 
annual elections or appointment officers, and in the very nature 
of things should not apply to teachers; that not infrequently 
the best teachers were discharged for inadequate reasons.64 
Tenure Status When District Merges 
With Another 
62 
Does a tenure teacher automatically lose her tenure status when the 
school district in which she holds tenure merges with another district? 
This was an issue in New Mexico in 1962., The court's decision should be 
of interest to teachers and school board members who, by virtue of reor-
ganization 9 may find their district with an oversupply of tenure · 
63Andrews v~ Union Parish School Board 9 184 So., 574 (Lae, 1938). 
64McSherry v. City of St. Paul, 277 Ne W. 541 (Minnesota, 1938). 
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teachers. In this case, the teacher in New Mexico had acquired tenure 
status in the Forrest School District No. 53 in Quay County and came 
within the protection of the tenure law in that state. New Mexico stat-
utes provide that any public school teacher who has taught for three 
consecutive years, and holds a contract for the completion of the fourth 
consecutive year in a particular district shall be entitled to tenure 
status and the rights attendant thereon. The board of education of the 
Forrest School employed the teacher for the fifth consecutive year, but 
before she could enter upon her duties, the Forrest and Melrose di.stri'cts 
merged. A new school board was elected and the teacher was allowed to 
teach and to receive compensation for the ensuing year. However, on 
April 17 she was notified of her dismissal. When the board refused her 
a hearing, and retained a nontenure teacher for her position, the teacher 
appealed to the state board of education. The state board affirmed the 
decision of the local board so the teacher took her case to court. 
The district court entered judgment in favor of the teacher, and 
the state board of education appealed. In upholding the lower court's 
ruling and the teacher, the Supreme Court of New Mexico asserted: 
The question for consideration is not one related to con-
solidation only; rather the question is whether a teacher 
automatically loses tenure status acquired in a particular dis-
trict when that district is consolidated or merged with another 
district. The trial court held that the teacher does not, and 
we think it reached the correct conclusion. 
As we read the statutes, upon consolidation, the governing 
board of the consolidated district becomes the governing board 
of the particular school district which merged into and became 
part of the newly created district. Actually, the consolidated 
district was a continuation of the old district which went into 
it. It follows, therefore, that the newly consolidated district 
was the 'particular' district in which appellee earned tenure. 65 
65 Hensley v. State Board of Education, 376 P. (2d) 968 (N. M., 1962). 
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The defense given by the board for dismissing the teacher, namely, 
that it had too many teachers and needed to reduce the number, reasoned 
the court, did not appear to be a good and sufficient cause for dis-
missal of a tenure teacher when another teacher without tenure was 
retained in her place. As stated by the same court in an earlier 
ruling: 
The legislature has recognized the sound public policy of 
retaining in the public school system teachers who have be-
come increasingly valuable by reason of their public servants 
and indefinite tenure_of position during satisfactory perform-
ance of their duties.66 
The court could not believe that the legislature intended that a 
new designation of name or a different governing board should destroy 
the actual existence of the "particular" school district which merged to 
form the consolidated district insofar as acquiring tenure was 
concerned. 
The effect of this decision, if it receives wide acceptance, should 
afford greater job stability for teachers with tenure when districts 
merge .. 
Rights of Teachers Under Tenure 
The right of a teacher who has been admitted to permanent tenure in 
the district where such right has been secured, subject to reasonable 
rules of the board of education, is held to be a vested right to employ-
ment in the district, and cannot be deprived of this right except 
through an exercise of due process of law. 
A major principle of tenure, with much support by the courts, is 
66 
Ortega v. Oteco, 154 P. (2d) 252 (N. M., 1944) .. 
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the tenet that a board of education has power to dismiss a teacher under 
tenure only by following the procedures prescribed in the statutes. A 
case arose in New York where a tenure teacher was placed on inactive 
status, without pay, for allegedly being then physically unfit to 
teach, without giving her a hearing. The court in ruling had this to 
say: 
It is the general rule that a tenure teacher may not be 
removed without a hearing, even though the evidence in pos-
session of the school board may appear to warrant removal. 
Moreover, a teacher's right to a hearing, accorded by statute, 
may not be altered by the board. 
Whether the action of the board resulted in a forced leave 
of absence due to illness, with payment from and reduction of 
accumulated absence reserve, or in a •suspension' and placement 
on 'inactive' status without pay is of no moment. What is 
important is the obvious fact that respondent's action has 
effectively separated petitioner from her teaching position 
without the required hearing, which thereby prevented petitioner 
from attempting to refute the finding of ill health, from pre-
serving her accumulated absence reserve, and from earning her 
salary as a teacher. In my view, regardless of terminology 
used, respondent's action has effected a suspension without pay 
or accompanied by a loss of such accrued reserve constitutes an 
unwarranted, prejudicial and damaging removal from office dur-
ing the period of suspension. The finding of physical fitness 
without a hearing was thus contrary to law and the petitioner 
is entitled to be reinstated as of date she was placed in 
'inactive' status.67 
Of course, the statutory provisions for tenure differ widely from 
state to state, but the principle that power to dismiss a tenure teacher 
depends upon following statutory provisions is universally applied. 
In an Illinois case where the tenure statutes provide "that if the 
charges assigned for dismissal are •on account of causes that may be 
deemed to be remediable' the board, before serving notice of such 
charges, must give the teacher a written warning notice, stating with 
67Brown v. Board of Education, 254: N. Y. S. (2d) 60 (N. Y., 1964:). 
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particularity the causes which, if not removed, may result in bringing 
dismissal charges." The board, in this case, without giving a warning 
notice, dismissed a teacher for inflicting corporal punishment on stu-
dents, swearing, and exhibiting an ungovernable temper, and in the best 
interest of the school. The court in ruling in favor of the teacher had 
this to say: 
While there is evidence in the record that plaintiff had 
a fiery temper, we must consider the type of students with 
whom he was dealing and the rather fantastic atmosphere which 
existed at the school. It must be said that the findings of 
the Board that the conduct of the teacher was not remediable 
is against the manifest weight of evidence. Consequently, 
the plaintiff should have been given the warning notice pro-
vided for in the Tenure Act.68 
A part of the dismissal procedure, under most tenure laws, is the 
requirement that a teacher who is to be dismissed or who is not to have 
his contract renewed must be notified in writing of the decision of the 
board to dismiss or to refuse to renew the contract. The specifications 
for such notice differ from state to state. Nevertheless, the general 
rule concerning notice is that failure to give a teacher a timely 
written notice of the proposed nonrenewal, or of the proposed dismissal, 
results in automatic re-employment or continuation of employment. 
The nature of notice of nonrenewal of contract is sometimes at 
issue. Unless the statutes authorize or specify otherwise, the rule is 
that where notice is required to be served upon a person for the purpose 
of determining rights, personal service is intended. However, where 
service by registered mail is statutorily provided, service is effected 
when the notice is properly addressed, registered, and mailed and area-
sonable time for the transmission and receipt of the notice has elapsed 
68Miller v. Board.£.!:. Education, 200 N. E. (2d) 838 (Ill., 1964). 
following the deposit of the notice in the post office. 
An interesting case arose in Washington where a teacher was noti~ 
fied of the nonrenewal of her contract, but failed to respond to the 
"mail arrival notice" left by the carrier. The certified and regis-
tered mail addressed to her was returned to the school district. The 
teacher then claimed that she had not been notified. The court in 
ruling that one could not igno~e customary and established methods of 
postal notification had this to say: 
The applicable principle is fundamental and unquestioned. 
He who prevents a thing from being done may not avail himself 
of the nonperformance which he has himself occasioned, for the 
law says to him in effect: 'This is your own act therefore you 
are not damnified. 1 
In this case, it is undisputed that appellant was not bed-
fast; that she received her regular mail and at least one 
notice of .the arrival of certified or registered mail; that 
she was aware of the principal's recommendations relating to 
nonrenewal of her contract; and that, as a teacher with several 
years' experience, she had reason to know, or should have 
known, of the notice provisions relating to nonrenewal of 
teachers contracts. It is likewise clear that each of the 
two letters addressed to the appellant was delivered to her 
home address, and a notice of arrival left, on the day fol-
lowing posting. 
Under the circumstances, we conclude that a period of 
four days following posting constitutes a reasonable time for 
transmission of the proposed nonrenewal was, accordingly, 
complete by April 15th at the latest.69 
In another New York case, it has been held that an agreement by 
67 
which the board attempted to get rid of a tenure teacher without charges 
or a hearing was violative of the tenure law and the constitutional ban 
against making gifts of public money. The agreement, in this case, pro-
vided that if the teacher would resign, the board would pay her for the 
remainder of the year. Later, the teacher decided not to be bound by 
69 
'Robel ~._Highline Public School District, 398 P. (2d) 1 
(washington1 1965)i 
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the agreement and brought an action to require her restoration to her 
position with full tenure rights and back pay. The court rules for the 
teacher on the ground that the agreement was not legal, saying: 
Such an agreement was contrary to the statute which says 
that teachers on tenure shall not be removed except for speci-
fied causes after a hearing on written charges. It is clear 
on this record that petitioner never voluntarily quit her job 
but was told by the board president to stop teaching and not 
return to her classroom. It is unquestionably a violation of 
the statutes and of tenure rights to remove, without charges 
and hearing, a teacher who has tenure. Of course, a teacher 
like any other employee may resign but the assertion here is 
not that petitioner resigned but that for a consideration she 
waived her right to a hearing. To validate such a holding of 
waiver would be contrary to the strong public policy of this 
state expressed in the tenure statutes. The purpose of the 
tenure law is 'to give security to competent members of the 
educational system in the positions to which they have been 
appointed.' The statutory tenure terms can be changed by the 
Legislature but never by the board of education. For the 
courts to validate a 'waiver' by a teacher of such rights 
would be violative of the spirit and public purpose of the 
act which protects the school system by giving permanency to 
the jobs of experienced teachers. This school board in order 
to back out of an unpleasant situation tried to create its 
own public policy by destroying tenure rights and giving 
away public money.70 
To defend their rights under tenure, professional employees must appeal 
to the proper authorities and use appropriate legal action. A Georgia 
case as an illustration helps to make this point clear.71 A teacher's 
contract was not renewed for the school year 1963-64. The county board, 
after a hearing, upheld this action. The Georgia State Board of Educa-
tion, upon another appeal, sustained the nonrenewal action. Thereupon, 
the teacher brought a court action for mandamus to compel the county 
board to reinstate him. When the case reached the Supreme Court of 
Georgia, the court ruled that the mandamus action would not lie against 
70 
Boyd v. Collins, 228 N. Y.. S. (2d) 228 (N. Y., 1962). 
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1964). 
Maxey v. DeKalb County Board of Education, 137 s. (2d) 657 (Ga., 
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county board because, under the statutes, the state board's decisions 
were binding upon all parties. In other words, it held that the action 
should have been brought to compel the state board and not the county·· 
board to reinstate the teacher .. 
It seems to be generally conceded that the teacher's position, 
despite the attainment of permanent tenure, is an employment and not an 
off.ice, since tenure statutes serve merely to extend the term of employ-
ment by operation of law, and not to change the relation of employer and 
employee existing between the district and the teacher. The tenure 
rights of a teacher include the right to active and continued employment, 
subject, of course, to removal or dismissal for the reasons and in the. 
manner provided by statute., However, terms different from those which 
governed his previous service may be imposed upon a permanent teacher, 
so long as the terms imposed are not arbitrary or capricious, but are 
calculated to meet the ~urrent needs of the school. The changes and 
terms necessary and proper to serve best the interests of a school sys-
tem must rest on the sound discretion of the administrative officials, 
although such discretion must not be unreasonable or capriciously 
exercised .. 
Summary 
Teachers perform a governmental function, but they are not public 
officers; they are employees of the board of education for whom they 
work. The distinction between "employees" and "officers" is not always 
clear9 although courts recognize certain differences between them. 
The state.may prescribe such qualifications for teachers as it 
deems necessary, and it may require a teacher to hold a certificate 
70 
which indicates that he possesses the prescribed qualifications. Those 
to whom the state has delegated authority to determine whether a pro-
spective teacher has met the statutory requirements for a certificate 
and to issue a certificate when the requirements have been met, perform 
a discretionary function and the court will not control their discretion 
unless it is abused. However, agencies authorized to issue certificates 
cannot refuse to do so without good cause. A teacher's certificate is 
not a contract between the teacher and the state; it is a license. 
Therefore, being a mere privilege conferred by the state, the state may 
revoke it. The state may also impose additional qualifications upon 
teachers who already possess certificates~ 
A teacher, so it is generally held, cannot enter into a legal con-
tract unless he possesses the certificate required by statute. One who 
teaches without the required certificate is a mere volunteer and cannot 
recover for services rendered in court of law or quantum merit in court •. , 
Where the statutes require a certificate in order to enter into a con-
tract, he must possess it at the time of signing the contracta However, 
when the statutes make the possession of a certificate a condition of 
employment, the courts are divided with respect to time when the teacher 
must have the certificate. Some have ruled that it is sufficient if the 
certificate is held at the time he begins to teach. 
A board of education cannot legally employ a teacher who does not 
possess the required certificate. The board may legally require addi-
tional qualifications that are reasonable. The board must also act in 
its corporate capacity. The meeting must be a legal meeting when 
employing teachers. 
Where the statutes provide for written teachers• contracts, an oral 
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contract is invalid and a teacher, as a rule~ cannot recover for serv-
ices rendered. A board of education cannot delegate the authority to 
select and employ teachers. A board of education is bound by the 
statutes, and a teacher's contract may be unenforceable because of some 
irregularity in the making of it. However, some unenforceable contracts 
may be ratified. A board may ratify any contract which it had authority 
to make in the first instance. Acceptance of the service of a teacher, 
with a knowledge of all the facts, usually constitutes ratification, 
provided, the board had authority to make the contract in the first 
place. As a general rule, teachers may recover their salaries for the 
time school is closed because of an epidemic of some contagious disease 
unless the contract provides otherwise. 
A statute providing for tenure for teachers does not create a con-
tract between the teacher and the state. Such a statute is an expres-
sion of current legislative policy and may be amended by later 
legislative bodies. Teacher-tenure statutes are intended to protect the 
teachers from dismissal for causes personal to them; they are not in-
tended to guarantee positions to teachers regardless of changing 
conditions. 
CHAPTER III 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF TEACHERS 
It is generally assumed that teachers enjoy a considerable measure 
of personal, political, and academic freedom in their status as teachers 
because the public schools teach concepts of democracy and freedom. It 
may surprise many to find that teachers as a class often find themselves 
limited in these respects more than persons who work in industry or pri-
vate enterprise. The teacher has always been in a unique position in 
the community. She has been under a duty to conduct herself in such a 
manner as to command respect and goodwill of the community in which she 
works. One result of that duty is the deprivation of the teacher of 
certain freedom of conduct and action enjoyed by persons in other voca-
tions. Certain conduct in or outside the classroom may be such as to 
destroy the usefulness of the teacher in the schools. The real diffi-
culty arises when undue restrictions which have no relationship to her 
usefulness are imposed upon the teacher. 
Teachers are not "second class citizens", however. They have all 
the rights and immunities accruing to all citizens, plus some rights, 
such as privileged communication, which the average citizen does not 
d . ·1 1 or 1nar1 y possess. The limitations upon political and personal 
1 
Chester Noltre and John Phillip Linn, School Law For Teachers, 
(Danville, Illinois, 1963), p. 167. 
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freedom of teachers arise from their unique status as government 
employees, as well as their status under the school laws of the state. 
Academic Freedom in Classroom Performance 
Perhaps no problem has created more resentment among educators 
than attempts to control what they should teach and their freedom of 
thought and expression both inside and outside the classroom. The 
problem arises more frequently in colleges and universities, but the 
public schools have not escaped. That there should be complete freedom 
for all teachers to teach anything that may suit their fancy, discuss 
any matter they may choose in any class, or advocate doctrines, which 
according to the mores of the time, are considered pernicious, would not 
be contended. It is inevitable that among the many teachers in schools, 
a few will be found that will abuse what is commonly called academic 
freedom. 
The best known of the academic freedom cases is the famous "Monkey 
Trial" of John Thomas Scopes, a teacher in Tennessee, who taught his 
students Darwin's theory of evolution in contravention of a state stat-,. 
ute prohibiting the teaching of that subject. The trial court held 
that the state may restrict the teaching of evolution in the public 
schools, and fined Scopes the sum of $100. The question of the consti-
tutionality of the statute was then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee for final disposition. The court upheld the trial court, 
using the following language: 
The statute before us is not an exercise of. the police 
power of the state undertaking to regulate the conduct and 
contracts of individuals in their dealings with each other. 
On the other hand, it is an act of the state as a corporation, 
a proprietor, an employee. It is a declaration of a master 
as to the character of work the master's servant shall, or 
rather shall not, perform. 
In dealing with its own employees engaged upon its own 
work the state is not hampered by the limitations of the 
Tennessee Constitution nor of the Four~eenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States. 
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The court's decision seemed to hinge on the relationship of master 
and servant. Scopes was an employee of the State of Tennessee, as 
such. 
He had no right or privilege to serve the state except 
upon such terms as the state prescribed. His liberty, his 
privilege, his immunity to teach and to proclaim the theory 
of evolution elsewhere than3in the service of the state was 
no way touched by this law. 
In Maryland a teacher brought a suit to require the board of educa-
tion to reinstate him as a teacher after his contract had not been 
renewed. The plaintiff's primary contention was that the County Board's 
action was in violation of his constitutional rights. Particularly, 
the termination denied him the right of free speech guaranteed by the 
First Amendment. The board did not renew his contract because he in-
sisted upon assigning the book Brave New World to his psychology classes. 
The court in dismissing the case had this to say: 
The factual allegations contained in the complaint, and 
in plaintiff's affidavit, show no denial of freedom of speech. 
It is claimed the plaintiff's contract was terminated because 
a complaint had been received about his assignment and teach-
ing from the book Brave~ World, and that the book there-
after be removed from the library. There is no allegation 
that plaintiff's personal right to free expression is in any 
way inhibited by the school authorities. 
2 
Scopes v. State, 289 S. W. 363 (Tenn., 1927). 
3Ibid. 
Even if such allegations were present, they would afford no 
grounds for the relief sought in this case. The right of free speech 
or expression, like other First Amendment guarantees, is not absolute. 
Where the abridgment of the abstract right of free speech 
results from government action taken for the protection of 
other substantial public rights, no constitutional deprivation 
will be found to exist. No unconstitutionality results where 
the right of free speech is reasonably curtailed· as a 
prerequisite to continued government employment. 
A school system has the constitutional right to 
require school teachers, as a prerequisite to their continued 
employment, to adhere to such requirements as those contained 
in the caution at the head of the reading list.4 
The academic freedom of teachers is further limited in other sub-
ject areas. A teacher in a boys' technical high school, who discussed 
matt.ers relating to sex in his speech classes, was suspended and later 
75 
discharged. He sued for reinstatement on the grounds that his dismissal 
had been arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable. The court held that 
the teacher had been legally dismissed and in doing so stated: 
Such argument fails to recognize that the issue is not 
whether it was improper conduct for relator to discuss sex in 
his speech classes, but rather whether his handling of this 
topic was such a violation of recognized standards of pro-
priety as to constitute bad behavior. Thus, if relator's 
discourses on sex in his speech classes had been conducted in 
such a manner as to constitute proper conduct in a biology 
class, they would not automatically have been converted into 
misconduct warranting discharge by the happenstance that they 
took place in the speech class, absent any rule of the school 
authorities prohibiting the same or any specific warnings to 
relator from the principal or superintendent that sex was not 
to be a subject of discussion in his speech classes. However, 
if relator's manner of discoursing on the topic of sex in his 
speech classes exceeded the bounds of the recognized standards 
of propriety, we deem that it constituted bad conduct which 
would warrant a discharge even though there was no.expressed 
rule prohibiting it and he had received no warning to desist 
therefrom. As an intelligent person trained to teach at the 
4Parker v. Board of Education of Prince George's County, Maryland, 
237 F. Supp. 222. (Maryland, 1965).-
high school level, relator should have realized that such 
conduct was improper.5 
Two judges concurred in the majority opinion that the teacher had 
been legally dismissed, but gave as their reason that parents have a 
right to know that those who teach their children have had special 
training in the presenting of the subject matter in question. Not all 
teachers, asserted the judges, are competent to teach sex education; 
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only persons properly certified should be allowed to undertake to teach 
this delicate subject. 
Another case is noteworthy, because it involves the freedom to 
teach that which may be called immoral. The well-known author, Bertrand 
Russell, had been appointed to the chair of philosophy at City College 
of New York. His appointment was challenged upon the grounds that 
Russell was not of good moral character, and his appointment violated 
public policy. The court quoted from Russell's writings to the effect 
that he advocated temporary childless marriages among university stu-
dents. The court said: 
While this court would not interfere with any action of 
the board insofar as a pure question of 'valid' academic 
freedom is concerned, it will not tolerate academic freedom 
being used as a cloak to promote the popularization in the 
minds of adolescents of acts forbidden by the Penal Law. 
This appointment affects the public health, safety and morals 
of the community and it is the duty of the court to act. 
Academic freedom does not mean academic license. It is the 
freedom to do good and not to teach evil. Academic freedom 
cannot authorize a teacher to teach that murder or treason 
are good. Nor can it permit a teacher directly or indirectly 
to teach that sexual intercourse between students, where the 
female is under the age of eighteen years, is proper. This 
court can take judicial notice of the facts that students in 
5state ex rel. Wasilewski v. Board of School Directors of the City 
of Milwaukee-,-111 (2d) 198 (Wisconsin, 1961). 
the college of the City of New York are under the a~e of 
eighteen years, although some.of them may be older. 
Defamation of Character 
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Sometimes a teacher is placed in the precarious position of having 
to make statements which can be construed as defaming the reputation of 
another. To allow teachers to carry out the proper function of teach-
ing, the law recognizes that the teacher must be free to state candidly 
his observations, beliefs, and opinions. It is recognized that the 
responsibility of a teacher to his pupils, to his superiors, and to the 
public, demand a well-defined limit of free communication without threat 
of liability. Under certain circumstances, the teacher has a qualified 
privilege of communication. The right of free speech guaranteed by the 
First Amendment to the federal constitution does not mean the unre-
stricted right to say what one pleases at all times under all 
circumstances. 
One who writes or speaks disparagingly of another or who spreads 
false or damaging rumors may be held guilty of defamation of character. 
The principle of law governing slander was spelled out by a Kentucky 
Court: 
Words are sl.anderous or actionable per~ only in cases 
where they are falsely spoken and (1) impute the commission 
of a crime involving moral turpitude for which the party 
might be indicted and punished; (2) i~pute an infectious di-
sease likely to exclude hfm from soc:i,ety; or (3) impute un-
fitness to perform the duties of an office or employment; 
or (4) prejudice him in his profession or trade; or (5) tend 
to discredit him. 
6 
194o). 
Kayv. Board..2.!HigherEducation, 18 N.Y.S. (2d) 821 (N. Y., 
In all other cases spoken words are either (a) not 
actionable at all or only actionable (b) on proof of special 
damage.7 
When the defamatory words are published in written form they are 
libelous; when verbally published, they are slanderous. Libel and 
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slander are torts against the person of another, and an action will be 
where the words spoken or written constitute accusations relating to 
criminal activities, certain loathsome diseases, mental disorder, 
unchastity, or other statements. resulting in damage to another. 
A teacher as a public employee owes a duty to the public. If a 
statement by a teacher is made in good faith and without malice, the 
statement is generally privileged. Any statement, however, which is 
false or motivated by malice removes the privilege, and subjects the 
person to liability. 
What defense has the teacher against a charge of defamation of 
character? One defense, of course, is that the communication was priv-
ileged. Still another defense is truth, but although truth is a de-
fense, even the truth can prove defamatory if not published with good 
intentions and toward justifiable ends. School people should not feel 
that because they speak the truth, and enjoy a measure of privilege, 
publication of certain information about others is permissible. 
In a case that came before the courts in Oklahoma, a teacher made 
the following notation in the register immediately preceding the stu-
8 
dent• s name. "Drag all the time; ruined by tobacco and whiskey." The 
teacher knew that the register would go to the clerk of the board. The 
7 Spears v. McCoy, 159 S. W. 610 (Ky., 1913). 
8nawkins v. Billingsley, 172 Pac. 69 (Okla., 1918). 
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teacher admitted the falsity of the statement, but maintained that the 
statement was protected by the qualified privilege because he believed 
it to be true at the time of publication. 
The court, however, could not agree with the teacher. The teacher 
had deviated from the procedure necessary to do his job effectively. 
Since defamatory statements in his register were beyond the teacher's 
strict line of duty, the court concluded that such statements are not 
privileged. 
This brings one to another interesting question. Are student 
records public? The courts are not in agreement on the question of 
whether student records are public records. One of the earliest cases 
on this topic arose in Iowa in 1919 and reached the Supreme Court of 
that state. A high school girl, a senior, had refused to wear a cap 
and gown to commencement exercise, and was denied her diploma and 
grades. The superintendent of schools maintained that the grades were 
the property of his school and no one had access to them. The court, 
in a ruling compelling the board to issue her grades, had this to say: 
In this case, in declaring the student record a •public' 
record, the court was referring to only one kind of record, 
that o.f a permanent or objective nature. Much of the infor-
mation gathered on students today is of another nature, per-
sonal, confidential and temporary. It is whether or not 
parents should have access to this last variety that concerns 
teachers today.9 
In New York, a father brought suit to require the disclosure of his 
son's school records. In granting this request, the court said in part: 
Petitioner's rights, if any, stem not from his status as 
a taxpayer seeking to review the records of a public corpora-
tion, but from his relationship with the school authorities 
as a parent who under compulsory education has delegated to 
9valentine v. Independent School District, 17~ N. 'W. 33~ (1919). 
them the educational authority over his child. Thus the 
common law rule ••• to the effect that when not detrimental 
to the public interest, the right to inspect records of a 
public nature exists as to persons who have sufficient inter-
est in the subject matter, is a guide •••• 
The records here sought to be inspected are not, 
strictly speaking, public records. No statutes exist which 
specifies those who are and those who are not entitled to 
inspect them •••• The records are required by law to be 
kept •••• It needs no further citation of authority to 
recognize the obvious 'interest' which a parent has in the 
school records of his child. We are, therefore, constrained 
to hold as a matter of law that the parent is entitled to 
inspect the records.10 
Bo 
Only four states have attempted to spell out the exact legal status 
of public school records. In Oklahoma, one of the states, the revela-
tion of student information by a teacher is a misdemeanor. The statute 
reads: 
It shall be a misdemeanor for any teacher to reveal any 
information concerning any child obtained by him in his ca~a-
city as a teacher except as may be required by his contractual 
duties.11 
It is clear that not everyone should have access to information 
which,if released to unscrupulous persons, might be damaging or even 
detrimental to the students. But student records are not alone the 
property of the faculty or of the school. The courts have termed this, 
"quasi-public" (like a public) record to describe the legal status of 
the student record. 
It is doubtful if the teacher can successfully deny the disclosure 
of student records to parents, at least that part that is permanent. He 
might deny that part which is temporary and personal in nature. 
10 Van Allen v. McCleary, 211 N. Y. S. (2d) 501 (N. Y., 1961). 
11 Oklahoma Statutes Ann. Title 70, Sec. 6-16. 
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In the absence of statutes, the wise board will develop defensible 
policies on student records against the time when a parent demands dis-
closure and as a safeguard for its faculty. 
Communications by Teachers About Pupils 
The courts have set up a protection for those whose duty it is to 
divulge information about others. Publication may be either absolutely 
or qualifiedly privileged. The former applies to legislative personnel, 
judges, and executive members of government in the proper discharge of 
their duties. It is never applicable to teachers, who come within the 
province of the second classification, that of qualified or conditional 
privilege. 
A case appeared before the courts in New York concerning privileged 
communication. 
A teacher in high school complained to the principal that a girl in 
her class when she got up to recite caused the other children to titter, 
and that there was a rumor about the school that she was pregnant, and a 
request was made for him to do something about it. 
A meeting of the Board of Education was called, at which meeting it 
was moved, seconded, and carried that the principal inform the parents 
to take her to a physician and see if she was in proper condition to 
attend school. In accordance with the resolution, the principal wrote 
the father of the student. 
The parents took the student to two doctors who examined her and 
found that she was not pregnant and was a virgin. 
The parents then sought judgment for $1,000 for student in slander 
action for alleged statement of the principal to students• parents that 
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student was pregnant and unfit for school. The Supreme Court of New 
York in reversing the decision of a lower court and dismissing the case 
had this to say: 
Defendants duty required him to communicate to the board 
of education the fact that rumors concerning plaintiff were 
circulated among the students and teachers. In so acting, he 
was protected by a qualified privilege and is free from lia-
bility unless his conduct results from malice. That there is 
no actual malice is conceded. There is no evidence that de-
fendant acted with a wanton and reckless disregard of plain-
• tiff's rights or otherwise than in good faith.12 
In another case, however, that appeared in the Georgia Courts con-
cerning an action by student against a college president for slander in 
falsely and maliciously accusing her in hearing of another of indictable 
offense of larceny, during investigation of series of thefts, at col-
lege, were sufficient to establish prima facie case of liability. 13 
Words, even though ordinary slanderous, are not so considered when 
spoken by party in performance of public or official duty, upon first 
occasion and without malice. 14 
Communication by Parents About Teachers 
Owing to the public nature of the teaching profession, a teacher is 
not exempt from criticism, but accusations imputing to a teacher's want of 
professional capacity, immorality, or unprofessional conduct are clearly 
actionable per se unless privileged. The private conduct or character 
of a teacher or any person engaged in activities of public conern may be 
criticized so far as his private conduct of character affects his public 
12 Forsythe v. Durham, 200 N. E. 67!:1: (New York, 1936). 
i3Davidson v. Walters, 91 S. E.(2d) 520 (Georgia, 1956). 
14Gaillot v. Sauvagean, 1511 S. (2d) 515 (Louisiana, 1963). 
conduct. The criticism, although defamatory, as privileged must rep-
resent the actual opinion of the critic and not be made solely for the 
purpose of causing harm to the other. 
The law of defamation touches the teacher's career in this way. 
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How free is a parent to criticize a teacher, even though later it is 
proved that the parents accusations are false? This case was placed 
before the courts in New York in 1965. Since parents are taking a more 
active interest in school than ever before, this case should be of 
interest to teachers. 
Plaintiff had been an industrial arts teacher in the New York City 
school system for seventeen years. The defendant is the mother of one 
of the plaintiff's former pupils. In this action for libel, plaintiff 
seeks damages for "injury to his credit and reputation and his standing 
in the communi ty 11 and "great mental pain and anguish." 
The defendant visited the principal of the school at his office to 
complain and investigate an incident which her son Charles told her took 
place in the school on the day before. The principal called the plain-
tiff to the office. In the presence of defendant and her son, plaintiff 
was informed by the principal that he had received an oral complaint 
from defendant and her son that while correcting the schoolwork of 
Charles, grabbed him by the neck and pushed. his head into the desk, 
causing his nose to bleed. The teacher denied such incident took place. 
The principal requested the parent to write a letter concerning the in-
cident and submit it to him. The letter was placed in the teacher's 
personal file at school. 
The teacher brought action against the parent for libel on account 
of the letter accusing teacher of mistreating student. 
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T-he court held that the accusation about ( 1) the teacher was false 
and (2) that the letter and its contents were libelous. The next ques-
tion is whether the communication was "privileged." The court gave the 
following test. 
A communication made bonafide upon any subject-matter in 
which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference 
to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person 
having a corresponding interest or duty, al though it contains 
criminating matter which, without this privilege, would be 
slanderous and actionable; and this though the duty be not a 
legal one, but only a moral or social duty of imperfect 
obligation. 
The rule o.f law that permits such publication grew out of 
the desirability in the public interest of encouraging a full 
and fair statement by persons having a legal or moral duty to 
communicate their knowledge and information about a person in 
whom they have an interest to another who also has an interest 
in such person. Such privilege is known as a 'qualified priv-
ilege•. It is qualified because it does not extend beyond 
such statements as the writer makes in the performance of such 
duty and in good faith believing them to be true. 
Unquestionably, the defense of 'privilege' is applicable 
here and the courts so hold. 15 
The obvious "interest" which the parent has in his child, and in 
his education, makes him legally covered by the privilege, so long as 
(1) he complains to the school official qualified to receive such a 
complaint and (2) he acts not with malice and ill will; but in good 
faith. The motives of the accuser rather than the accusations being 
true or false determine the proof of damages. 
Libel 
Written defamation, libel, is more easily redressed in the law 
courts than spoken defamation. Libel is frequently actionable even 
15segall v. Piazza, 260 N. Y. S. (2d) 543 (N. '!.,, 1965) • 
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though the same words if spoken would not be actionable without special 
damage; that is, when the words are written, no injury to reputation 
need be proved. 
In New York, a jury awarded a teacher $100,000 in damage after the 
defendant was found guilty of circulating to approximately sixty persons 
a libelous statement to the effect that the teacher was a malicious 
liar. Since the teacher enjoyed a fine reputation, and did not lose 
his job as a result of the statement, the court reduced the award of the 
jury to $50,000. In so ruling, the court had this to say: 
One cannot review the long, honorable, active life of 
this plaintiff without feeling assured that the assailing of 
his character or reputation, which heretofore has been with-
out reproach according to evidence must have wounded the 
plaintiff deeply. 
The fact, however, that the jury found in favor of the 
plaintiff, especially in a case where the defendant pleaded 
the defense of truth or justification, must have given some 
solace and consolation to the plaintiff, if not, indeed a 
sort of balm for his wounded feelings. 
The evidence justifies the inference that the defendant 
sought to injure the plaintiff economically and profession-
ally by the communications which the defendant set in motion 
between himself and the officers of Columbia University, and 
other persons in the field of education and social service. 
But, so far as the evidence in this case tends to disclose, 
those efforts on the part of the defendant, however malevo,-
lently they were motivated, fortunately do not seem to have 
succeeded in the attainment of their harmful purpose.16 
In order for a communication to injure one's business or profes-
sional reputation, the words must relate directly to the person's 
official or business character and impute misconduct to him in that 
capacity. 
16 · . ( ) Forester ,v. Ridder, 57 N .• Y. S. 2d 668 (N •. Y., 1945). 
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A case came before the courts in Georgia involving the writers on 
the staff of the Saturday Evening~ and Wallace Butts, the athletic 
director at the University of Georgia. The story alleged that Butts, 
coach of the University of Georgia team, had given information on 
Georgia players to Bryant, coach of the University of Alabama team, ifi 
advance of the Alabama-Georgia game played in Birmingham in September, 
Butts, a man in his fifties holding the post of University Athletic 
Director at the University of Georgia, at the height of his career and 
having good prospects for possible advancements to a larger institution 
or other larger responsibilities, sued the publisher for damages of 
libel. Publication of the article, he said, had halted all of his cur-
rent negotiations for future employment in college and professional 
football, and in effect, destroyed or diminished his prospects. 
A jury in federal district court returned a verdict in his favor, 
and awarded him $60,000 actual damages and $J,OOO,OOO punitive damages, 
whereupon the defendant publisher moved for a new trial on the grounds 
that the award was grossly excessive. 
The order of the court was that the new trial be granted "unless 
the plaintiff, within 20 days shall in writing remit all the punitive 
damages awarded above the sum of $~00,000; the award of $60,000 for 
general damage to remain. " 
The court in ruling had this to say: 
The article was clearly defamatory and extremely so. 
The Saturday Evening ~ had a circulation in excess of six 
million copies per issue. It· claims readers of twenty-two 
million. Butts was unquestionably one of the leading figures 
in the national football picture. The jury was warranted in 
concluding from the foregoing incidents and the persistent 
and continuing attitude of the officers and agents of the 
defendant that there was a wanton or reckless indifference of 
plaintiff's rights. The guilt of the defendant was so 
clearly established by the evidence in the case so as to have 
left the jury no choice to find the defendant liable.17 
In the opinion of the court, the article was clearly defamatory 
because it unequivocally charged that Butts was a corrupt person who 
87 
betrayed or .sold out his students. The charge was not substantiated in 
court. One of the writers had specifically quoted several informants in 
support of his story, but most of these persons denied under oath they 
had given him any such information. Thus, the story appeared to be 
libelous publication based on charges unsupported by the evidence. 
If a man teacher unjustly accused of unchastity can show special 
damages, or that the defamation injured his reputation as a teacher, or 
that the conduct of which he is accused constitutes a statutory crime of 
which he is innocent, he can sue for libel. 
In Alabama, a statement charging a teacher with immoral conduct 
with his pupils was circulated. in a magazine. 18 The article contained 
pictures and detailed description of the teacher's alleged relations 
with school students, an attack with a hatchet and pistol on a poster, 
and of his resignation from a previous teaching position following 
charges of impro.per relations with students. The jury concluded that 
the publications had been made and were false. They returned a verdict 
of damages of $45,0QO to compensate the teacher for injury. 
In determining whether or not an article is libelous, it must be 
read as a whole, and words are to be construed together with their con-
text. In New York, a printed article misinterpreted a history 
17Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F. (2d) 916. (Ga.,. 19.~~,iL 
18 Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 124 So. (2d) 441. (~la.,, 19.(.)0H. 
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professor's statement as advocating mass ignorance of the United States 
history, was not libelous. The headlines did not identify any particu-
lar professor and the reading of the entire article would disclose that 
the claim that the professor advocated mass ignorance was merely the 
writer's unwarranted interpretation of professor's statement. The court 
in ruling had this to say: 
It is true that a defamatory heading .referring to a per-
son may be actionable al though the body of the article may 
explain away the defamatory construction to be placed upon 
the headline. This is so because many readers may only read 
the headlines and never read the body of the article. This 
is, however, not such a case since the headline merely reads: 
'Some Professors in Favor of Ignorance' and no one reading 
that plaintiff was in favor of mass ignorance. In order to 
connect the statement made in the headline with plaintiff one 
would have to read the body of the article, and upon doing so 
would, if a reasonable person, understand that as previously 
indicated, the plaintiff made no such statement.19 
Since all defamation of character cases turn on rule of reasonable-
ness, it is difficult to determine unequivocally in advance what may 
constitute defamation in any given set of circumstances. Teachers and 
counselors should be doubly careful to avoid abuse of privileged 
communications in the discharge of their duties. 
Religious Education 
As the American people have developed a national constitutional 
government based on the principle of separation of church and state, 
the public schools in the United States have been faced with developing 
a curriculum in a society of diverse religious beliefs. The quest for 
a solution as to what the scope of religious education should be in the 
19Mattingly v. News. Syndicate £2...:_, Inc., 81 N. Y. S. (2d) 30 
(N. Y., 194:8). 
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public school has led to the inclusion of a wide variety of religious 
practices in the curriculum of the pubiic schools. 
Originally, the individual states were free to do as they please~ 
about religion. It was only the federal government that was prohibited 
from passing a law "respecting an establishment of religion." At one 
time in their history, nine of the thirteen original colonies had state 
religions. The Congregational Church was established in Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and New Hampshire. The Anglican Church was established in 
New York, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
G . 20 eorgia. Four of these maintained established churches for more than 
twenty-five years after the adoption of the First Amendment. 
Upon undergoing the critical evaluation of the divergent citizenry 
of the country, many of the practices related to religion have been 
questioned as suitable activities for incorporation in the public school 
curriculum. Controversies have ensued over the different interpreta-
tions as to what constitutes religious freedom in the public schools, 
and, as a result, litigations have developed concerning the practices 
related to religious education in the curriculum. 
Public school practices conce:,:-ning the use of the Bible, the saying 
of prayers, and the singing of hymns as a part of the curriculum have 
caused controversies to be carried to the courts for adjudication. 
In 185!,i,, the Supreme Judicial Cour·t of Maine held that a regulation 
by the school board acting according to the statute adopting a particu-
lar version of the Bible as a textbook for use in the classroom was 
20 James V. Panoch" and David Barr, Religion ~ .:!:£_ School, (New 
York, 1968). 
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constitutional. 21 In Massachusett~ the Supreme Court upheld an order 
of the school committee that pupils should bow their heads during daily 
reading of the Bible and prayer. 22 In discussing the requirement, how-
ever, the court commented that a regulation ~equiring pupils to join in 
a religious rite or ceremony contrary to their religious beliefs would 
be involved. 
In Kentucky, the practice of conducting an exercise which included 
prayer and reading the King James version of the Bible was upheld by the 
courts. Concluding that: 
A prayer offered at the opening of a public school day, im~ 
ploring the aid and presence of the Heavenly Father during 
the day's work, asking for wisdom, patience, mutual love and 
respect, looking forward to a heavenly reunion after death, 
and concluding in Christ•s name, is not sectarian. 23 
In Texas, the Supreme Court by a unanimous decision upheld the 
reading of the King James Bible with no comment, the reciting of the 
Lord's Prayer, and the singing of hymns. Al though the students were 
required to be present and to be orderly, they were not required to 
participate. In support of its decision, the court reasoned as follows: 
Christianity is so interwoven with the web and woof of 
the state government that to sustain the contention that the 
Constitution prohibits reading the Bible, offering prayers, 
or singing songs ,of a religious character in any public 
building of the government would produce a condition border-
ing upon moral anarchy. The absurd and hurtful consequences 
furnish a strong argument against the soundness of the 
proposition. 24 
21Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Md. 379 (Maine, 1854). 
22spiller v. Inhabitants .2f Woburn, 94 Mass. 127 (1866). 
23ttackett v. Brooksville Graded School, 87 S. W. 792 (Kentucky, 
1905) • 
24 
Church v. Bullock, 109 S. W. 115 (Texas, 1908). 
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In 1950, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a statute requir-
ing that at least five verses from the Old Testament of the Bible be 
read without comment each day in each public school classroom and pre-
mitting the saying of the Lord's Prayer in such schools did not violate 
the First or Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution as 
claimed by the plaintiff. Pointing out that the statutes had been un-
challenged for forty-seven years, the court concluded its unanimous 
ruling as follows: 
Our view is that a prohibition which is not in the 
language and which is contrary to the intention of those who 
framed and adopted the instrument should not now be read into 
it. We consider that the Old Testament and the Lord's Prayer, 
pronounced without comment, are not sectarian, and that the 
short exercise provided by the statutes does not constitute 
sectarian instruction or sectarian worship but is a simple 
recognition of the Supreme Ruler of the Universe and a def-
erence to His majesty; that since the exercise is not sec-
tarian, no justifiable sectarian advantage or disadvantage 
flows therefrom; and that, in any event, the presence of a 
scholar at, and his participation in, that exercise is, under 
the direction of the Board of Education, voluntary. 25 
In 1956, the Supreme Court of Tennessee was called upon to rule on 
the constitutionality of a statute which imposed upon teachers the duty 
to read or cause to be read at the opening of every school day a selec-
tion from the Bible but prohibited the same selection from being read 
more than twice a month. The court explained that it was beyond the 
scope and authority of school officials and teachers in the public 
schools to conduct a program of education or explain the meaning of any 
chapter or verse in the Bible. The court added, however, that the read-
ing of a verse of the Bible without comment, the singing of some inspir-
ing songs, and the repeating of the Lord's Prayer were not violations of 
25Doremus v. Board of Education, 75A (2d) 880 (New Jersey, 
1950). 
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the constitutional mandate which guarantees to all men a right to wor-
ship God according to the dictates of their own conscience, nor could 
such exercises be considered the support of a place or form of worship. 
Commenting further that the doctrine of separation of church and state 
should not be tortured into a meaning never intended by the founders of 
the Republic, Chief Justice Neil declared: 
In conclusion we think that the highest duty of those who 
are charged with the responsibility of training the young peo-
ple of this state in the public schools is in teaching both by 
percept and example that in the conflicts of life they should 
not forget God •••• For this court to hold that the statute 
herein assailed contemplates the establishment of a religion, 
and that it is a subtle method of breaking down 1 Mr. 
Jefferson's' wall of separation 'between the church and state' 
would be a spectacular exhibition of judicial sophistry.26 
In February, 1963, the United States Supreme Court heard arguments 
in two cases concerning the constitutionality of Bible reading and the 
saying of the Lord's Prayer in the public school. 27 In one of the 
cases under consideration, Murray v. Curlett, a Maryland court had 
upheld exercises involving the recitation of the Lord's Prayer and read-
ing from the Bible. 28 The decision by a federal district court in the 
Schempp case, the other case being heard by the court, had held the 
practice of Bible reading in the public schools to be a violation of 
the Constitution. 29 
26 Carden v. Bland, 288 S. W. (2d) 718 (Tennessee, 1956). 
2711supreme Court Continues to Hear School Prayer Issues," The 
Dispatch, LXXX, No. 149 (February 28, 1963), p. 1. 
28 Murray v. Curlett and Board of Commissioners, 179A (2d) 698 
(Maryland, 1962). 
29school District of Arlington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 
374 U. S. 203, 83 S Ct. 1560 (Pennsylvania, 1963). 
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The Supreme Court of the United States handed down its decision 
concerning the propriety and constitutionality of Bible reading and 
the recitation of the Lord's Prayer in the public schools and the laws 
requiring them on June 17, 1963. 30 By an eight to one majority, the 
court declared that the required religious practices of reading the 
Bible and reciting the Lord's Prayer and the laws used in connection 
with requiring them are unconstitutional. 
Chief Justice Clark, writing the majority opinion, summarized the 
court's position in the following manner: 
The practice of religion in our society is an exalted 
one, achieve.d through a long tradition of reliance on the 
home, the church and inviolable citadel of the individual 
heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter ex-
perience that it is not within the power of government to 
invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid 
or oppose, to advance or retard. In the relationship between 
man and religion, the state is firmly committed to a position 
of neutrality. Though the application of that rule requires 
interpretation of a delicate sort, the rule itself is clearly 
and concisely stated in the words of the First Amendment. 
In the quest for a solution to the problem of how to provide moral 
and spiritual education for young people, some school systems have 
resorted to various programs revolving around a released time plan for 
religious education. 
In California, a case arose questioning the legality of a statute 
providing that "pupils, with the written consent of their parents, may 
be excused from schools to participate in religious exercises or 
instructions. 1131 The school district cooperated with the churches of 
30schempp v. School District, Arlington Township, 201 E. Suppl. 
815 (Pennsylvania, 1963). 
31Gordon v. Board of Education.£.!. Los Angeles, 178 R (2d) ~88 
(California, 19~7). 
the city in the released time program by aiding with records. Pupils 
who did not participate in the program remained in the classroom for 
instruction by the regular teacher. The court upheld the release time 
plan, maintaining that such action is a matter of discretion with the 
school board. 
In 1948, the McCollum case reached the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 32 The appellant had begun an action of mandamus against the 
Board of Education alleging that religious teachers employed by private 
religious groups were allowed to give religious instruction in public 
school classrooms. Pupils who did not participate in the religious 
instruction during the released time were required to leave their regu-
lar classrooms and study their secular studies at various places in the 
school building. The petitioner charged that the released time program 
for religious education in the public schools violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In support of 
the petitioner's contention, Justice Black, delivering the opinion of 
the court said: 
To hold that a state cannot consistently with the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments utilize its public school system to 
aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination 
of their doctrines and ideals does not, as counsel urge, 
manifest a governmental hostility to religion or religious 
teachings. A manifestation of such hostility would be at war 
with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amend-
ment's guaranty of the free exercise of religion. For the 
first Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and 
government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each 
is left free from the other within its respective sphere. 
Here not only are the State's tax-supported public 
school buildings used for the dissemination of religious 
doctrines, the State also affords sectarian groups an 
32Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School 
District~· 71,333 U •. s. 302, 68 S~ Ct. 4:6(1948). 
invaluable aid in that it 
religious classes through 
public school machinery. 
and State. 
helps to provide pupils for their 
use of the State's compulsory 
This is not separation of Church 
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The Supreme Court of the United States heard another case pertain-
ing to released time. This case differed from the previous case in that 
the classrooms were not turned over to religious instruction in the 
school building. Pupils were released with parental approval during the 
school day to go to religious centers away from the public school for 
religious instruction or activities, and those pupils who did not desire 
to participate in the program remained in the classroom. In upholding 
the program, Justice Douglas, delivering the majority opinion of the 
court, said: 
We would have to press the concept of separation of 
Church and State to those extremes to condemn the present law 
on constitutional grounds. The nullification of this law 
would have wide .and profound effects.... The teacher ••• 
cooperates in a religious program to the extent of making it 
possible for her students to participate in it. Whether she 
does it occasionally for a few students, regularly for one, 
or pursuant to a systematized program designed to further the 
religious needs of all the students does not alter the 
character of the act. 
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose 
a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom of worship as one 
chooses ••• When the state ••• cooperates with religious 
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to 
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our tradition. For 
it then respects the religious nature of our people and 
accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. 
To hold that it may not, would be to find in the Constitution 
a requirement that the government show a callous indifference 
to religious g~oups. That would be preferring those who 
believe in no religion over those who do believe •••• 33 
The courts have been called upon to rule on numerous controversies 
related to religious instruction in the public schools. Consistency in 
33 ) Zorach v. Clauson, 34:3 U.S. 306, 72 S. Ct. 679 (N. Y., 1952 • 
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the rulings of the courts has focused on a recognition of the principle 
of separation of church and state, but a divergence of opinions has 
existed in the interpretation of the courts as to what breaches the 
principle and violates the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held a prayer prescribed 
for public schools by a state authority to be in violation of the First 
Amendment. In addition, the Court has declared that the required prac-
tice of reading the Bible and reciting the Lord's Prayer and the laws 
used in connection with them are unconstitutional. Since this decision, 
it is expected that in the future if such questions should come before 
the state courts that the reading of the Bible and reciting the Lord's 
Prayer in the public school would be held illegal. 
A released time program for religious instruction in connection 
with the public schools has been upheld where the instruction took 
place outside the school premises and the operational machinery of the 
school was not actively involved in the program. 
Stripped of its essentials, the legal background indicates that the 
teacher may expose but must not impose religion. 11 Expose 11 here means 
to convey understanding of a phenomenon, the reasons for it, the per-
sonalities who developed it, and its subsequent influence. "Impose" 
means to require a commitment to a particular value system. 
Nothing religious has been barred from the public school. There is 
no theme, no concept, no idea, no personality, no object, and no book 
that has been banned from the public school as such. The legality de-
pends on the use. If the use is to expose for understanding, it is 
legal; if it is to impose for commitment, it is illegal. 
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Tort Liability 
A tort is a wrong committed against the person or property of 
another. L . b"l"t . 1 1 "b"l"t 34 Th f t t 1· b"l 1a 1 1 y is ega respons1 1 1 y. ere ore, or 1a 1 -
ity is the responsibility of one who commits a wrong against the prop-
erty of another to answer to the injured by the payment of damages. 
Some injuries are accidental; that is, no one has been at fault. These 
are called "pure accidents" and no damages are recoverable. What is 
pure accident is determined by the process of elimination: when the 
rules do not classify an injury as having occurred through the negli-
gence or intentional wrong-doing of another, the injury is said to have 
been caused by a pure accident. Tort liability, within the scope of 
this chapter, rests upon the negligence of the one who is the legal 
cause of the injury. 
The meaning of negligence and the rules of law concerning liabil-
ity for negligent acts causing injury must be examined. To discuss the 
tort liability of school districts, local school boards, and their 
employees, certain distinctions must be made. 
The school district in its corporate status and the board of edu-
cation as a legal entity are concepts in school law difficult to 
understand. Education is a state function, and to fulfill that function 
the state has divided its territory into subdivisions usually called 
school districts. Being a subdivision of the state, a school district 
takes on some of the attributes of the state. School boards are arms 
of state government, therefore acts for the state within the powers 
34Madaline K. Remmlein, ~~~ Local Public School Adminis-
tration (New York, 1953), p. 30. 
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delegated to it by the state. Only the board, acting as a unit in a 
regular convened meeting, has the authority to the action that involves 
the exercise of discretion. This rule has been stated as follows: 
The board of directors of a school district is an entity 
which can act and spe.ak only as such. The separate and indi-
vidual acts and discussions of the director members, even 
though they may be in complete agreement with each other, 35 
have no effect. They must be assembled and act as a board. 
In the normal course of events, then, tort liability is the same 
when a school district or its board of education is charged with negli-
gent conduct resulting in injury. 
The corporate liability of a school district depends whether or not 
(1) the statutes of the state are silent, (2) existing state statutes 
preserve the district's governmental immunity, (J) existing state 
statutes abrogate the district's governmental immunity, or (4) existing 
state statutes impose liability.36 
In the absence of statutes, tort liability rests on common law 
principles. Common law was the law that was in force in England at the 
time the United States was founded. Common law principles remain the 
law in the United States unless changed for a particular state by its 
state legislature. 
Under common law, the state and its political subdivisions are not 
subject to tort actions. This is called governmental immunity. It 
began .in the.Middle Ages when it was said, "The King can do no wrong." 
Since a tort is a wrong, school districts cannot successfully be sued in 
35state v. Consolidated School District No. 1., 281 s. WA (2d) 511 
(Missouri, 1955). 
36Lee O. Garber, ~~~School Business Manager (Danville,, 
Illinois, 1957). 
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tort actions unless a state legislature has abrogated the common law 
immunity. 
This reason is not as sound today as when first advanced many 
years ago, and the theory of governmental immunity has been criticized. 
Lincoln is quoted as saying, 11 It is as much the duty of government to 
render proper justice against itself, in favor of its citizens as to 
administer the same between private individuals.11 37 Since Lincoln's 
day, critics have included legislators, judges, and educators. Yet, the 
very judges who criticize the theory as being antiquated usually follow 
the precedents laid down under the theory. 
Several states have passed legislation that would seem to have been 
intended to abrogate the governmental immunity of their school dis-
tricts. Among the earliest were Minnesota, Washington, and Oregon. The 
Oregon law of 1862 provided that: 
An action or suit may be maintained against any of the 
other public corporations in this state mentioned in section 
8-701 including school districts in its corporate charac-
ter, and within the scope of its authority, or for an injury 
to the rights of the plaintiff arising from som38act or 
commission of such other public corporation •••• 
In 1917, the Washington legislature passed a law applicable to 
school districts specifically excluding actions based on injuries sus-
tained in playgrounds, field houses, or from the use of athletic 
t 1 . l t . . . t 39 appara us or app iances, or manua raining equipmen. 
In New York, the history of the development of tort liability of 
school districts is different. The New York courts applied the common 
37First Annual Message, December 3, 1861. 
38oregon Compiled Laws Annotated, Sec. 8-702. 
39R . d ' t S 28 58 030 · evise ~ .2.f. Washing on, ec. , • • 
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law principle of respondent superior even before it had statutory pro-
visions in its Education Law.4o Then, in 1937, New York enacted a 
"save harmless" law for school districts, which included authorization 
to carry insurance. 41 Courts of New York have interpreted the same 
harmless law as, in effect, imposing direct liability on the school 
board, saying that it was unnecessary to sue an employee and obtain a 
judgment first and then seek settlement of the judgment from the school 
42 
board. 
In a case decided by the Court of Appeals of New York in 1965, 
action had been brought against a board of education for injuries sus-
tained by a child who was struck by a snowball on school property as 
she was returning to school after lunch. The school had made a rule 
against snowball throwing and the child's teacher had warned her pupils 
not to throw snowballs. 
The court, in reaching its decision, laid down several significant 
legal rules governing playground supervision by teachers in general and 
stated the measure of care which teachers owe their pupils: 
Teachers have watched over the play of their pupils time 
out of mind. At recess periods, no less than in the class~ 
room, a teacher owes it to his charges to exercise such care 
of them as a parent of ordinary prudence would observe in 
comparable circumstances • 
••• No one grows up in this climate without throwing 
snowballs and being hit by them. If snow is on the ground as 
children come to school, it would require intensive policing, 
almost child by child, to take all snowball throwing out of 
play. It is unreasonable to demand or expect such perfection 
40 
Court of Claims!£!, Sec. 8. 
41 
New York Education Law, Sec~ ·3023. 
42 
Reeder v. Board of Education .£.!. ~ ~ City, 290, Ng Y. 829 
( 1943). 
in supervision from ordinary teachers or ordinary school man-
agement; and a fair test of reasonable care does not demand 
it. 
A reasonable measure of a school's responsibility for 
snowball throwing is to control or prevent it during recre-
ation periods according to the best judgment of conditions, 
and to take energetic steps to intervene at other times if 
dangerous play comes to its notice while children are within 
its area of responsibility. 
No requirement • • • is imposed on teachers to enforce the 
rules against snowballs by standing outside in the cold to 
watch to see that children do not violate the rule as they 
come into the school, and it is an undue burden on the school 
to impose a liability because teachers did not stand outside 
for active intervention in the circumstances shown by the 
record. 
A school is not liable for every thoughtless or careless 
act by which one pupil may injure another. Nor is liability 
invariably to fall on it because a school rule has bet~ vio-
lated and an injury has been caused by another pupil. 
It appears that teachers today are being sued for negligence 
resulting in pupil injury more than ever before. 
In the states where government immunity has been abrogated, the 
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courts will accept a tort action against the school district based upon 
an injury caused by negligence of the board of education itself, collec-
tively, or its agent or employees. However, it is theoretically pos-
sible for a district required to pay damages because of negligence of 
one of its agents or employees, to seek indemnity from the individual 
whose negligence cause the district's liability. Therefore, these 
statutes do not entirely relieve individuals from responsibility for 
their negligent acts, although from the practical point of view, the 
'*3Burns v. Board 2.f Education.£.!~~ City, 39 N. Y. "'=23 
(1965). 
school district is not likely to seek indemnity because of the 
financial condition of most of its employees. 44 
Teacher Responsibility 
Since an individual is not liable for damages when the injured 
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cannot prove negligence on the part of the defendant, it is necessary to 
examine the meaning of negligence. When an injury occurs in such a way 
that the injured cannot prove it happened but the evidence shows that 
it could have happened only through the negligence of the defendant, 
such as when a locker fell, obviously because it was negligently secured 
to a wall, the~ ipsa loquitur principle would apply if the school 
district were subject to tort action. However, this principle would 
not be applied in most states because of their government immunity. If 
an individual were responsible for conduct leading to such an injury, 
the principle would apply. It is only under this principle that the 
injured need not prove negligence; then he must prove that the principle 
applies. In all other circumstances, the injured plaintiff has the 
burden of proof that his injury resulted from the negligence of the 
defendant. 45 
Negligence as a separate tort emerged about 1825. Negligence is 
conduct which should be recognized by a reasonable prudent man as 
involving unreasonable danger to others. 
Certain elements are necessary for an action based on negligence. 
They are: 
44 
Freund v. Oakland Board.£! Education, 82 P. (2d) 197. (Calif., 1938). 
4511District Liability for Injuries,"~ Nations Schools, 58: 
44-46, (July, 1956). 




The failure to so act; 
The injury, of another, causing loss or damage, as the 
result of such failure.46 
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The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, and negligence ordinarily 
must be proved by circumstantial evidence. The ~ ipsa loqui tur prin-
ciple is an example. It is applicable when: (1) the accident is of a 
kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negli-
gence, (2) the apparent cause of the accident indicates that the defen-
dant would be responsible for any negligence connected with it, and (3) 
the plaintiff had not been guilty of contributory negligence. 47 Under 
these circumstances, the plaintiff can invoke the~ ipsa loquitur 
principle without actual proof of the defendant's negligent conduct. 
In general, negligence can be of two kinds: (1) behavior which a 
reasonable man would have realized involved an unreasonable risk of in-
jury to others, and (2) failure to do an act which one is under a duty 
to do for the protection of another. 
Harper lists a number of kinds of conduct which creates actionable 
1 . 48 neg 1.gence. From this list, the following applications can be made to 
injuries sustained by pupils due to negligence of teachers and other 
school employees. 
46Madaline K. Remmlein, "Tort Liabilities of School Districts, 11 
~and~ School Business Manager (Danville, 1957), p. 204. 
47Ibid., p. 205. 
48 
Fowler Harper, ~ Law of Torts (Indianapolis, Ind., 1933), 
PP• 171-176. 
A school employee may be negligent because: 
1. He did not take appropriate care; 
2. Although he used due care, he acted in circumstances 
which created risks; 
J. His acts created an unreasonable risk of direct and 
immediate injury to others; 
4. He set in motion a force which was unreasonably 
hazardous to others; 
5. He created a situation in which third persons, such 
as pupils, or inanimate forces, such as shop machin-
ery, may reasonably have been expected to injure 
others; 
6. He allowed pupils to use dangerous devices although 
they were incompetent to use them; 
7. He did not control a third person, such as an ab-
normal pupil, whom he knew to be likely to inflict 
intended injury on others because of some incapacity 
or abnormality; 
8. He did not give adequate warning; 
9. He did not look out for persons, such as pupils, who 
were in danger; 
10. He acted without sufficient skill; 
11. He did not make sufficient preparation to avoid in-
jury to pupils before beginning an activity where 
such preparation is reasonably necessary; 
12. He failed to inspect and repair mechanical devices 
to be used by pupils; 
13. He prevented someone, such as another teacher, from 
assisting a pupil who was endangered, although the 
pupil's peril was not caused by negligence. 
Literature abounds with discussions of negligent behavior in 
specific circumstances. Garber lists ten precautions to be followed 
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to avoid negligence when taking pupils on field trips or excursions.49 
Li:9Lee o. Garber, "Field Trips and Excursions," The Nation's 
Schools (September, 1955), pp. 82-85. 
105 
Leibee50 lists sixteen ways to prevent negligent conduct on the part 
of physical education teachers; Piils51 lists thirteen ways that shop 
teachers could be negligent. 
Teacher Liability 
The fact that a pupil sustains an injury in a school-related activ-
ity does not, in itself, mean that the teacher in charge of the activity 
will be held liable for the injury. Injury to pupils may result in pure 
accident which occurs without negligence. 52 
Application of the rule that a teacher is expected to exercise 
reasonable foresight is illustrated by a case in which a pupil was 
crushed by a log at a beach while on a schoo~ .outing. The teacher in 
charge of the outing was assisted by several other adults, including the 
mother of the injured child. Several children climbed upon a large log 
lying on the beach some distance from the water's edge. While the 
teacher was trucing a picture of the children on the log, a large wave 
suddenly surged up the beach causing the log to roll over. The injured 
child fell to the seawar<l side of the log, and when the wave receded it 
drew the log over the child. The court ruled that the injury was fore-
seeable and that the teacher was negligent in failing to truce action to 
avoid the injury. The court commented: 
50Howard C. Leibee, "Legal Liability for Injuries in the Service 
Program," College Physical Education Association Proceedings ( 1954), 
PP• 34-39. 
51H. E. Piils, 11 Are Shop Teachers Liable'? 11 Safety Education, 
:(May, 1951), PP• 13-14. 
52wire v. Williams, 133 N. W. (2d) 840 (Minn., 1965). 
The first proposition asks this court to hold, as a matter 
of law, that unusual wave action on the shore of the Pacific 
Ocean is a hazard so unforeseeable that there is no duty to 
guard against it •••• On the contrary, we agree with the 
trial judge, who observed that it was common knowledge that 
accidents substantially like the one that occurred in this 
case have occurred at beaches along the Oregon coast. Fore-
seeability of such harm is not so remote as to be ruled out 
as a matter of law •••• 53 
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In another case involving the question of foreseeability, it has 
been held that a teacher was negligent in permitting a boy to burn a 
hole in an automobile which had an open gasoline tank, which exploded, 
k · 11 · · 1 d . . . th 54: i ing one pupi an inJuring ano er. 
In other cases, however, it has been ruled that an acc{dent which 
,resulted in injury to a pupil could not reasonably have been foreseen 
by the teacher. In a Michigan case, a pupil was injured while watering 
plants in a nature study class. The pupil, with the teacher's know-
ledge, stood on a chair to water some plants and was severely cut when 
she fell from the chair and landed on a broken bottle in which she had 
been carrying water. In ruling that the teacher had not been negligent, 
the Supreme Court of Michigan said: 
••• There is nothing in the nature of the act itself or the 
instrumentalities with which plaintiff was permitted to 
perform the act which would lead a reasonably careful and 
prudent person to anticipate that the child's safety or 
welfare was endangered in the performance of the act. The 
mere fact that an accident happened, and one that was un-
fortunate, does not render defendant liable.55 
53Morris v. Douglas County School District ~ .2.., 4:0J P. (2d) 775 
(Ore., 1965). 
54: Dutcher v. Santa Rosa High School District, 2908 (2d) 316 
(Calif., 1955) • 
55Gaincott v. Davis, 275 N. W .• 229 (Mich., 1937). 
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It has also been ruled that a teacher could not be expected to 
anticipate that a paper bag which she asked a pupil to pick up would 
contain a broken soda bottle upon which the pupil would cut herself. 56 
Liability for negligence is based upon two considerations: (1) 
the character of the conduct, and (2) the nature of the results. The 
amount of caution required is proportioned to the amount of threatened 
or apparent danger. The legal cause of an injury is that cause which 
in the natural sequence of events produced the result. The first test 
for determining liability is whether or not the defendant's liability is 
legal cause of the plaintiff's injury. To do this, the law uses the 
measure of foreseeability. When a reasonable prudent person could have 
foreseen the harmful results of his act and disregards the foreseeable 
-consequences, his act is the legal cause of the injury and he is liable 
for his negligent conduct. 
Summary 
It is clear that ••• { teachers] have the right under 
our law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will. ••• 
It is equally clear that they have no right to work for the 
state in the school system on their own terms •••• They may 
work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid 
down by the proper authorities •••• If they do not choose to 
work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their 
beliefs and associations and go elsewhere.57 
The rights of citizens, including teachers, to assemble and speak 
freely are constitutional rights, and should be zealously guarded, but 
they must yield when they conflict with a higher public interest. The 
56west v. Board of Education of City of New York, 187 N. Y.S. (2d) 88 
(1959).--
57 Adler v. Board of Edu cat ion, 3/,i,2 U. S. 4c85 ( 1952). 
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public interest in an uninterrupted educational system is most impor-
tant. It may outweigh the constitutional rights of the teacher in 
certain situations. 
To allow the teacher to carry out the proper function of teaching, 
the law recognizes that the teacher must be free to state candidly his 
opinions, observations, and beliefs. Under some circumstances, teachers 
have a qualified privilege communication. However, the right of free 
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
never meant the unrestricted right to say what one pleases at all times 
under all circumstances. 
When a teacher makes a publication in good faith, whether written 
or oral, the statement is generally privileged communication. Any state-
ment, however, which is motivated by malice removes this privilege and 
may subject the party to liability. 
Since all defamation of character cases turn on the rule of rea-
sonableness, it is difficult to declare in advance what may constitute 
defamation of character in any given set of circumstances. Teachers, 
counselors, and principals should be doubly careful to avoid abuse of 
privileged communications in the discharge of their duties. 
The courts will not interfere in the exercise of a board's discre-
tion on employment practices, unless it can be shown that the board has 
been discriminatory in its deliberations; that is, discrimination must 
be on the basis of race, color, or creed, rather than on the basis of 
the individual's qualifications. In many instances, this is not easy 
to prove. 
The governing of the right of teachers to strike has not been 
precisely established, but such authority as there is indicates that 
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teachers, like other government employees, do not have this right. It 
has been held that teachers may engage in collective bargaining provided 
they do not do so under threat of strike. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISMISSAL OF TEACHERS 
Intro duct ion 
The word dismissal refers to the termination of the teacher's ser-
vices by a board of education prior to the lawful expiration date of the 
contract. It applies to the tenure teacher as well as to the probation-
ary teacher, so long as the action is taken prior to the end of the 
contractual period. It does not apply to refusal of a board to renew 
the non-tenure teacher's contract; such non-renewal does not constitute 
dismissal in the legal sense of the word. In general, dismissal in 
legal terminology is interchangeable with such other terms as release, 
discharge, let go, let out, terminated, and removed from the position of 
teacher. While there are obvious differences of meaning in these terms, 
they are essentially the same when applied to teacher dismissal. 
Since the right of teachers to compensation for teaching arise out 
of a contract with the district, it follows that she has no right to 
compensation if she breaks her contract and the board may discharge her 
with legal impunity. The right of the board to dismiss teachers is a 
correlative function of its right to employ them. This right must be 
exercised, however, in a reasonable manner and within the limitations of 
any existing legal framework. A teacher's contract of employment in-
cludes the implied power of the school board to dismiss the teacher who 
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fails to competently and loyally perform all reasonable assigned duties 
and to act in an exemplary manner. 
There is, of course, some times great difficulty in determining 
what teacher action constitutes cause for dismissal. An examination of 
the state statutes and court cases reveals a wide range of cause for 
which teachers may be discharged from their positions. 
The law provides for a formal procedure in reference to the termi-
nation of the contract and provides not only for notice to the teacher 
as to the alleged charges, but also for a hearing before the board of 
education. A teacher employed for a school year, if wrongfully dis-
charged before expiration of the term of employment, may recover salary 
in full for the remainder of such term, upon demonstrating the failure 
1 
to obtain other employment after reasonable effort to do so. If em-
ployment is obtained, whatever amount is earned during such period must 
be offset against the salary claimed. A teacher who does not challenge 
the sufficiency of the reasons of the board in dispensing with hisser-
vices, cannot recover salary for the remainder of the year as fixed in 
his contract of employment. 
Statutory Rights of Board to Dismiss Teachers 
In many states, the statutes provide that teachers may be dismissed 
upon stated grounds. In such states, they may be dismissed only upon 
the grounds indicated. 2 In other words, the specification of grounds 
of dismissal precludes all other grounds by implication. The wording of 
1u . r1e v. 
1922) .--
Board of Education of Pryor Creek, 208 P. 210 (Okla., 
2ci ty .£!. Elwood v. State, 180 N •. E. 4:71 ( Ind., 1932). 
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statutes vary widely but most of them are to the general effect that 
dismissal may be had for incompetency, immorality, or neglect of duty. 
A few statutes have added to the grounds just stated the clause, "and 
for other good and just causes." 
But even in these instances the cause must be of a character simi-
lar to those enumerated. In a Mississippi case, the court said: 
••• The phrase, •or other good causes, 1 in the statute must 
be considered in connection with the specific causes pre-
ceding it. It is a well recognized rule of law where in a 
statute general words follow a designation of particular 
charges, the meaning of the general words will be presumed to 
to be restricted by the particular designation, and to in-
clude only things of the same kind, class, or nature as 
those specifi~ally enumerated, unless there is a clear 
manifestation of a contrary purpose.3 
The legal provisions for dismissal for any good or just cause 
refers to the teacher's fitness or capacity to discharge his duties. 
Any grounds put forward by a board of education must be in good faith 
and not arbitrary, irrational~ unreasonable, or irrelevant to the 
board's task of building an efficient school system. In so ruling a 
Massachusetts court had this to say: 
Manifestly one of the most important duties involved in the 
management of a .school system is the choosing and keeping of 
proper and competent teachers. The success .of a school system 
depends largely on the character and ability of the teachers. 
Unless a school committee has authority to employ and dis-
charge teachers it would be difficult to perform properly its 
duty of managing a school system •••• 
••• In accord with the general legislative policy in the 
regard to the discharge of teachers •good sense' is held to 
include •any ground which is put forward by the committee in 
3Madison County Board of Education v. Miles, 173 So. (2d) 425 
(Miss., 1965). 
good faith and which is not arbitrary, irrational, unreason-
able, or irrelevant to the committee's task of building up 
and maintaining an efficient school system.'~ 
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Where the statutes do not specify what constitutes good cause, the 
power to determine this question is in the hands of the board of educa-
tion. This power may not be exercised unreasonably or arbitrarily says 
the court in Illinois and in so ruling stated: 
It is our opinion that the statutes give the Board ample au-
thority to determine in the first instance what causes were 
not remediable, and that the Board was well within its rights 
in apparently determining, in the first instance, and until 
a final hearing, that the charges, particularly when con-
sidered as a whole, were not remediable.5 
A contract may specify grounds for dismissal where the statutes are 
silent or where it is clear that the grounds expressed by statutes are 
6 
not intended to be exclusive of all others. 
The legislature has the right to determine the grounds upon which 
teachers may be employed and discharged and boards may not, by the 
weight of authority and the better view, append other grounds to those 
stated in the law. While there are cases to the contrary, it is usually 
held that of specific statutory grounds for dismissal are stated, a 
provision in the contract that the teacher shall teach only at the dis-
cretion of the board is invalid. 
It is well established that school teachers are not public 
officers. They are employees, and such rights as they have to 
~Davis v. School Cammi ttee of Somerville, JO N. E. (2d) 1±01 (Mass., 
1940). 
5Eveland v. Board of Education, 92 N. E.(2d)182 (Ill., 1950). 
--6Consolidated School District v. Millis, 139 P. (2d) 18J (Okla., 
194:J). 
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compensation grow out of contractual relationship.? The welfare of the 
schools requires that the rights and responsibilities both of the teach-
er and the board of education be clearly defined and established on 
principles that recognize a professional status for the teachers. 
Generally, teachers can be dismissed only for cause during their 
contract period, and as a rule they can be dismissed for no other 
8 
reason. The assumption is that the enumeration of causes in the stat-
utes was intended to be exhaustive. If a board wishes to dismiss a 
teacher prior to the end of his contract, it must be able to prove in a 
hearing at least one or more of the following stipulated conditions for 
dismissal: incompetency, willful neglect of duty, immorality and mis-
conduct, refusal to obey rules and order of board, marriage, and for 
other good causes. 
Incompetency 
Incompetency is a valid ground for dismissal at common law and 
under the statutes of the several states. By accepting a teaching posi-
tion, the teacher thereby represents that he possesses a reasonable 
degree of skill and learning, that he will be diligent in the execution 
of his work and has reasonable ability to discipline and control his 
school. Whether the teacner meets these standards is a question of 
fact to be determined by the legal trier of the facts, and the burden 
of proof is upon those who assert that the teacher has fallen short of 
his obligations. 
7 Brown v. Bowling, 2'*0 P. (2d) 84:6 (New Mexico, 1952). 
8 
People v. Maxwell, 69 N. E. 1092 (New York, 1904:). 
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It is not always clear what constitutes incompetency, since the 
fact that the teacher holds a valid certificate is considered prima 
facia evidence of competence before the law. Since the teacher holds a 
valid certificate, the burden of proof of incompetence rests on the 
board of education. A Connecticut court states: 
It is time, as he claims, that the board had the power to 
terminate his employment only if the charge of 'gross ineffi-
ciency' was 'supported by a preponderence of the evidence,' 
viewed from the standpoint that the board had the burden of 
proof. This means simply, as in any civil action, that the 
evidence must when considered fairly and impartially, induce 
a reasonable belief that. the fact in issue is true.9 
In a North Dakota case, the court commented: 
••• it becomes important to distinguish between a cause for 
discharge and termination of contract based on a rule and a 
cause for discharge and termination of a contract not based 
on a rule. In the latter case, the misconduct must be of 
such a serious nature that, standing alone, it would 
constitute cause.10 
It is also the opinion of several courts that examples of ineffi-
ciency or incompetent teaching behavior which can be remedied are not 
sufficient cause for dismissal. A teacher may be issued a warning 
without a written notice that, unless the quality of his performance 
11 improves, dismissal will be recommended. 
In Illinois a case came before the courts to determine that in the 
absence of prior warning, alleged failure of teacher to require enough 
work of students, improper grading of papers and tests, incompetence 
9conley v. Board. of Education.£!. City .£!. Britain, 123A (2d) 747 
(Conn., 1956). 
10Miller v. South ~ Special School District No • .!, 124 N. W. 
(2d) 475 (North Dakota, 1963). 
11Board ..£!. Education, Tucson High School Dist. No • .! v. Williams, 
4o3 P. (2a) 324 (Ariz., 1965). 
in classroom, failure to teach students enough were "remediable, 11 and 
if teacher was entitled to warning before notice of charges for dis-
missal. The court in ruling had this to say: 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that any of the 
causes proved inflicted damage or injury to the school, stu-
dents or faculty which could have not been remedied if com-
plaints had been made to the plaintiff when knowledge of the 
causes first came to the attention of her superior and there 
is no evidence or reason inferable from the records why 
plaintiff would not have corrected the causes if her supe-
riors had warned her or made complaints about the causes.12 
In another case appearing before the courts it was held that the 
use of corporal punishment, use of improper language, and exhibiting 
uncontrollable temper were remediable. 13 
In the Horasho case, a teacher who worked in a beer garden was 
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discharged on the grounds of incompetency, inasmuch as the type of work 
caused her to lose the respect of the community and her pupils. 14 She 
had been given a rating of 11 43 per cent competent" by the county 
superintendent, a rating of 50 per cent was the passing or average 
rating. The court ruled that the combination of her outside work and 
low rating constituted legal basis for dismissal on the grounds of 
incompetency. 
In California, the Los Angeles school board dismissed a permanent 
teacher for incompetency, basing its charges on the lack of knowledge of 
subject matter, failure to organize courses or study, lack of control 
12 
Werner v. Community Unit School Dist. ~ i!:,, 190 N. E. (2d) 184 
(Ill., 1963). 
13Miller v. Board of Education of School Dist. ~ 132, 200 N. E. 
(2d) 838 (Ill., 1964). 
14 
(1939). 
Horasho v. Mount Pleasant Township School District, 6A (2d) 866 
over pupils, and failure to cooperate with colleagues. The teacher 
contended that the charges set forth in the complaint failed to give 
sufficient definitions as to enable him to prepare a defense. The 
Supreme Court of California, in ruling for the board and against the 
teacher said: 
Section 5.652 (of the school code) requires that the notice 
specify the 'nature' of the alleged incompetency with suffi-
cient particularity to furnish the employee an opportunity 
to correct his faults. It is not required that any particu-
lar facts or episodes be set forth in the notice. Defendant 
was given sufficient notice of the charges against him to 
enable him to overcome his deficiencies if he had the ability 
and desire to do so. Counsel for plaintiff aptly suggested 
that the governing board notified defendant to study more, 
plan more, control his temper, be more polite, to be more 
cooperative, and be more self-controlled. The notice was a 
sufficient compliance with the School Code.15 
Neglect of Duty 
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As in the case of incompetency, what constitutes neglect of duty is 
a question of fact. The courts have not attempted to define it. It is 
clear that repeated absences or tardiness is such neglect of duty as to 
justify the dismissal of the teacher. Even if the teacher is unavoid-
ably absent for a long period of time, as in the case of illness, her 
contract may be terminated. The test is not whether the absence was 
avoidable but rather whether it is of such duration that it goes to the 
essence of the contract. That is, does the absence deprive the district 
of a substantial part of the services to which it was entitled under the 
contract. If it does the contract may be terminated without liability. 
There may, therefore, be involuntary or unavoidable neglect of duty 
15 Board of Education of City of~ Angeles v. Ballou, 68 P. (2d) 
781 (1937). 
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which goes to the essence of the contract. Not every neglect of duty, 
however, small, will justify dismissal. The charges must be substantial. 
In an Illinois case, outside employment of an agriculture teacher 
which tended to interfere with his teaching duties constituted suffi-
cient neglect in the opinion of the court to warrant the teacher's 
dismissa1. 16 Serious illness may render a teacher incapable of per-
forming his regular duties. In California, a teacher who became the 
victim of sarcoidosis was absent from school for long periods of time. 
The board dismissed him on the ground that he was neglecting his teach-
ing duties. The court upheld the board, noting that the teacher's 
affliction made it necessary for him to be absent from duty more often 
17 than the normal person. 
From these cases it appears that the courts will attempt to dis-
cover whether the absence was of such duration as to breach the con-
tract, not whether the absence was unavoidable. A teacher visiting in 
Europe missed the ship that would have allowed her to return in time for 
her position was judged not to have breached her contract. The board 
could not legally dismiss her for neglect, inasmuch as the delay was 
unintentional and unavoidable. 18 
To the same effect was a case in California where the courts ruled 
that an unavoidable delay in reporting back to work after a brief vaca-
tion did not constitute sufficient basis for the teacher's dismissal on 
16Meredith v. Board of Education of Community Unit School District 
No. l, 130 N. E. (2d) 5 (Ill., 1957). - -
17Riggins v. Board£! Eq.ucation, JOO P. (2d) 84:8 (Calif., 1956). 
18 School District No. 1 v. Parker, 260 P. 521 (Calif.,. 1927). --- -----·-- -- -
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the ground of neglect of duty. The teacher had been employed in the 
district for more than twenty years. He had worked diligently, some-
times without pay, for the promotion of the summer school and other 
similar projects. Leaving a note on the principal 's desk, he absented 
himself from the job, and went deer hunting, giving the impression that 
it was due to illness. Much to his dismay, he was II snowed in" while on 
the hunting trip, and reported back to school later than he had antici-
pated. The board deducted $96.00 from his salary, and dismissed him. 
The Supreme Court of California, in a three-to-two decision, refused to 
uphold the board in its action. 
The court said that the defendant was guilty of a measure of de-
ception and his conduct was reprehensible when measured by the high 
standards of his profession. But whether the legislature intended that 
all deception, however slight, should result in dismissal is doubtfu1. 19 
Courts will not, however, uphold persons that have been dismissed 
20 
for willful absence from duty. 
A ruling by the Tenure Commission of Michigan indicates that minor 
neglect of duty does not justify dismissal of tenure teachers. A 
teacher upset over a discipline problem and an unrelated reprimand by 
the assistant superintendent turned his keys and classbook over to 
another teacher. Two days later when he apologized and indicated his 
willingness to return, he was informed that he was no longer employed. 
The Tenure Commission of Michigan held that the teacher was wrongfully 
19Midway School District of~ County v. Griffeath, 172 P. (2d) 
857 (Colorado, 1956). 
20 
Board of Public Instruction v. State, 171 So. (2d) 209 (Florida, 
1965). 
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dismissed and that he in fact had not quit. However, the Michigan 
Supreme Court held that the Tenure Commission was without authority to 
decide the case and that the board of education was authorized to appeal 
the case to the courts. 21 
In dismissing teachers, the board must not act hastily, not in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner, no matter how well convinced it may be 
that the teacher is not "working out." By doing so, a board may inad-
vertently act in such a manner as to render its decisions ineffective 
and void. Most teachers, if given the opportunity, will attempt to 
improve themselves, when it is clear that the board is acting in good 
faith. 
Immorality and Misconduct 
The peculiar relationship between the teacher and his pupils is 
such that it is highly important that the character of the teacher be 
above reproach. It is well settled, therefore, that a teacher may be 
dismissed for immorality or misconduct. The Court of Appeals of 
Kentucky has said that both parents and pupils regard the teacher as an 
exemplar whose conduct might be followed by his pupils, and the law by 
necessary intendment demands that he should not engage in conduct which 
would invite criticism and suspicions of immorality. 22 Even charges of 
or reputation for immorality, alth~ugh not supported by full proof, 
might, in some cases, be sufficient ground for removal. Not merely 
good character, but good reputation, is essential to the greatest 
21School District of City of Benton Harbor v. Michigan State 
Tenure Commission, 126 N°:'w. (2d)102 (Mich., 1964:). 
22Gover v. Stovall ~ &:_, 35 S. W'"" (2d) 24: (Ky., 1931). 
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usefulness of the teacher in the schools. It requires no extended argu-
ment to convince one that a teacher upon whom rests a well-grounded 
suspicion of immorality cannot be an effective teacher of public school 
pupils. The board is not bound to form a judgment as to the truth or 
falsity of the charges. 
No clear definition is possible of those acts on the part of the 
teacher which may amount to immorality and, hence, constitute grounds 
for dismissal. In interpreting the meaning of the term immorality, the 
courts have been known to hold teachers to a stricter definition than is 
usually applicable to the acts of other citizens. The reason for this 
is obvious; the teacher is an example for the youth of the community, 
and his conduct is expected to be above reproach. Any deviation from 
the modes of the local community, or the accepted standards of behavior 
in its society, may subject the teacher to dismissal for immorality or 
moral turpitude. It is not necessary for a teacher to be found guilty 
of an immoral act; it is only necessary that the teacher's reputation 
23 be such as to embarrass the board. Since a teacher's reputation in 
the community is of prime importance, a board may dismiss a teacher who 
has "had a bad reputation," even though he may not be found guilty of 
a specific wrongful act. Where the board is of the opinion that the 
effectiveness of the teacher has been lowered, the court ruled that it 
should not interfere in the legitimate exercise of board discretion. 
"Drinking within the boundary of the schoolhouse and also offering 
such to the students" provided grounds for dismissal of a Wyoming teach-
er. The teacher charged that he had been illegally ~ismissed, and 
23 Watts v. Stewart School Board, 1/,i, L. Ed. (2d) 261 (Alaska, 1965). 
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sued for the salary due him. Said the Supreme Court of Wyoming, in 
ruling in favor of the board: "Even charges of or reputation for 
immorality, although not supported in full proof, might in some cases 
be sufficient ground for removal. Not merely good character but good 
reputation is essentia1.11 24 
In California, a teacher was found guilty of unprofessional con-
duct in that she distributed pamphlets entitled "Time to Resist" which 
condemned United Nation troops who fought in Korea as murderers, urged 
the youth of the United States to resist military service by choosing 
prison, extolling achievements of the Communist rule in North Korea, 
held up the American way of life to ridicule and contempt, and con-
demned and belittled the action of the United Nations in Korea. The 
court in upholding the Board of Education's decision to dismiss the 
teacher for unprofessional conduct stated: 
That the school authorities have the right and the duty 
to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their 
fitness to maintain the integrity of the school as a part of 
ordered society, cannot be denied. One's associates, past 
and present, as well as one's conduct, may properly be con-
sidered in determining fitness and loyalty. 25 
Therefore, dismissal for unprofessional conduct may be influenced 
somewhat by surrounding circumstances as illustrated by the following 
case: 
Shortly after Pearl Harbor, a Chicago teacher was dismissed for 
unprofessional conduct in the public schools. She had written a letter 
to a former student, who had failed to register under the Selective 
24 
Tracy v. School District~ 22, Sheridan County, 243 P. (2d) 
932 (Wyo., 1954). 
25Laguna Beach Unified School District of Orange County v. Lewis, 
304 P. (2d) 59 (Calif., 1956). 
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Service Act, congratulating him on his "courageous and idealistic 
stand," and stating that "you and others who take the same stand are 
the hope of America." The teacher was fully aware'of the Selective 
Service Act when she wrote the letter. The school board dismissed the 
teacher and she sought through court action to be reinstated to her 
position, asserting that her actions were not "cause for her removal." 
The court in upholding the school board's decision had this to say: 
••• We think the board was fully justified in finding 
that the teacher writing such a letter ought not to be per-
mi tte.d to continue as a teacher in the public schools.... It 
will be noted that when the teacher was dismissed by the 
board, the U. S. was engaged in a war with Japan. Certainly 
it was incumbent upon teachers, to display the proper 
patriotic attitude.26 
In Illinois, a teacher was dismissed for her outside activities 
when she appeared on the streets in an intoxicated condition. In up-
holding her dismissal, the court noted that there was no question of 
her competency as .a teacher, but her outside activities were grounds 
for her dismissal. The court in ruling said: 
It is plain the dismissal was not simply because plain-
tiff had consumed intoxicants. It is the opinion of the 
court that a teacher is some.thing of a leader to pupils of 
tender age, resulting in admiration and emulation, and that 
the board might properly fear the effect of social conduct 
in public not in keeping with the dignity and leadership 
they desire from teachers.27 
Hamilton states that when teachers enter the teaching profession, 
"28 
they legally surrender a measure of their freedom of action. A 
26 
Joyce v. Board of Education of Chicago, 60 N.E. (2d) 431 
(Ill., 1945). 
27scott v. Board of Education 2.f. Alton, 156 N.E. (2d) 1 (Ill., 
1959) • 
28Robert R. Hamilton, The Bi-Weekly School Law Letter (December 23, 
1954). 
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teacher may be legally free to be immoral, so long as he violates no 
law, but he is not legally or educationally free to be a teacher and 
engage in immoral conduct. 
In Wisconsin the courts have held that detailed discussion of sex 
matters was improper conduct for a teacher and sufficient grounds to 
' t'f h' d' . 1 29 Jus 1 y 1s 1sm1ssa. 
Refusal to Obey Rules and Orders of the Board 
Boards of education have expressed or implied powers to adopt and 
enforce reasonable rules and regulations for the government of the 
schools of the district. Any failure of a teacher to obey them is 
adequate grounds for dismissal. Rules must be reasonable and not arbi-
}rary, and must have a reasonable relation to the management of the 
schools. If these conditions are met, the courts are not inclined to 
inquire into the wisdom of the rules. 
Failure or refusal to obey reasonable rules and orders of the 
board is one form of insubordination and a teacher may be dismissed 
therefore under the statutes of the several states. Since reasonable-
ness and unreasonableness is a question of fact, the final determina-
tion is in the courts. Very few cases holding rules or orders 
unreasonable have come to the attention of the courts, but there are 
numerous ones in which rules are held reasonable. This could indicate 
that there is little disposition by courts to declare rules 
unreasonable. 
29state v. Board of School Directors of Milwaukee, 111 N. W. (2d) 
198 (Wis., 1961). - -
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An illustration of the authority of the school boards to enforce 
reasonable rules and regulations is found in an Oklahoma case. At the 
opening of the school term, the superintendent of schools assigned, as 
he was authorized to do, a teacher to teach the fourth and fifth grades. 
The teacher agreed to the assignment and entered upon the discharge of 
her duties for about four days; then without authority or consent, she 
peremptorily took charge of the seventh grade and advised the superin-
tendent that she would only teach that grade. After consultation with 
the county superintendent, the superintendent endeavored to persuade 
the teacher to perform her duties as teacher of the fourth and fifth 
grades, which she refused to do. Therefore, because she had failed to 
observe the rules and regulations of the district board, her dismissal 
was entered. 
The contract spec;i.fically provided that the teacher "agrees in all 
things to observe the rules and regulations of the district board. 1130 
In California, the Board of Education of San Francisco adopted a 
resolution requiring teachers to reside within the city and county 
during the term of their employment. A teacher who resided across the 
bay in Berkeley brought act;i.on to enjoin the enforcement of the rule. 
The court, in denying the injunction, had this to say: 
In contemplation of the fact that the teacher stands in 
~ parentis, .that it .may become her duty to devote her 
time to the wel.fare of individual pupils even outside of her 
school hours, that the hurrying for boats or trains cannot 
be regarded as conducive to the highest efficiency on the 
part of the teacher, that tardiness may result from delays 
or obstr11ctions in the transportation which a non-resident 
teacher must use, and finally, as has been said, that the 
I benefit o.f pupils and resulting benefits to their parents 
30consolidated School District No.~ Bryan County v. Millis, 139 
P. (2d) 183 (Okla., 19~3). 
and to the community at large, and not the benefit of teach-
ers, is the reason for the creation and support of the public 
schools, 1 (Bates v. Board of Education, 72 Poe. 907), all 
these, and many more considerations not necessary to detail, 
certainly make the resolution in question a reasonable exer-
cise of the power of the Board of Education.31 
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On the other hand, if a board makes an unreasonable rule or rules 
in excess of its authority, the teacher is not bound thereby. Whether 
a rule is reasonable or unreasonable is a matter to be decided by the 
courts. It was stated thus by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma: 
In the absence of a stipulation to the contrary in the con-
tract of employment, a school teacher is not required to 
perform the substantial janitor work, such as carrying the 
fuel, making the fires and preparing the school building 
for occupancy during school hours; it is the duty of the 
school board, under such circumstances to not only furnish 
the building and equipment, but also to have the building 
made sufficiently comfortable and habitable that the teach-
er can discharge the duties she has contracted to perform.32 
Academic Freedom 
Perhaps no problem has created more resentment among educators 
than attempts to control what they shall teach and their freedom of 
thought and expression both inside and outside the classroom. The prob-
lem arises most frequently in colleges and universities, but the public 
schools have not escaped. That there should be complete freedom for all 
teachers to teach anything that may suit their fancy, discuss any matter 
they may choose in any class, or advocate doctrines, which according to 
the times, are considered pernicious, would not be contended. It is 
inevitable that among the tens of thousands of teachers in the schools, 
a few will be found who will abuse what is commonly called academic 
31stuart v. Board of Education, 118 Pac. 712 (Calif., 1911). 
32 
School District~ 25 v. ~' 233 P. ~27 (Okla. 1925). 
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freedom. These should be eliminated from the school. The difficulty 
lies in determining what constitutes such abuse. 33 
Legal relief for encroachments upon academic freedom is very inad-
equate. Since a teacher is an employee and not an officer, he may be 
discharged for any or no reason at the end of the contract period. If 
discharged during the contract period, the only recourse is an action 
for damages since the courts will not specifically enforce personal ser-
vice contracts. Furthermore, it has been observed in other connections 
that there is decided reluctance by courts to interfere with the exer-
cise of wide discre~ion by school boards. 
The only real relief is that offered by legislation such as tenure 
laws, but. even that leaves much to be desired. 
The majority of discharge cases involving the principle of aca-
demic freedom do not pass upon the problem specifically. The real 
question is often hidden under some other charge such as incompetency, 
immorality, lack of cooperation, failure to observe rules, or other 
similar charges, or as indicated above, by mere refusing to interfere 
with the discretion of the boards. In still other cases in which the 
question is raised, there are other charges included, and the discharge 
is upheld upon the latter, or at least, the emphasis is placed 
thereon. 34 
3311Academic Freedom and the Law," ~ ~ Journal, 46 ( 1937) 670. 
34Bump v. Union High School District, 24 P. (2d) 330 (Oregon, 
1933). 
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Remedies of the Teacher for Wrongful Dismissal 
If the statutes expressly provide that a teacher may not be dis-
missed without a hearing, the statute must be compiled with strictly, 
and deviation from the statutory procedure will render the discharge 
invalid. Conversely, if the laws of the particular state permit dis-
charge at the will of the board, no hearing is necessary. In states in 
which the statutes provide that dismissal may be for cause only, or 
certain grounds for dismissal are specifically set out, that weight of 
authority is that a hearing is necessary even though a hearing is not 
specifically provided for in the law. 
It is well settled in the law that anyone wishing to find relief 
must first exhaust all administrative avenues open to him such as.· 
appeal to the superintendent or other designated officials. Failing 
to obtain relief, one then may appeal to the courts. A case which arose 
in Minnesota concerning a teacher with a valid contract opened a letter 
one day from the board of education stating she had been expelled as a 
teacher. Minnesota law requires no hearing for nontenured teachers, and 
no hearing was provided. The teacher sued for the balance due under the 
contract. The court in ruling for the plaintiff had this to say: 
The statutes do not provide 'a procedure for the removal of a 
nontenure teacher 1 for cause.' However, even though no 
method of procedure is set out in the statutes for the guid-
ance of the school board, a teacher is, nevertheless, en-
titled to notice of charges made against him and a fair 
hearing before an impartial board.JS 
.The statutory procedure of giving notice to the teacher of the 
alleged grounds for his dismissal must be followed. The notice must be 
35Kuehn v. School Di" stri· ct .~o. 70, 22 "' W ("d. )' "'20 (Mi· 19· 1·8·) ""· · • .::. .::. nn~ , '± • 
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in writing and it must be served upon or otherwise given to the teacher. 
Unless some other mode of service is expressly authorized, as by regis-
tered or certified mail, personal delivery of the notice is contem-
plated. The charges must give fair notice of their essential nature. 
If they are not specifically specific to enable the teacher to prepare 
his case, he should be able to obtain the particulars by a timely 
36 demand. 
The board may not circumvent the statutory procedures by giving 
only the appearance of following hearings. The teacher is entitled to 
a fair hearing at which all the evidence used against him is presented 
and he has an opportunity to rebut it. Unless a statute so requires, a 
board need not adopt formal procedural rules for the conduct of a hear-
ing.37 Fair hearing also requires that the teacher be given a reason-
able opportunity to present his evidence. This matter was before a 
Michigan court under the Michigan tenure law, which provides that a 
hearing with testimony under oath is necessary before a teacher can be 
removed. The teacher indicated that he had about one hundred witnesses 
to present. The board of education, however, chose to hold the meeting 
in a room seating only twenty-five persons. The Michigan Supreme Court 
in ruling that the teacher had not had a proper hearing and that the 
dismissal was illegal had this to say: 
••• We note that under C. L. 1948 38.121, Stat. Ann. 15.2021, 
a teacher has the right to appeal from the action of the 
school board, and that the conduct of the appeal before the 
commission shall be the same as provided in article 4, 
36wade v. Granite Community Unit School District No • ..2., 218 N. E. 
(2d) 19----riT1., 1966). 
J7Moffett v. Calcasien Parish School Board, 179 So. (2d) 537 
(La., 1965). 
section 4, of the act. Under article 4, section 4, of the 
act the school board has the power to 'subpoena witnesses on 
its own motion or at the request of the teacher against whom 
charges had been made. We conclude that under article 4, 
section 4, of the act, the commission has the right to sub-
poena witnesses. And, if they have the right to subpoena 
witnesses, they have the right to hear the evidence.38 
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Strict rules of evidence need not be followed at the hearing, but 
the evidence relied upon by the board to support its findings should be 
sufficient, relevant, and material so that a reasonable mind could 
accept it as adequate to support the conclusions reached. On this 
point a Minnesota court commented: 
••• It is true that an administrative body acting quasi-
judicially is not bound by procedural strict rules which cir-
cumscribe the action of a court, and that incompetent 
evidence is not fatal to its determination. Nevertheless, 
when a teacher's job is at stake, a just concern for fair 
play would require that the evidence which is calculated to 
support the charge should be relevant and have probative 
value. The board should not have to find support for its 
determination in hearsay or to make deductions from opinions 
and views relating to technical or theoretical principles. 
If there is substance to the charge that the teacher's con-
duct and want of competence requires her dismissal, there 
ought to be substantial evidence of it which could be estab-
lished in a fraction of the time consumed in the present 
proceedings. 39 
It h,as been said that the measure of damages in an action for 
breach of contract "is wages which would have been paid under the con-
tract less any sum actually earned or might have been earned by the 
teacher in exercise of reasonable diligence in seeking and obtaining 
other similar employment."W A teacher who has been wrongfully 
38 Rehberg v. Board of Education£!. Melvildale, 77 N. W. (2d) 131 
(Mich., 1956). 
39Morey v. School Board of Independent School District~ 492, 
136 N. W. (2d) 105 (Minn., 1965)-.-
WMiller v. South Bend Special School District ~ 1., 124 N& W. (2d) 
475 (North Dakota, 1963-) .-
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dismissed is under a duty to mitigate damages by using reasonable dili-
gence in finding other comparable employment. In a court action by a 
teacher for loss of earnings, the burden is upon the school district to 
show that the teacher failed to exercise reasonable diligence in seeking 
other employment to mitigate his damages. In so ruling the court had 
this to say: 
The school district must assume the burden of proving that a 
teacher has failed to exercise reasonable diligence in seek-
ing employment to minimize his damages on a breach of his 
contract by the school district.41 
In order to be made whole completely, a wrongfully dismissed or 
suspended teacher should also be allowed to recover for items other than 
loss of salary. In a California case it was ruled: 
In a case in which a local board of education suspends a 
teacher upon charges which the board fails to establish as 
proper, pursuant to statutory requirements, the teacher is 
entitled to reinstatement, to full salary from the day of 
suspension, including retirement benefits, and to interest 
from the dates upon which such salary payments were 
due •••• 42 
As previously stated, the teacher's duty to mitigate damages by 
seeking other similar employment must normally be considered. Any 
earning du.ring the period of suspension or dismissal ordinarily are 
deductible. 43 
41Mier v. Foster School District No. _g, 146 N,._ W. (2d) 882 (North 
Dakota, 1966). 
42Mass v. Board of Education of San Francisco Unified School 
DistricT:"3"94 P. (2d) 579 (Calif., 1964-Y:-




A summary of the various causes for dismissal enumerated in the 
various state statutes would, no doubt, be rather lengthy. In addition, 
boards of education list a variety of rules and regulations, the viola-
tion of which are considered grounds for dismissal. 
It is established that the dismissal of a teacher by a board of 
education is not final and conclusive; an appeal may be carried to a 
higher authority. Not only does cause for dismissal differ in various 
states, different methods are prescribed whereby a party must exhaust 
his remedies within the state school system before he may have access 
to the courts. Where statutory provisions concerning administrative 
remedies have been enacted, the courts generally insist that a party 
exhaust these remedies before resorting to litigation. 
When an appeal is taken to the court of an aggrieved teacher, the 
court will, as a rule, make a determination of three things: (1) Did 
the board of education act within the scope of authority? (2) Did the 
board follow prescribed statutory procedure? and (J) Did the board 
have some reasonable basis for its action? 44 
A valid contract between the teacher and the school district which 
employs him is essential to the existence of any mutual obligation be-
tween them. It is the board, and not the superintendent, who has the 
authority to employ teachers, and the superintendent may legally only 
recommend teacher appointment. It should be noted that a teacher is 
not legally employed until he possesses a legal certificate. Art. invalid 
44 
Edwards, p. 504. 
contract between the school district and a teacher usually may be 
ratified and made valid by permitting the teacher to enter upon his 
duties. 
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From the early beginning of the public school system in the United 
States, the higher courts of the various states have been asked to make 
a judicial determination of controversies ensuing from problems pertain-
ing to public schools and school personnel. Unless it appears that the 
act of a school agency pas been unconstitutional or illegal or unless 
an action has amounted to an abuse of the power vested in the school 
authority the courts will not interfere with the discretionary action 
of school officials. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The public school system of education in the United States has its 
basis in the law. Although administered on a local basis, education is 
in legal theory a function of the state. The primary purpose for which 
public schools are created and supported is not for the benefit of the 
individual but, rather, to provide an educational citizenry for the 
benefit of society. 
There are basically four general types of school law. They are: 
constitutional provisions, legislative enactments, administrative regu-
lations, and case law. The first three constitute that which is termed 
written law and the fourth, which consists of judicial decisions, is 
termed the unwritten law. 
Written law provides effective guidelines for public school teach-
ers and administrators, and it has a certain amount of rigidity about 
it. However, it is impossible to establish written law for every con-
ceivable situation. The ever-changing environment in which one lives 
creates the need for new laws and new rules. In today's society, the 
decisions of courts cover such gaps. 
The amount of legislation, the number of recent court cases, and 
current literature tend ,to indicate widespread interest and controversy 
related to teacher activities. These sources appear to identify those 
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problems associated with teachers'rights and responsibilities, academic 
freedom, and dismissal of teachers. 
To help cope with the many problems that face them daily, boards of 
education and school administrators have found it necessary to adopt 
policies, enact rules and regulations, and take certain actions regard-
ing school personnel. In most instances these actions require indi-
viduals to relinquish to some degree their personal freedom for the 
general welfare of others as well as the general well being of the 
school. 
Lacking specific .statutes to guide their actions, school boards 
often formulate rules and regulations that are challenged as being un-
reasonable, arbitrary, or illegal. Extreme instances of disagreement 
usually end· in the courts. 
Generally, when the courts are called upon to adjudicate a dis-
agreement, they are reluctant to interfere with the operation and man-
agement of the school by local authorities unless there is a clear abuse 
of authority. 
In making a decision concerning a case, the courts give judicial 
cognizance to the opinions of other courts in their jurisdiction and 
other jurisdictions in similar cases. The courts will consider the 
circumstances of each case in the light of the authority of the school 
officials to enact the rule, the constitutionality of the rule, and the 
reasonableness of the action taken. The courts will not pass upon the 
wisdoms or expediency of the ~ul~ or regulation in question. 
The position of a public-school teacher is created by legislatures 
directly and by state constitutions indirectly in provisions requiring 
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the legislature to establish and maintain public schools. The powers 
and duties of public school teachers are fixed by law to a large extent. 
The profession is limited to those who hold evidence of that legal 
qualification in the form of a certificate, license, or credential. The 
method of appointing establish for teachers a legal status. 
Any conclusion to be drawn on the basis of cases reviewed must be 
limited by the influence of earlier precedents, judicial and statutory 
differences, and the certainty that factual situations yet to arise will 
pose different legal questions. Within these limitations the following 
general conclusions concerning recent development in legal aspects of 
the rights and responsibilities of classroom teachers can be drawn: 
1. A teacher may not legally recover salary for services rendered 
unless he has a valid certificate at the time his services are 
performed; however, in some states, a teacher legally may be 
employed before he receives the certificate, but in all states 
he must possess a legal certificate before teaching services 
are performed. 
2. A valid contract between the teacher and the school district is 
essential to the existence of any mutual obligations between 
them. Generally, the school board, and not the superintendent, 
has the authority to hire teachers. The superintendent may 
legally only recommend teachers for appointment. 
J. An invalid contract between the teacher and a school district 
may be ratified and made valid by permitting the teacher to 
enter upon his duties. In such case, the ratified contract is 
as legal as if it had been valid in the first instance. 
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4. Generally, reasonable rules and regulations of the board of 
education are part of the teacher's contract. This includes 
rules passed after the contracts are signed as well as those 
in effect when contract was consummated. 
5. Teachers are legally obligated to perform a reasonable amount 
of 11 outside 11 duties under contract even though the contract 
does not expressly state such duties. 
6. Both the teacher and school districts may be held liable for 
breach of their respective contractual obligations. 
7. Teachers as individuals may be held liable for their torts. 
Liability may be imposed upon teachers for failure to exercise 
adequate supervision over the pupils in their classroom and on 
the playground. Teachers may also be held liable for injury 
or damage caused by a pupil while on an errand for the 
teacher. 
8. "Save harmless" laws have been enacted in some states to per-
mit school districts to pay the cost of any lawsuit or judg-
ment which teachers may incur as a result of negligence in 
their position. Teacher organizations should encourage the 
enactment of such legislation in all states. 
9. In most states, the law specifically enumerates the grounds 
upon which boards of education may discharge teachers. The 
usual statutory grounds for teacher dismissal are incompe-
tency, neglect of duty, immorality and misconduct, and 
11 other good and just cause." Boards of education may dis-
charge teachers for adequate cause when statutes do not 
provide specific grounds for teacher dismissal. 
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10. In practically all states, a teacher is entitled to a hearing 
before he may be dismissed from his position. 
11. A wrongfully discharged teacher is expected to seek another 
; ' ' position in order to mitigate the damages which the district may incur as a result of wrongful dismissal. 
12. The basic policy of tenure laws is to protect the educational 
interest of the state and not to place teachers in a favorable 
position. "Permanent" tenure laws are not, in fact, permanent. 
The educational interest of the state dictates such change and 
teachers have no legal remedy against such change. Tenure 
laws do not entitle a teacher to any particular salary or 
position within the school system. 
13. With certain limitations, a teacher is legally entitled to 
engage in political activities. Teachers legally may join 
unions. However, they may not legally strike. 
1~. School districts are corporations and may sue and be sued on 
their contractual obligations. However, unless the statute 
of the particular state expressly permits it, a school dis-
trict is not liable for injury or damage caused by the negli-
gent act of teachers or other district employees. The 
immunity from tort liability which a district enjoys does not 
extend to teachers or other district employees. 
15. Defamation of character is actionable only when special injury 
can be shown. Therefore, it is only when a teacher is un-
justly accused that action should be considered. 
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16. Generally, courts have held that teachers'reports to princi-
pals or other school officials are privileged communications 
if not written with malicious intent. 
Recommendations 
Al though it presently appears that the court's concept o:£, reason-
able rules and regulations in the area of teachers'rights and responsi-
bilities tend to mirror the reflections of local school authorities, 
boards of education and school administrators should not become compla-
cent by these broad generalities and principles. Administration and 
school boards must become well informed about the factual situations in 
their communities, the statutes, and the effect of their policies when 
contemplating rules for school personnel. 
Current nationwide unrest, especially among teachers, the inter-
est in civil rights and formation of teacher unions have made the task 
of school administrators more complex and complicated. No longer may 
school authorities formulate rules and regulations simply because it is 
desirable. Instead they would be better advised to have some tangible 
evidence that a problem actually exists and their rules and regulations 
will produce desirable solutions. 
In view of these considerations the following recommendations are 
made for the benefit of those persons concerned with the management 
and control of public schools. These suggestions are somewhat subject-
ive and it is acknowledged that they will undoubtedly meet with some 
disagreement. Nevertheless, it is contended that they are based upon 
legal principles as well as principles of sound school administration. 
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1. Teachers must become aware that contracts must conform to all 
the gener~l requirements of contracts in general. That is, 
it must be between competent parties, supported by adequate 
consideration, be sufficiently definite to indicate what the 
parties intended and conform to any special statutory provi-
sions that may be applicable. 
2. Teachers should become familiar with the tenure laws of their 
respective state. The courts have construed tenure laws gen-
erally in favor of teachers and liberally, to effect the gen-
eral purpose of the legislation, which was to improve 
education. They have not in any case interpreted tenure to 
mean a warranty of teaching jobs under all circumstances, but 
have permitted dismissal for justifiable causes. 
J. The business of education has become so large that it is unfair 
to impose on public school teachers the risks involved in their 
respective positions. 11 Save harmless" statutes for the pro-
tection of teachers should be enacted by each state legisla~ 
ture. These laws require or permit districts to pay judgments 
recovered against teachers. They also permit or require the 
district to defend teachers in suits against them for damages 
caused by their negligent acts while performing their teaching 
duties. Teachers should not be harassed by the possibility of 
judgments arising out of the conduct of their work. 
4. An objective view on the legality of religious instruction in 
the public schools, in the light of constitutional and stat-
utory provisions and the judicial interpretation placed upon 
these provisions indicated convincingly that such instruction 
14:1 
is limited. ln fact, any instruction or related activity in 
the public school which contains sectarian influences is 
illegal. Also, any activity which aids one or more religious 
sects, or prefers one religious doctrine is illegal. Teachers 
must substitute moral and spiritual values for religious in-
struction. Stressing moral and spiritual values in education 
does not necessarily preclude friendly relations between reli-
gion and public education. This can and should be done, how-
ever, without the injection of sectarianism or indoctrination 
of specific religious beliefs. 
5. Teachers must become aware that there are some activities 
outside the classroom that are subject to reasonable regula-
tions associated with the welfare of the school. It is gen-
erally agreed that there are some types of conduct that would 
render them unfit to teach. However, statutes must be substan-
tially complied with in the dismissal of teachers; otherwise, 
dismissal will not be upheld, even if it is for justifiable 
reasons. Teachers, as well as boards of education, are re-
quired to follow the designated procedures. 
6. Teachers should acquire an understanding of school law as 
related to the areas in which they function. Principals, 
supervisors, and other professional personnel should have a 
knowledge of the legal principles derived from court decisions. 
Studying court cases in their entirety would not only enhance 
understanding of the law, but would likely develop a keener 
appreciation of today's judicial system. 
It should be emphasized once again that public schools owe their 
very existence to the society that created them and that they were 
created primarily for the benefit of such society rather than individual 
benefits. To achieve this goal for which they were established, boards 
of education must have reasonable rules and regulations under which to 
operate. Someone must attempt to determine the amount of personal 
liberty that may be allowed its employees without interfering with the 
efficient and proper conduct of the entire system. This is primarily 
the problem that confronts the legislature, the board of education and 
the school administrator in adopting statutes, formulating policies 
and rules and regulations pertaining to its employees. 
Teachers should look to their state laws for their duties and 
responsibilities. Ignorance of the law does not excuse one from per-
formance of duty. It is the responsibility of the teacher to ascertain 
for himself just what his statutory duties are and to conform to all 
prescriptions of state law, state board regulations, and local school 
board rules. 
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TABLE OF TERMS 
Action. An ordinary proceeding in a court by which one party prosecutes 
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress 
of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense. In common lan-
guage, a suit or lawsuit. 
Allegation .. Statement in pleadings, setting forth what the party expects 
to prove .. 
Allege., To state, assert, or charge; to make an allegation .. 
Appellant,. The party who makes an appeal from one court to another. 
Arbitrary,. Not supported by fair C~!US~ and without reason given. 
Citations. References to law books .. A citation includes the book where 
the reference is found, the volume number 9 and section or page 
numbero 
Civil Actione One brought to recover some civil right, or to obtain 
redress for some wronge 
Codeo A compilation of statutes 9 scientifically arranged into chapters 9 
subheadings 9 and sections 9 with a table of contents and index. 
Common Lawo As here used 9 legal principles derived from usage and cus-
tom, or from court decisions affirming such usages and customso 
Concurring Opinione 
majority of the 
ent reasons for 
An opinion written by a judge who agrees with the 
court as to the decisions in a case 9 but has differ-
arriving at that decisiono 
Damages" Pecuniary compensation or indemnity which may be recovered in 
court by the person who has suffered loss or injury to his person, 
property1 or right through the unlawful act, omission, or negligence 
of another,. 
De facto® Actually; in fact; in deed. A term used to denote a thing 
actually done0 
Defendant® The party against whom relief or recovery is sought in a 
court action .. 
Defense,. That which is offered and alleged by the defendant as a reason 
in law or fact why the plaintiff should not recover. 
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Dissenting opinion. The opinion in which a judge announces his dissent 
from the conclusion held by the majority of the court. 
Due Process. The exercise of the powers of government in such a way as 
to protect individual rights. 
Enjoin. To require a person, by writ or injunction from a court of 
equity, to perform, or to abstain or desist from, some act. 
Injunction. A prohibitive writ issued by a court of equity forbidding 
the defendant to do some act he is threatening, or forbidding him 
to continue doing some act which is injurious to the plaintiff and 
cannot be adequately redressed by an action at law. 
Liability. The state of being bound or obligated in law or justice to 
do, pay, or make good something; legal responsibility. 
Majority opinion. The statement of reasons for the views of the major-
ity of .the members of the bench in a decision to which some of them 
disagree. 
Mandamus. A writ to compel a public body or its officers to perform a 
dutyo 
Mandate. A command, order, or direction, written or oral, which court 
is authorized to give and person is bound to obey. 
Mandatoryo Compulsory, referring to a command for which disregard or 
disobedience is unlawfulo 
Permissiveo That which may be doneo 
Petitiono Written application or prayer to the court for the redress of 
a wrong or the grant of a privilege or licensee 
Plaintiffo Person who brings an action; one who sues by filing a 
complainto 
Prayer. The part of the petition in which petitioner requests the court 
to grant relief soughto 
Precedento A decision considered as furnishing an example or authority 
for an identical or similar case afterward arising on a similar 
question of law. 
Reliefo The redress or assistance which a complaint seeks from the 
court, not properly applied to money damages. 
Res adjudicatao A matter judicially decidedo 
Res ispa loquituso The thing or act speaks for itself. 
Respondento The defendant in an action; a party adverse to an appellant 
in an action which is appealed to a higher court. 
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Respondent superior. Employer is liable for the torts of his employees. 
Restraint. To prohibit from action; to enjoin. 
Right. A power or privilege in one person against another. 
Save harmless law. A law that provides that judgment obtained against 
an employee is payable out of school funds under certain 
circumstances. 
Statute. Acts of the legislature. 
Ultra vius. A term used to express the action of a corporation which is 
beyond the power conferred upon it by its charter, or by the 
statutes under which it was instituted. 
Void. Ineffectual, having no legal force or binding effect; said of a 
contract, a defective instrument which can be cured by ratification 
by the one who could have avoided it. 
Writ of mandamus. An order which issues from a court of superior juris-
diction, and is directed to a private or municipal corporation, or 
any of its officers, or to an inferior court commanding the per-
formance of a particular act therein specified or directing the 
restoration of the complainant to rights or privileges of which he 
has been illegally deprived. 
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